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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses four different topics in labor economics. In the main introduction, a short 
summary of all results is given. This abstract gives a very short overview of all topics that are covered 
in this dissertation: Chapter 1 focuses on estimating the effect of an extension of maternity leave from 
18 to 36 months on young women’s participation in job-related training. It is shown that maternity 
leave extension negatively affects job-related training for young women, especially when focusing on 
employer-arranged training. In Chapter 2 the effect of a reduction of sick pay on absence and on 
health-related outcomes is evaluated. Results show that a reduction of sick pay reduced absence from 
work significantly, while there is no effect on subjective health indicators. In Chapter 3 the 
relationship between overweight and wages is estimated. Results indicate discrimination against 
overweight women, since they receive significantly lower wages than women of healthy weight. 
Chapter 4 studies maternal labor supply and how it is related to childhood overweight, especially when 
taking birth order and age differences between siblings into account. Findings indicate that childhood 
overweight is positively related to the amount of hours worked by the mother. Moreover, this 
relationship is more pronounced for only children, lastborns and children with large age differences to 
their siblings. 
Keywords: policy evaluation, discrimination, overweight 
 
 
 
 
 
Kurzzusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Arbeitsökonomik. In der 
Haupteinleitung werden die einzelnen Kapitel und die Ergebnisse kurz zusammengefasst. In dieser 
Kurzzusammenfassung wird ein Überblick über die einzelnen Kapitel und die darin enthaltenen 
Themen gegeben. In Kapitel 1 wird eine Reform zur Verlängerung des Erziehungsurlaubes im 
Hinblick auf mögliche negative Konsequenzen für junge Frauen am Arbeitsmarkt evaluiert. Es zeigt 
sich, dass durch die Verlängerung der Erziehungsurlaubszeiten junge Frauen signifikant weniger 
Weiterbildung bekommen, vor allem wenn es um Weiterbildung auf Betreiben des Arbeitgebers hin 
geht. Kapitel 2 evaluiert eine Reform zur Kürzung der Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall. Es zeigt 
sich, dass die gekürzte Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfall die Fehlzeiten signifikant reduziert hat, 
während sie dabei keinen Einfluss auf das subjektive Gesundheitsempfinden gab. In Kapitel 3 geht es 
um den Zusammenhang zwischen Übergewicht und Löhnen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen einen 
signifikanten Zusammenhang zwischen Gewicht und Löhnen bei Frauen, wobei es diesen 
Zusammenhang bei Männern nicht zu geben scheint. Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich mit dem 
Arbeitsangebot von Müttern und wie es mit Übergewicht bei den Kindern zusammenhängt. Es zeigt 
sich, dass Arbeitsstunden der Mutter positiv korreliert sind mit der Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass das Kind 
übergewichtig ist. Dieser Zusammenhang wird stärker bei Einzelkindern, Letztgeborenen und Kinder 
die eine große Altersdifferenz zu ihren Geschwistern haben.  
Schlagwörter: Politikevaluation, Diskriminierung, Übergewicht 
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Main Introduction 
This dissertation consists of four chapters that are separate empirical research projects 
supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) as is part of the research initiative 
‘Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labour Markets’. The four chapters cover various aspects of 
empirical labor economics. While Chapter 1 and 2 are on policy evaluation of labor market 
reforms (both co-authored with Patrick Puhani) the remaining chapters study the economics 
of obesity, focusing on discrimination (Chapter 3) and maternal labor supply (Chapter 4). All 
research project focus on Germany and use German datasets; nevertheless, results are set in 
contrast with evidence from other countries in order to get an international perspective. In this 
introductory part, a short summary of all four chapters is given. 
In Chapter 1, three representative individual-level datasets for West Germany are used 
to estimate the effect of an extension of maternity leave from 18 to 36 months on young 
women’s participation in job-related training. Since only young women of childbearing age 
are affected by the reform, difference-in-differences identification strategies are used to 
identify a causal effect of the reform on young women’s training participation. Results 
indicate that maternity leave extension negatively affects job-related training for young 
women - even if they do not have children - especially when the focus is on employer-
arranged training. There is tentative evidence that young women partly compensated for this 
reduction in employer-arranged training by increasing training on their own initiative. 
Chapter 2 evaluates the effects of a reduction in sick pay from 100 to 80% of the 
wage. Unlike previous literature, apart from absence from work, this study also considers 
effects on doctor/hospital visits and on subjective health indicators. Moreover, both switch-on 
and switch-off effects are estimated, because the reform was repealed two years later. Results 
show that the reform reduced the annual number of absent days by two days. Quantile 
regression reveals higher point estimates (both in absolute and relative terms) at higher 
quantiles, meaning that the reform predominantly reduced long durations of absence. In terms 
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of health, the reform reduced the average number of days spent in hospital by almost half a 
day, but there is no robust evidence for negative effects on health outcomes or perceived 
liquidity constraints.  
Chapter 3 estimates the relationship between overweight and wages with a large 
German dataset and finds that lower wages for obese women are likely to be due to 
discrimination. Obese women earn 2.4 percent lower wages than women having a BMI in the 
recommended range, while women who are in the top 10 percent of the body mass index get 
4.3 percent lower wages than thinner women. The focus of this chapter is on whether these 
differences in wages are due to reduced productivity of overweight women or due to 
discrimination against them. These two hypotheses are tested using four different subgroup 
designs: I test whether gender-composition of coworkers plays a role and if contact to 
customers or coworkers matters when it comes to wages of overweight women. Moreover, I 
divide the sample into employed and self-employed women and into young and older women 
to test which group faces lower wages when overweight. Results of these subgroup 
estimations clearly support the discrimination hypothesis. 
In Chapter 4, the correlation between maternal employment and overweight children is 
analyzed. Using German Micro Census data, it is clearly shown that there exists a strong 
relationship between the mother’s working activities and childhood overweight. Children of 
mothers in a fulltime employment have an up to 3.2 percentage points higher probability to be 
overweight. Moreover, it is found that birth order and age differences between siblings are 
significantly related to the probability of being overweight. Only children and lastborns have 
a higher probability to be overweight than firstborns or middleborns if the mother is working. 
Furthermore, the relationship between maternal employment and overweight children is 
stronger for children with large age difference to their siblings. 
Chapter 1   
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1.1 Introduction to Chapter 1 
Most industrialized countries have some form of maternal leave policy that effectively 
grants employment protection to women around childbirth. Arguments in favor of this 
employment protection refer to the well-being of both young children and their mothers. From 
a labor perspective, employment protection through maternity leave might increase the 
attachment of mothers to their employer or the labor force in general. However, it may also 
have the opposite effect in that maternity leave combined with maternity benefits can be seen 
as a subsidy to leave the labor market temporarily with potential long-term consequences.  
Whereas previous studies on maternity leave with employment and wages as outcome 
variables have frequently discussed the role of human capital accumulation and depreciation, 
we know of no study relating human capital investments like training directly to maternity 
leave.1 Therefore, in this paper, we estimate the effect of prolonged maternity leave on the 
human capital investments of women of working and childbearing age. To this end, we 
exploit the natural experiment of a 1992 extension in the employment protection (maternity 
leave) period in Germany from 18 to 36 months, which propelled Germany to the top position 
in the ranking of legislatively mandated maternity leave durations among industrialized 
countries.2 To assess the effect of this reform on the human capital investments of young 
women workers, we draw on three individual-level datasets, all of which ask information on 
job-related training for women and men of different age groups.  
It is well-established empirically that women are generally less attached to the labor 
force than men and that they receive less job-related training. For example, Barron, Black and 
                                                 
1
 Present discounted value of earnings, of which wage profiles and employment histories are major ingredients, 
might be the most appropriate outcome variable for the financial impact of maternity leave. However, 
measurement of the impacts on overall lifecycle wage and employment profiles is complicated by the frequent 
lack of long panel data. Conversely, impacts on wages at a certain point in the lifecycle may fail to take account 
of effects like steepened wage profiles. For example, when women have to bear a higher share of the costs of 
firm-specific training because of extended maternity leave, their early-career wages may fall, although 
Hashimoto’s (1981) model would predict that they will also reap a higher share of the returns later in their 
careers. Thus, without data on lifecycle wage profiles, estimates with wages as the outcome might be difficult to 
interpret. 
2 See http://www.childpolicyintl.org/issuebrief/issuebrief5table1.pdf 
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Loewenstein (1993) show that U.S. workers with weaker attachment to the labor market are 
allocated to jobs offering less training, while women are employed in positions associated 
with shorter durations of job-related training. Similarly, Royalty (1996) finds a significant 
relationship in the U.S. between the predicted probability of job turnover and the probability 
of receiving training. Thus, the fact that women change their job positions more frequently 
accounts for about one fourth of the gender gap in training. For Britain, Green (1991) 
analyzes the differences in job-related training between young women and young men and 
between older women and older men. In comparison to young men, young women have less 
than half the chances of receiving training, although no differences are found between older 
women and older men.  
Although these studies do not explicitly relate maternity leave to the incidence of 
training for women, they implicitly raise the question of whether prolonged maternity leave 
might affect job-related training for young women. The effect on training might be negative 
because a very long maternity leave reduces a young woman’s labor market attachment, at 
least for the duration of the leave. As a consequence, employers should be less likely to invest 
in young women’s human capital and place them in career paths with less training. 
Theoretically, the opposite effect might also prevail: if employers are forced to reemploy a 
woman even after a long leave, they might make the best of the situation and make up for lost 
human capital through intensified training. In the end, it is an empirical question which effect 
predominates. 
Previous research has analyzed the relationships between both maternity leave and 
labor force participation and maternity leave and wages. For instance, Waldfogel (1999) finds 
no negative effects for the Family and Medical Leave Act’s (FMLA) introduction of a 12-
week maternity leave on the wages or employment of young women. Hashimoto et al. (2004) 
also find the effects to be negligible. Indeed, Waldfogel (1998) suggests that maternity leave 
may even increase young women’s employment and wages, a finding corroborated by 
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Zveglich and van der Meulen Rodgers’s (2003) investigation of a similar reform in Taiwan 
that introduced an 8-week maternity leave. Nevertheless, these findings contrast with those of 
Lai and Masters (2005) for Taiwan, as well as with Gruber’s (1994) finding of a negative 
effect on wages of variations in maternity benefits across the U.S. They also contrast with the 
results of European studies that use reforms or other control group designs with longer 
maternity leave periods (up to three years). Among these, Ondrich et al. (2003) and Lalive 
and Zweimüller (2005), based on data from Germany and Austria, respectively, find that 
extended maternity leave results in short-run reductions in labor supply, while Schönberg and 
Ludsteck (2007) estimate negative long-run effects on wages in Germany. Likewise, in an 
analysis of policy variation in a panel of European countries, Ruhm (1998) reports increased 
employment due to parental leave (de facto maternity leave) but lower wages.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview 
of maternity leave regulations in Germany, especially with respect to the 1992 reform 
investigated here. Section 1.3 describes the datasets and the research design, after which 
Section 1.4 presents the difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of maternity leave 
extension on job-related training for women of childbearing age. Overall, these estimates 
show that the extension reduces training for young women, even for those who do not have 
children. A separate look at different types of training shows that it is particularly employer-
arranged training that has been reduced by the extension of maternity leave. Point estimates 
suggest that young women are in return trying to compensate the reduction in employer-
arranged training by increasing training on their own initiative. Section 1.5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
Chapter 1   
 17 
1.2 Maternity leave in Germany 
The duration of maternity leave as guaranteed by law in Germany exceeds that of 
other industrialized countries. For example, only since 1993 have U.S. federal regulations 
given women the right to take a 12-week maternity leave from work, even though many firms 
previously had their own maternity leave schemes. In contrast, as early as 1952 Germany 
enacted the first law protecting mothers (Mutterschutzgesetz) with a mandated 12-week 
maternity leave, which was extended in 1965 to 14 weeks (i.e., six weeks before and eight 
weeks after the predicted birth date). In 1979, this maternity leave duration was extended to 
an optional additional four months (decided on by the mother), and since 1986 the 
government has repeatedly increased the maximum duration of maternity leave (see Table 
1.1), with the largest increase being the 1992 extension of the maximum duration from 18 to 
36 months.3  
One intention of policy makers when increasing the maximum maternity leave 
duration was to protect women from unemployment following the birth of a child. Another 
was to improve the welfare of children. Since public childcare facilities for children younger 
than three years of age are not generally available in Germany (having only recently gained 
broader political support in the western part of the country), all women are supposed to be 
given the opportunity to care for their children for up to three years.  
By law, women also have the right to return to a job with their previous employer 
following maternity leave, not necessarily the same job but one comparable to that held before 
the leave. Nevertheless, not all women take this opportunity to return to the labor force. For 
example, Ondrich et al. (2003) and Weber (2004) find that a longer duration of maternity 
leave has a negative impact on the probability of women returning to the labor market, a 
finding also reported by Lalive and Zweimüller (2005) for Austria. For the U.S., Klerman and 
                                                 
3
 Since 1986, fathers have also been allowed to take part of the leave, but, according to the Federal Ministry of 
Families, Seniors, Women and Youth, only 1.5 percent of fathers make use of this opportunity.  
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Leibowitz (1990) show that because of better childcare facilities and less maternity leave 
protection, mothers return to the labor market sooner than in the past. Similarly, Waldfogel 
and Berger (2004) report that more than 80 percent of U.S. women working before childbirth 
return to work within 12 months after childbirth, while 55 percent return within 12 weeks 
after childbirth. In Germany, however, only around 55percent of all women working before a 
first birth return to the labor market within 24 months (Gustafsson et al. (1996)). 
Figure 1.1 shows calculations of the average maternity leave durations for women 
working before childbirth based on biographical information from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). In the first graph, we calculate the average period out of the labor 
force due to childbirth by adding the duration of formal maternity leave to the number of 
months after the leave until a mother was reemployed. In the second, we plot the average 
duration of maternity leave taken by mothers who return to work directly when the official 
maternity leave ends. The difference between the two lines is driven by the fact that in 
Germany many mothers stay at home with their children for many years, even after their 
maternity leave entitlement has run out. It should also be noted that we have very few 
observations (between 10 and 70 per year), so the numbers shown here have high sampling 
variance.  
For both graphs, we have censored all durations at 36 months (the maximum maternity 
leave duration in Germany since 1992) because we are only interested in how far maternity 
leave extension drives career breaks up to that limit. As it turns out, maternity leave extension 
is associated with an increase in average career break durations due to childbirth. Keeping in 
mind the sampling variance, career break durations increased from around 20 months in the 
late 1980s to around 25 months in the early 1990s. If we only consider mothers who return to 
work directly following the official maternity leave (which may be for shorter periods than 
the legal limit), we observe a sharper increase in career breaks due to maternity leave, from 
around 5 to 10 months in the 1980s to between 15 and 20 months (and over 25 months in one 
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estimate) in the 1990s. Moreover, the pattern in the curve of Figure 1.2, which outlines the 
increase in the share of time spent in official maternity leave by all young women aged 20 to 
35 (excluding post-leave career breaks), is similar to that showing the length of official 
maternity leave. This figure also plots the development of fertility, which has declined 
somewhat but not dramatically over the last two decades, meaning that the extension of 
maternity leave has seemingly had no overwhelming effect on birth rates.  
Thus, Figure 1.1 suggests that, ceteris paribus, mothers’ labor force attachment 
decreases through the direct effect of maternity leave extension, especially for those women 
who return to the labor force within the first three years after childbirth. As it is difficult for 
employers to predict who will become a mother and when, all else being equal, the extension 
of the leave period has probably decreased the expected job attachment of all female 
employees at childbearing age, even though, as discussed later in Section 1.3, other factors 
besides maternity leave expansion might be impacting the labor supply of young women.  
The literature also indicates that job-related training is likely to at least partly entail 
investment in firm-specific human capital. Theoretical results in Becker (1962) and 
Hashimoto (1981) raise the hypothesis that the reduction in young women’s job attachment 
due to prolonged maternity leave will decrease firms’ willingness to invest in job-related 
training for women of childbearing age (or at least reduce their willingness to bear the costs). 
Likewise, young women’s willingness to invest in job-related training may also decrease due 
to a reduction in expected returns to that investment. Alternatively, young women may want 
to compensate the reduced willingness of employers to invest in their human capital, by 
undertaking more training on their own initiative. It is, however, an empirical question which 
effect dominates. We evaluate the impact of extended maternity leave on the incidence of job-
related training for young women in the following.  
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1.3 Data and methodology 
1.3.1 The treatment group and data sets 
From the employer’s perspective, extension of the maternity leave period constitutes 
an increase in employment protection for women of childbearing age. That is, if increased 
protection rights for young women are not reflected in implicit or explicit contracts that 
compensate employers for young women’s extended maternity leave, women of childbearing 
age can expect diminished employment opportunities, such as less job-related training (cf. 
Lazear (1990)). However, unlike Schönberg and Ludsteck (2007), who consider extended 
maternity leave a treatment for mothers only and use mothers subject to shorter maternity 
leave as controls to measure labor force participation and wages as outcomes, we are 
interested in extended maternity leave rights as a treatment that affects all women of 
childbearing age with job-related training as an outcome of that treatment. Therefore, in our 
research design, the treatment group consists of all women of childbearing age, defined as 
those between 20 and 35 years of age. We exclude women between 36 and 39 because we 
cannot tell whether or not an employer perceives these women as being of childbearing age.4 
In the subsequent analysis, we draw on three individual-level datasets that represent 
the West German workforce. East Germany was excluded because at the time of the reform, it 
was experiencing a major transition whose related factors are difficult to filter out from the 
effect of the maternity leave extension. In addition, the prereform points of observation are 
mostly from the 1980s when East Germany was under communist rule and thus excluded 
from the data. The three datasets used are the Report System [on] Further Education 
(Berichtssystem Weiterbildung, BSW)5, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),6 and 
                                                 
4
 According to administrative birth records for Germany, 8.3 percent of all new mothers in 1990 were 36 years of 
age or older. This share is rising over time. For example, in the year 2000, it was already 11.5 percent. However, 
the share of all new mothers aged 40 or older is much lower at 1.8 and 2.5 percent in the years 1990 and 2000, 
respectively.  
5
 More information on these data is available from the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, University 
of Cologne web site: http://info1.za.gesis.org/DBKSearch12/SDesc.asp  
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the Qualification and Careers Survey (Qualifikation und Berufsverlauf, IAB-BIBB)7. A brief 
description of the datasets can be found in Appendix 1.2. 
We restrict the sample to persons who are currently employed and hence attached to 
the labor market because by definition, persons not working cannot receive job-related 
training. Hence, we ignore the potential effect of extended maternity leave on training that 
works directly through (temporarily) reduced labor supply in order to focus on the effect for 
young women attached to the labor market (and thus potentially interested in job-related 
training). Nevertheless, because the three datasets we use measure the incidence of past job-
related training for the last 1, 3 and 5 years (BSW, GSOEP, and IAB-BIBB, respectively), in 
two of the datasets we cannot avoid capturing some of the potential direct effect through the 
reduced labor supply that results from maternity leave.  
Despite differences in the size of the event window referred to by the various surveys, 
all three datasets exhibit a large degree of communality in training incidence, with training 
participation in the BSW and GSOEP varying between a quarter and a third (see Table 1.2). 
In the IAB-BIBB data, participation is somewhat higher (between a third and almost one half) 
because this survey asks for training during the previous 5 years (compared to 1 year in the 
BSW and 3 years in the GSOEP). 
As Table 1.2 shows, all datasets report an increase in training participation over time, 
a finding that holds true for all age-gender groups. Moreover, consistent with the growing 
emphasis on lifelong learning, training participation increased more among older (aged 40–
55) than younger workers (aged 20–35). Note, however, that in 1994, after the extension of 
maternity leave, young women had the lowest incidence of employer-arranged training but the 
                                                                                                                                                        
6
 The GSOEP is probably the most frequently used individual-level data set for Germany. For more information, 
see http://www.diw.de/english/soep/29012.html 
7
 The Qualification and Careers Survey (IAB-BIBB), which specializes in job descriptions, was also used by 
Spitz-Oener (2006). More information is available at http://www.gesis.org/ 
Datenservice/Themen/38Beruf.htm 
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highest training incidence of training on the employee’s initiative.8 Neither of these facts held 
in 1988, before the extension of maternity leave. Formal testing of these before-after 
comparisons is carried out in Section 1.4.  
 
1.3.2 Potential control groups 
In tracking the development of job-related training of young women before and after 
the increase in the maternity leave period, we consider three demographic groups as reference 
points to construct control group designs: young men of similar age to the treatment group 
(20–35), women aged 40–55 years, and young men together with women and men aged 40–
55. Similar treatment-control group designs are used in Gruber (1994), Ruhm (1998), 
Waldfogel (1999) and Lai and Masters (2005). We exclude persons older than 55 years from 
all analyses because this group’s outcomes may be affected by other factors like early 
retirement, which may evolve differentially between men and women. In addition, training is 
less important to the older worker because the closer the retirement age, the lower the returns 
to investment.  
Before comparing changes in training participation before and after the maternity 
leave extension for different age-gender groups, we check whether the extension of the 
maternity leave period did indeed lower young women’s labor market attachment in relation 
to the potential control groups. This assessment is important because theory suggests that 
labor market attachment may be a key determinant of employers’ willingness to support job-
related training (Hashimoto, 1981). Likewise, observation of young women’s labor force 
participation is important because general trends in female labor force participation may 
overlap with the effects of maternity leave on labor force participation and thus also influence 
job-related training. Hence, we must show an association between the German government’s 
                                                 
8
 The question in the BSW asks whether job-related training was a) arranged by the company, b) arranged on the 
recommendation of a supervisor, or c) on your own initiative. We subsume answers a) and b) under ‘employer-
arranged training’. 
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extension of maternity leave duration and a decrease in young women’s labor force 
participation relative to the control group. As Figure 1.1 has already shown, for young 
mothers, actual maternity leave periods have increased.  
Figure 1.3 to Figure 1.5 profile the development of the full time equivalent (FTE) 
labor force participation rates of our treatment group (young women, irrespective of whether 
they are mothers) in relation to various controls. Because we restrict our sample to employees, 
self-employed are excluded; however, the graphs are robust to the inclusion of self-employed 
workers. We expect no abrupt change in labor market participation owing to maternity leave 
extension because hesitation to exploit the extended leave to its full extent is quite plausible in 
the face of uncertainty about how the employer will deal with this new situation. This view is 
borne out by the gradual increase in the average maternity leave period exhibited in Figure 1.1 
and Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.3 shows the full time equivalent (FTE) labor force participation of young 
women relative to the older women controls in two datasets: the GSOEP and the Micro 
Census9. Even though the GSOEP’s smaller sample size results in more erratic results than the 
Micro Census data, both datasets suggest that young women’s labor force participation has 
decreased over the last two decades relative to that of older women. It should also be noted 
that the more reliable evidence from the Micro Census data suggests a much deeper decline in 
young versus older women’s labor force participation in the late 1980s and early 1990s; that 
is, exactly during the period when maternity leave duration was massively extended (from 6 
to 10 months in 1986, 12 months in 1988, 15 months in 1989, 18 months in 1990, and 36 
months in 1992). This decline in relative participation is sizeable, at about 5 percentage points 
between the 1980s and 1993 according to the Micro Census. This steep downward trend 
                                                 
9
 The Micro Census (MZ) is a one-percent sample of the population (the scientific community receives only a 70 
percent sample of that one percent) and asks similar questions to a census. For political reasons, there has been 
no census in Germany since 1987, so the Micro Census acts as a substitute. For more information, see 
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/press/abisz/Mikrozensus__e,templateId=re
nderPrint.psml 
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flattens in the mid-1990s, although it remains negative despite no further reforms to maternity 
leave.  
Figure 1.4 presents a comparison between young women and young men. Although 
the labor force participation of the former is lower than that of the latter, young women have 
seemingly been catching up over time. Nevertheless, the Micro Census data clearly suggest 
that the long-run trend in catching up with young men stalled after 1992 (when the maternity 
leave period was doubled from 18 to 36 months) until about 2000. Hence, the short time 
series presented here is consistent with a permanent reduction in the labor force attachment of 
young women relative to their male peers. Taking into account that this reduction overlaps 
with an upward trend that dominates the data, we expect no decrease in young women’s job-
related training relative to young men. On the contrary, an increase is to be expected. This 
increase is actually observed in the data. However, because young men are not an adequate 
control group due to the trends observed here, we do not present the results with young men 
as the control group in this paper.10  
The third alternative for the control group design compares young women to older 
women and relates this difference to young versus older men. Consequently, Figure 1.5 
depicts the difference in the differences of FTE labor force participation rates between young 
and older women and young and older men. This development is similar to that for the older 
women control group: young women’s labor force attachment declines relative to older 
women, and the gap between young and older women declines in relation to the gap between 
young and older men. This pattern holds true during the period of maternity leave expansion 
and in the years after 1992 until the (positive) difference between these two gaps remains 
constant or even increases again from the late 1990s onwards. Therefore, we expect a 
                                                 
10
 In results not shown here, it turns out, however, that despite of the catch-up in labor supply of young women 
in relation to young men, young women have lost in terms of employer-arranged training in relation to young 
men after the extension of maternity leave. When considering training in general, however, they have caught up. 
Yet, consistent with the relative labor supply trends shown here, this catch-up in terms of training in general was 
slowed down in the period when maternity leave was extended (compared to a placebo period).  
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decrease in the relative incidence of job-related training for young women with this control 
group design. 
Based on the control group designs just presented, we estimate two sets of regression 
equations. The first is an estimate of the difference in training incidence between young and 
older women before and after the 1992 reform:  
 
 
trainingit = α + β1X it + β2afterit + β3 youngit + τ1( youngit × aftertt ) + εit   (1) 
 
where training is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if training has occurred. Young 
and after are dummy variables indicating whether a women is young (20 to 35 years) and 
whether an observation refers to a post-1992 time point. The vector X denotes other control 
variables. In this difference-in-differences setup, the effect of interest is 
 
τ1 , which we expect 
to be negative because of the relative labor supply developments shown in Figure 1.3. If we 
have panel data (as in the GSOEP) instead of repeated cross sections (as in the other two 
datasets), we adjust standard errors for clustering (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).  
If older women and young and older men are used as controls, we estimate a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences model using the following equation: 
 
 
trainingit = α + β1X it + β2afterit + β3 femaleit + β4 youngit
+ β5( femaleit × youngit ) + β6( femaleit × afterit ) + β7 ( youngit × afterit )
+ τ2( femaleit × youngit × afterit ) + εit
 (2) 
 
with 
 
τ 2  as the coefficient of interest, which, as argued in Figure 1.5, is expected to be 
negative. The regression results are presented below. 
Chapter 1   
 26 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Before-after estimates by age and gender 
We formalize the comparison of changes in training incidence in providing before-
after estimates for the four age-gender groups: young women as the treatment group and older 
women and young and older men as the controls (see Table 1.3). We estimated results for four 
types of specifications. First, as would be appropriate if the before-after comparison was not 
confounded by any compositional effects or if any compositional effects were the outcome of 
extending the maternity leave period, we used no control variables (e.g., if young women 
invested less in education, education would be endogenous and thus should not be controlled 
for). We then successively increased the set of control variables in specifications 2 through 4, 
first by including dummy variables for education (i.e., high school diploma/A-level/Abitur 
and a tertiary polytechnic or university degree) and controlling for age and age squared to 
account for possible changes in the age distributions within age groups. In specification 3, we 
also added job characteristics using dummy variables for full-time, white-collar, and civil 
servant employment. Finally, in specification 4 we incorporated dummy variables for civil 
status (i.e., for being married and having children). Thus, those variables most likely to be 
endogenous were included last in the four specifications. In other words, we believed that 
family status and children might be affected by extended maternity leave, whose original 
intention was to facilitate women’s work-life-family balance in order to increase fertility. If 
so, the civil status variables should not be included among the controls. Similar arguments 
might apply to the occupational and educational variables, but probably to a lesser extent. It 
turned out that controlling for these sets of variables had only a minor impact on the 
estimates. Hence, in the subsequent tables we only report estimates based on the specification 
with the full set of control variables.  
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As Table 1.3 shows, according to the BSW data, the smallest increase in training 
incidence between the 1988 and 1994 surveys (referring to training in 1987 and 1993, 
respectively) is among young women. That is, the point estimate in specification 4 exhibits an 
increase in training participation of 5.7 percentage points, significant only at the 10 percent 
level, compared to a 6.1 percentage point estimate for young men, significant at the 5 percent 
level. The point estimates for older women and men are even larger and highly significant, at 
8.8 and 10.1 percentage points, respectively. 
Although the difference between the increases in training for young women and men 
seem rather small (5.7 versus 6.1 percentage points), this contrast becomes much more 
pronounced when we distinguish between different types of training (only possible 
consistently over time in the BSW data). Young women’s probability to have taken part in 
employer-arranged training only increased by 2.5 percentage points (statistically 
insignificant), the number for young men, however, is 7.0 percentage points (significant at the 
5 percent level). By contrast, young women seem to have partially compensated for this 
divergence by investing more in training on their own (rather than their employer’s) initiative: 
the increases in the training incidences for this type of training are 4.5 percentage points for 
young women (significant at the 10 percent level), but only 1 percent for young men 
(insignificant). Hence, overall young women have not only experienced somewhat lower 
increases in training than young men, but also a change in the type of training they receive in 
relation to young men: the before-after estimates suggest that employers were less interested 
in the training of young women in relation to young men after the extension of maternity 
leave. What is striking is that the BSW data report similar (and significant) increases in 
employer-arranged training for three age-gender groups: young men (7.0 percentage points), 
older women (7.3 percentage points) and older men (6.2 percentage points), but not for young 
women (insignificant 2.5 percentage points). As a result, young women compensated this 
development by an increase in their own initiative to obtain training.  
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When we compare the BSW results with the other two datasets, we can only consider 
training incidence in general, but not by the type of training (employer-arranged or not). As 
can be seen in Table 1.3, similar to the BSW data, the GSOEP and the IAB-BIBB data show 
an increase in training of older relative to younger workers (irrespective of gender). Hence, 
the BSW data seem to measure the same thing as the other two data sets. However, they give 
better information on the type of training.  
Note that for training arranged by the employer, the ‘age effect’ in the increase in 
training is not observed any more (that is to say, although older workers have higher general 
training increases than younger workers, they do not exhibit higher employer-arranged 
training increases than young workers). Because training arranged by the employer is more 
relevant than training in general, we will put special emphasis on the BSW data in the 
following, but use GSOEP and IAB-BIBB data for robustness checks. 
 
1.4.2 Difference-in differences estimates 
As Table 1.4 demonstrates, job-related training is much more common among white-
collar than among blue-collar workers (e.g., 33 versus 13 percent in the 1988 BSW survey). 
Among white-collar workers, training participation is higher in larger than in very small firms 
(28 versus 17 percent in the 1988 BSW survey), perhaps because the latter find it more 
difficult to substitute for workers who are currently in training. Maternity leave reform should 
be more likely to have an impact on a group of workers with a high training incidence. We 
thus also report estimates where we restrict the sample to white-collar workers in firms with at 
least 20 employees to see whether the estimates for this subsample are more pronounced than 
those for all workers. Unfortunately, the information on firm size varies between datasets so 
that in the IAB-BIBB data, the firm-size limit must be set to 10 instead of 20 employees. In 
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the BSW and GSOEP data, however, we are able to limit the sample to white-collar workers 
in firms with at least 20 employees.  
Table 1.5 presents the difference-in-differences estimates for the three datasets and 
two control group designs.11 As argued in connection with relative labor supply developments 
(see Section 1.3), we expect young women to lose in terms of training incidence relative to 
older women because of the (accelerated) decrease in their labor supply after maternity leave 
was extended. The point estimates in Table 1.5 generally confirm this hypothesis, and the 
findings are statistically significant for two of the three datasets (GSOEP and IAB-BIBB).The 
point estimates are -4.9, -13.5, and -9.6 percentage points for the BSW, GSOEP, and IAB-
BIBB datasets, respectively.12 
Additionally, because average training participation differs between datasets, we also 
provide estimates of the change in training participation for young women relative to the 
prereform level. The resulting estimates imply a relative decline in training participation by 
19, 44, and 29 percent in the BSW, GSOEP, and IAB-BIBB datasets, respectively. When 
restricted to white-collar workers in firms with at least 20 employees, the effects are even 
larger at -6.4, -21.8, and -13.1 percentage points in the BSW, GSOEP, and IAB-BIBB 
datasets, respectively. Especially large and significant are the estimates in those datasets that 
refer to a longer event window, such as training in the previous 3 and 5 years (the GSOEP and 
IAB-BIBB, respectively). As pointed out previously, the longer the event window, the larger 
the estimates will be in absolute value in that they include the direct effect of prolonged 
maternity leave on job-related training through temporary reduction of the labor supply due to 
maternity leave. Moreover, although the BSW, which only refers to the previous year, also 
suggests a large effect (a 19 percent reduction in job-related training for young women, and 
also 19 percent reduction when the sample is restricted to white-collar workers in larger 
                                                 
11
 Again, because control variables do not make a noteworthy difference to the estimates, we only report the 
specifications for the full set of control variables. 
12
 As was the case with the before-after estimates, there is hardly any variation in the estimates across 
specifications with different control variables. 
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firms), the coefficient estimate is not significant. Therefore, we interpret these estimates as 
only tentative evidence that extended maternity leave reduces the incidence of job-related 
training for young women in general (below, we will see that there is ample evidence that 
employer-arranged training has been reduced). 
In a second set of estimates using older women and young and older men as controls, 
we use a difference-in-difference-in-differences strategy to compare the changes in training 
incidence of young versus older women in relation to the changes of young versus older men. 
Based on the relative labor supply behavior reported earlier (see Figure 1.5), we expect 
negative estimates for 
 
τ2 , a hypothesis confirmed by all point estimates (see Table 1.5, last 
column). For the BSW, GSOEP, and IAB-BIBB datasets, respectively, the point estimates 
suggest a -1.8, -5.5, and -2.0 percentage point change in young women’s training 
participation. The estimates are not statistically significant. When restricted to white-collar 
workers in firms with at least 20 employees, the corresponding estimates are -8.7, -14.6 
(significant at the 10 percent level), and -4.9 in the BSW, GSOEP, and IAB-BIBB datasets, 
respectively. 
Note that the just presented investigation of the impact of maternity leave reform on 
the incidence of any job-related training makes no distinction between types of training, 
which, unlike schooling, is poorly classified in most surveys. Nevertheless, unlike the other 
two datasets, the BSW data has information on whether training was arranged directly by the 
employer or taken on the employee’s own initiative (information lacking in the other 
datasets).13 We therefore apply the same estimates as above but distinguish between different 
types of training. 
 
                                                 
 
13
 The GSOEP provides information on these training aspects, but the questions are inconsistent across the 
years. 
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1.4.3 Employer-arranged training vs. training on the worker’s initiative 
Only the BSW data provide information on the role of the employer in job-related 
training. In the following, we calculate separate estimates for job-related training arranged 
directly by the employer and training on the employee’s own initiative. The incidence of the 
two types of training for the four age-gender groups in the BSW data is reported in Table 1.2. 
Whereas in the first year of observation (1988), 26 percent of all workers in the sample 
received some type of job-related training, only 14 percent received training arranged by the 
employer.  
Table 1.6 shows estimation results for these two types of training using the same 
control group designs as before. Again, we report two blocks of estimates, one for the full 
sample and one for white-collar workers in firms with at least 20 employees. The fact that 
only a few estimates are statistically significant may be due to the sample size. However, it 
should be noted that all the point estimates for employer-arranged training are negative. For 
the subsample of white-collar workers in larger firms, by contrast, all point estimates for 
training on the employee’s initiative are positive (albeit not statistically significant), but 
smaller than the negative ones for employer-arranged training. Hence, young women seem at 
best to have partially compensated for the reduced interest in training by their employers.  
For employer-arranged training, the point estimates indicate a reduction in young 
women’s training participation of 4.6 or 7.0 percentage points depending on the control 
group. For young white-collar women, these estimates are larger and statistically significant, 
at 9.6 and 15.7 percentage points. In relation to the training incidence before maternity leave 
extension, these point estimates are huge, implying a reduction in employer-arranged training 
of between 35 and 54 percent for all young women and between 53 and 87 percent for young 
white-collar women in firms with at least 20 employees. Moreover, estimated increases in 
training on the employee’s initiative lie between 20 and 43 percent. We must not 
overemphasize these large numbers because of the large standard errors attached to the 
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estimates. Nevertheless, point estimates are in a similar range irrespective of the control group 
chosen (for training on the employee’s initiative this is only true if the sample is restricted to 
white-collar workers in larger firms). 
 
1.4.4 Effects for young women without children 
Maternity leave extension should affect women of childbearing age even if they 
currently have no children because they are at risk of leaving the employer for up to three 
years with a right to return. This risk is enough to make them part of the treatment group. 
Therefore, to check whether the results so far also apply to women without children, we 
repeat the estimates provided in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 for young women who do not have 
children as treatment group (the control groups remain unchanged). These results, presented 
in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8, show very similar point estimates to those obtained for the full 
samples, which include young women with children. However, as shown in Table 1.8, in the 
BSW estimates for different types of training, none of the estimates remain statistically 
significant once young women with children are excluded (cf. Table 1.6). However, the point 
estimates still remain consistently negative and economically significant both for general 
training and for employer-arranged training, but positive in three out of four cases for training 
on the employee’s initiative. The statistical insignificance may simply be the result of reduced 
sample size and correspondingly large standard errors. In sum, there is some evidence that 
maternity leave extension has reduced job-related training even for young women without 
children. Again it seems that this result is mainly driven by a reduction in employer-arranged 
training, which has only been partly compensated by training on young female employees’ 
own initiative. 
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1.4.5 Placebo estimates 
The estimates so far seem to suggest that young women receive less employer-
arranged job-related training because of the extension of maternity leave from 18 to 36 
months. Methodologically, we have relied on the difference-in-differences assumption that – 
in the absence of maternity leave extension – the training gap between treatment and control 
group would have remained constant. Because this identifying assumption is not testable and 
because there may be differential trends in training participation between treatment and 
control groups even in the absence of training, we carry out placebo estimates. This is to say, 
we estimate the same difference-in-differences models for a period in which no change in 
maternity leave took place. Because extensions have been frequent since 1979 and more data 
are available for recent years, we choose a postreform period for such estimates. However, 
owing to data availability constraints, we can only use 1997 and 2003 data from the BSW and 
2000 and 2004 data from the GSOEP and must exclude the IAB-BIBB, whose last two waves 
occurred in 1991 and 1998. 
The placebo estimation results for the three categories of training in the BSW data are 
provided in Table 1.9 for both the full sample and the subsample of white-collar workers in 
firms with at least 20 employees. These placebo estimates correspond to the results for the 
extension of maternity leave given in Table 1.6. Whereas in Table 1.6 the estimates for 
employer-arranged training are all negative and somewhat similar in magnitude, with half of 
them being statistically significant, none of the placebo estimates in Table 1.9 are 
simultaneously negative and statistically significant. In general, the placebo test is not so 
convincing when all workers – including blue-collar – are considered (upper panel of Table 
1.9). There are, however, clear contrasts in the point estimates of the reform and placebo 
periods both for training in general and for employer-arranged training when we restrict the 
sample to white-collar workers in larger firms, i.e. the group of workers for whom job-related 
training seems most relevant. This comparison provides further support for the hypothesis that 
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young women’s participation in training has been held back by the maternity leave extension. 
Concerning training on the employee’s initiative the point estimates in the placebo time 
period are similar to the ones for the period when maternity leave was extended. Hence, the 
evidence that young women partly compensated the reduction in employer-arranged training 
by their own initiative is only tentative.  
The placebo estimates based on the GSOEP also support the assumption that our 
previous results on reduced training for young women due to extended maternity leave were 
not spurious. Whereas our GSOEP-based estimates using older women and older women 
together with young and older men as controls were significantly negative (see Table 1.5), the 
corresponding placebo estimates, given in Table 1.10, are all positive and insignificantly 
different from zero. Moreover, as the table shows, these placebo results hold for both the full 
sample and white-collar workers in firms with at least 20 employees. 
 
1.5 Conclusions of Chapter 1 
Even though policies that support the family-work balance are contentious on both 
sides of the Atlantic, maternity leave that guarantees a post-leave right to return to work is an 
important component of family policies. Whereas some countries like the United States opt 
for very short maternity leave periods (i.e., 12 weeks), Germany lies at the other extreme, 
having extended maternity leave with a right to return to work with the same employer from 
18 to 36 months, which ranks in the highest maternity leave durations in industrialized 
countries. In this paper, we use difference-in-differences estimates to investigate the effect of 
this extension on the human capital investment of young women workers.  
Specifically, drawing on three individual-level datasets that represent West German 
workers, we measure participation in job-related training as a proxy for human capital 
investment, taking care to consider long-term trends in labor force participation when 
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interpreting our difference-in-differences estimates using alternative control groups. Similar 
to the previous literature, we choose older women and older women together with young and 
older men as control groups. We particularly focus on one dataset which distinguishes 
between employer-arranged training and training on the employee’s initiative.  
We find significant evidence that maternity leave extension reduced employer-
arranged training for young women. There is also tentative evidence that young women partly 
compensated for this reduction in employer-arranged training by undertaking more training on 
their own initiative.  
Taken together with extant findings on extended maternity leave in European 
countries, our results point to negative economic consequences of protective measures like 
maternity leave of up to three years (as in Germany) for all young working women, even 
those without children. These negative effects must be weighed against the potential job 
security benefits for those who become mothers and the potential benefits for their children. 
However, as Dustmann and Schönberg’s (2008) regression discontinuity estimates illustrate, 
this latter may be close to zero.  
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Tables and Figures of Chapter 1 
Table 1-1: Increase of maximum maternity leave duration 
Year Duration Maternity leave 
1979 4 months Introduction of a 4-months maternity leave, which can be taken in addition 
to the 14 weeks retention period. Maternity benefits up to 750 
deutschmarks (about €375) per month) paid by the government 
1986 10 months Maternity leave can be taken by mother or father. Both are allowed to work 
for up to 19 hours per week. Maternity leave can be exchanged once 
between mother and father. Less than 2 percent of men take this 
opportunity. Parental benefits of 600 deutschmarks (about €300) per month 
paid for 10 months by the government 
1988 12 months Duration of maternity leave is extended to 12 months. Parental benefits of 
600 deutschmarks (about €300) per month paid for 12 months by the 
government 
1989 15 months Duration of maternity leave is extended to 15 months. Parental benefits of 
600 deutschmarks (about €300) per month paid for 15 months by the 
government 
1990 18 months Duration of maternity leave is extended to 18 months. Parental benefits of 
600 deutschmarks (about €300) per month paid for 18 months by the 
government 
1992 36 months Duration of maternity leave is extended to 36 months. Demand for 
maternity leave can be exchanged three times between mother and father. 
Parental benefits of 600 deutschmarks (about €300) per month paid for 24 
months by the government 
Source: Kreyenfeld (2001). 
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Table 1-2: Descriptive statistics: training participation 
a) All datasets BSW GSOEP IAB-BIBB 
  1988 1994 1989 2000 1991 1998 
All 0.26 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.42 
Young women 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.37 
Older women 0.18 0.31 0.16 0.34 0.26 0.39 
Young men 0.32 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.39 
Older men 0.25 0.36 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.51 
n 3,112 2,147 2,764 5,639 16,682 17,564 
 
b) Detailed 
 information   
 only in BSW BSW BSW 
  Training arranged by 
employer 
Training on one's own 
initiative 
  1988 1994 1988 1994 
All 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.14 
Young women 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.16 
Older women 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.14 
Young men 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.14 
Older men 0.16 0.22 0.08 0.14 
n 3,112 2,147 3,112 2,147 
Source: Report System Further Education (BSW); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); 
Qualification and Careers (IAB-BIBB); own calculations.  
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Table 1-3: Before-after estimates 
a) All datasets    b) Detailed information only in BSW data 
BSW - Training in general 
 
BSW - Training arranged by employer 
Young women 0.057*  Young women 0.025 
n=1,188 (0.031)  n=1,188 (0.024) 
Older women 0.088***  Older women 0.073*** 
n=1,016 (0.029)  n=1,016 (0.022) 
Young men 0.061**  Young men 0.070*** 
n=1,405 (0.029)  n=1,405 (0.025) 
Older men 0.101***  Older men 0.062*** 
n=1,456 (0.027)  n=1,456 (0.024) 
GSOEP - Training in general 
 
BSW - Training on one's own initiative 
Young women 0.002  Young women 0.045* 
n=1,716 (0.030)  n=1,188 (0.027) 
Older women 0.128***  Older women 0.047*** 
n=1,849 (0.024)  n=1,016 (0.023) 
Young men -0.004  Young men 0.010 
n=2,175 (0.028)  n=1,405 (0.024) 
Older men 0.039*  Older men 0.066*** 
n=2,539 (0.023)  n=1,456 (0.020) 
IAB-BIBB - Training in general 
 
 
Young women 0.012    
n=7,513 (0.012)    
Older women 0.104***    
n=6,823 (0.012)    
Young men 0.006    
n=9,560 (0.011)    
Older men 0.085***    
n=10,072 (0.010)    
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: age, age squared, dummy variables 
for high school (A-level, Abitur) and tertiary degrees, dummy variables for full-time employment, 
white-collar job, civil-service employment, for being married and for having children. Because control 
variables only have a minor impact on these estimates, we only report the results with the full set of 
controls. 
Source: Report System Further Education (BSW); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); 
Qualification and Careers (IAB-BIBB); own calculations. 
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Table 1-4: Training participation for subgroups  
  
Blue-collar worker White-collar 
worker 
White-collar 
worker in firms 
with at least 20 
employees 
White-collar 
worker in firms 
with less than 20 
employees 
BSW 0.13 0.33 0.28 0.17 
GSOEP 0.13 0.41 0.34 0.16 
IAB-BIBB 0.20 0.44 0.37 0.25 
Note: Figures refer to the survey years before the reform: 1988 (BSW), 1989 (GSOEP) and 1991 
(IAB-BIBB). 
Source: Report System Further Education (BSW); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); 
Qualification and Careers (IAB-BIBB); own calculations.  
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Table 1-5: Difference-in-differences estimates 
  
DiD DiDiD 
 
Control group: Control group: 
BSW Older women 
Older women  
and all men  
-0.049 -0.018 
Full sample (0.042) (0.057) 
Relative deviation -0.19 -0.07 
n 2,204 5,065 
   
-0.064 -0.087 White-collar workers in firms with 
at least 20 employees (0.058) (0.082) 
Relative deviation -0.19 -0.26 
n 1,378 2,873 
GSOEP   
-0.135*** -0.055 
Full sample (0.038) (0.052) 
Relative deviation -0.44 -0.18 
n 3,508 8,146 
   
-0.218*** -0.146* White-collar workers in firms with 
at least 20 employees (0.056) (0.080) 
Relative deviation -0.51 -0.34 
n 1,991 4,362 
IAB-BIBB   
-0.096*** -0.020 
Full sample (0.017) (0.022) 
Relative deviation -0.29 -0.06 
n 14,336 33,968 
   
-0.131*** -0.049 White-collar workers in firms with 
at least 10 employees (0.024) (0.032) 
Relative deviation -0.31 -0.11 
n 8,448 18,216 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: age, age squared, dummy variables 
for high school (A-level, Abitur) and tertiary degrees, dummy variables for full-time employment, 
white-collar job, civil-service employment, for being married and for having children. Because control 
variables only have a minor impact on these estimates, we only report the results with the full set of 
controls. 
Source: Report System Further Education (BSW); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); 
Qualification and Careers (IAB-BIBB); own calculations.  
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Table 1-6: Difference-in-differences estimates: 
Results for different types of training – BSW  
  
DiD DiDiD 
 Control group: Control group: 
Full sample  Older women 
Older women  
and all men 
Job-related training  -0.049 -0.018 
(general) (0.042) (0.057) 
Relative deviation -0.19 -0.07 
   
Job-related training  -0.046 -0.070 
(arranged by employer) (0.033) (0.047) 
Relative deviation -0.35 -0.54 
   
Job-related training  -0.003 0.049 
(on one's own initiative) (0.035) (0.043) 
Relative deviation -0.02 0.38 
   
n 2,203 5,065 
 
  
White-collar workers in firms 
with at least 20 employees   
Job-related training  -0.064 -0.087 
(general) (0.058) (0.082) 
Relative deviation -0.19 -0.26 
   
Job-related training  -0.096** -0.157** 
(arranged by employer) (0.047) (0.077) 
Relative deviation -0.53 -0.87 
   
Job-related training  0.030 0.065 
(on one's own initiative) (0.049) (0.065) 
Relative deviation 0.20 0.43 
   
n 1,378 2,873 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: age, age squared, dummy variables 
for high school (A-level, Abitur) and tertiary degrees, dummy variables for full-time employment, 
white-collar job, civil-service employment, for being married and for having children. 
Source: Report System Further Education (BSW); own calculations. 
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Table 1-7: Difference-in-differences estimates for young women without children  
  
DiD DiDiD 
 
Control group: Control group: 
BSW Older women 
Older women  
and all men 
-0.069 -0.024 
Full sample (0.049) (0.063) 
Relative deviation -0.23 -0.08 
n 1,712 4,568 
   
-0.049 -0.060 White-collar workers in firms with 
at least 20 employees (0.067) (0.088) 
Relative deviation -0.14 -0.17 
n 1,106 2,598 
GSOEP   
-0.170*** -0.088 
Full sample (0.044) (0.057) 
Relative deviation -0.45 -0.23 
n 2,972 7,610 
   
-0.246*** -0.173** White-collar workers in firms with 
at least 20 employees (0.060) (0.083) 
Relative deviation -0.52 -0.37 
n 1,735 4,106 
IAB-BIBB   
-0.103*** -0.014 
Full sample (0.019) (0.024) 
Relative deviation -0.28 -0.04 
n 11,784 31,416 
   
-0.133*** -0.044 White-collar workers in firms with 
at least 10 employees (0.026) (0.035) 
Relative deviation -0.30 -0.10 
n 7,101 16,869 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: age, age squared, dummy variables 
for high school (A-level, Abitur) and tertiary degrees, dummy variables for full-time employment, 
white-collar job, civil-service employment, for being married and for having children. Because control 
variables only have a minor impact on these estimates, we only report the results with the full set of 
controls. 
Source: Report System Further Education (BSW); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); 
Qualification and Careers (IAB-BIBB); own calculations.  
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Table 1-8: Difference-in-differences estimates for young women without children – 
Results for different types of training – BSW  
  
DiD DiDiD 
 Control group: Control group: 
Full sample  Older women 
Older women  
and all men 
Job-related training  -0.069 -0.024 
(general) (0.049) (0.063) 
Relative deviation -0.23 -0.08 
   
Job-related training  -0.033 -0.056 
(arranged by employer) (0.040) (0.052) 
Relative deviation -0.25 -0.43 
   
Job-related training  -0.035 0.029 
(on one's own initiative) (0.039) (0.048) 
Relative deviation -0.22 0.22 
   
n 1,712 4,568 
 
  
White-collar workers in firms 
with at least 20 employees   
Job-related training  -0.049 -0.060 
(general) (0.067) (0.088) 
Relative deviation -0.14 -0.17 
   
Job-related training  -0.062 -0.123 
(arranged by employer) (0.056) (0.077) 
Relative deviation -0.34 -0.68 
   
Job-related training  0.011 0.057 
(on one's own initiative) (0.053) (0.069) 
Relative deviation 0.06 0.32 
   
n 1,106 2,601 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: age, age squared, dummy variables 
for high school (A-level, Abitur) and tertiary degrees, dummy variables for full-time employment, 
white-collar job, civil-service employment, for being married and for having children.  
Source: Report System Further Education. 
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Table 1-9: Placebo tests – BSW 
  
DiD DiDiD 
 
Control group: Control group: 
 
Older women Older women  
and all men 
Full sample     
Job-related training  -0.007 -0.096 
(general) (0.051) (0.071) 
   
Job-related training  0.024 -0.042 
(arranged by employer) (0.045) (0.061) 
   
Job-related training  -0.035 -0.055 
(on one's own initiative) (0.040) (0.057) 
   
n 1,817 3,736 
   
White-collar workers in firms 
with at least 20 employees   
Job-related training  0.088 0.001 
(general) (0.070) (0.099) 
   
Job-related training  0.069 -0.014 
(arranged by employer) (0.065) (0.092) 
   
Job-related training  0.016 0.017 
(on one's own initiative) (0.055) (0.084) 
   
n 1,075 2,128 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. The estimates 
are based on regressions with the following set of control variables: age, age squared, dummy 
variables for high school (A-level, Abitur) and tertiary degrees, dummy variables for full-time 
employment, white-collar job, civil-service employment, for being married and for having children.  
Source: Report System Further Education (BSW); own calculations.  
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Table 1-10: Placebo tests – GSOEP 
  
DiD DiDiD 
 
Control group: Control group: 
Full sample Older women 
Older women  
and all men 
Job-related training  0.029 0.023 
(general) (0.034) (0.054) 
   
n 4,232 9,426 
   
White-collar workers in firms 
with at least 20 employees    
Job-related training  0.059 0.033 
(general) (0.057) (0.078) 
   
n 2,478 5,207 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. The estimates 
are based on regressions with the following set of control variables: age, age squared, dummy 
variables for high school (A-level, Abitur) and tertiary degrees, dummy variables for full-time 
employment, white-collar job, civil-service employment, for being married and for having children.  
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); own calculations.  
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Figure 1-1: Average length of maternity leave taken 
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Note: All durations longer than 36 months were censored to 36 months. Vertical lines show the timing 
of the reforms to increase maternity leave duration. The length of maternity leave is measured in 
months for women between 20 and 35 years of age who started their maternity leave in the year before 
the interview. In the top line, we add the durations of official maternity leave and post maternity leave 
career breaks, which are common in Germany. The lower line only considers official maternity leave 
for mothers who return to the labor market directly after their official maternity leave.  
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); own calculations.  
 
 
Figure 1-2: Young women’s labor force participation and birth rates 
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Note: These results refer to all women aged between 20 and 35 years. Percentage rate of year spent in 
maternity leave gives an idea of how long young women, on average, are absent due to maternity leave 
each year. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); own calculations.  
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Figure 1-3: Difference between young and older women’s labor force participation – 
Full-time equivalents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The boxes at the bottom of the graphs indicate the event windows referred to in the training 
questions in the respective surveys. As mentioned in the text, the BSW refers to job-related training in 
the previous year, whereas the GSOEP and IAB-BIBB data refer to the previous three and five years, 
respectively. Vertical lines show the timing of the reforms to increase maternity leave duration. 
Source: Micro Census (MZ); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); own calculations. 
 
Figure 1-4: Difference between young women’s and young men’s labor force 
participation – Full-time equivalents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The boxes at the bottom of the graphs indicate the event windows referred to in the training 
questions in the respective surveys. As mentioned in the text, the BSW refers to job-related training in 
the previous year, whereas the GSOEP and IAB-BIBB data refer to the previous three and five years, 
respectively. Vertical lines show the timing of the reforms to increase maternity leave duration. 
Source: Micro Census (MZ); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); own calculations. 
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Figure 1-5: Difference in difference of young and older persons’ labor force 
participation between men and women – Full-time equivalents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The boxes at the bottom of the graphs indicate the event windows referred to in the training 
questions in the respective surveys. As mentioned in the text, the BSW refers to job-related training in 
the previous year, whereas the GSOEP and IAB-BIBB data refer to the previous three and five years, 
respectively. Vertical lines show the timing of the reforms to increase maternity leave duration. 
Source: Micro Census (MZ); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); own calculations.  
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
Appendix 1-1: Summary statistics 
  BSW GSOEP IAB-BIBB 
  1988 1994 1989 2000 1991 1998 
Training (All) 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.42 
High school 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.18 0.26 
University 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.14 
Age 37.2 37.8 37.1 39.0 36.9 38.2 
Age between 20 and 35 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.47 0.54 0.48 
White-collar Worker 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.51 0.56 
Blue-Collar Worker 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.30 0.40 0.34 
Civil Servant 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.10 
Female 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.43 
Married 0.68 0.66 0.58 0.55 0.75 0.74 
Children 0.41 0.48 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.42 
Working full-time  0.83 0.81 0.86 0.81 0.88 0.84 
n 3,112 2,147 2,764 5,639 16,682 17,564 
Source: Report System Further Education (BSW); German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); 
Qualification and Careers (IAB-BIBB); own calculations. 
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Appendix 1-2: Data description 
The three datasets used are the Report System [on] Further Education (Berichtssystem 
Weiterbildung, BSW), the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), and the Qualification 
and Careers Survey (Qualifikation und Berufsverlauf, IAB-BIBB).  
The BSW is relatively unknown compared to the other datasets. The BSW survey was 
conducted seven times (1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000 and 2003) by the 
Federal Ministry for Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung); data are provided by the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, 
University of Cologne. Each survey year, about 7,000 persons between 19 and 64 years are 
interviewed orally (this includes employed and non-employed people). The BSW dataset is at 
present the only regular representative survey containing all kinds of training incidences in 
Germany.14 In contrast to the other datasets, questions on training are the focus of this survey. 
We take the year 1988 as observations before and 1994 as observations after the reform. 
Questions on job-related training refer to the last 12 months. 
The GSOEP is an individual-level dataset with panel structure. It is the largest 
representative longitudinal study of private households in Germany. The same private 
households, persons and families have been surveyed annually since 1984. In this dataset we 
have information on whether a person took part in job-related training in the last three years. 
Observations before the reform refer to 1989 and observations after the reform to the year 
2000. The GSOEP has been conducted since 1984, but questions on job-related training 
started in 1989 and were only repeated in 1993, 2000, and 2004. We do not use 1993 because 
in asking for training during the last three years, this wave barely covers the 1992 reform. 
The IAB-BIBB data are a representative survey of employed persons, which was 
conducted in 1985, 1991, and 1998. It focuses on job descriptions and detailed information on 
                                                 
14
 For more information, please see: 
http://www.bmbf.de/pub/berichtssystem_weiterbildung_9.pdf 
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qualification profiles and occupational development. Each survey wave consists of more than 
34,000 observations; questions on job-related training refer to the last five years. 
Although there are some questions on job-related training in the German Micro 
Census (Mikrozensus, MZ), this dataset is not suitable for this analysis, because training 
participation is underrepresented there.15 As pointed out by Wohn (2007) there are several 
reasons why training participation in the MZ is underrepresented compared to the BSW 
training participation. Since the other two datasets (GSOEP and IAB-BIBB) have comparable 
training incidences to the BSW, we focus on these three datasets in the regression analyses 
and use the Micro Census data only for descriptive analyses (see Figures 3 to 5).  
The choice of datasets is driven by information on job-related training at the individual 
level both before and after the maternity leave extension of 1992. Because the treatment group 
comprises all women of childbearing age, actual information on maternity leaves was not 
required for a dataset to be used here. Nevertheless, problems do arise in the dataset 
comparison. First, all three datasets measure the outcome variable, job-related training, for a 
different period of time: the last five years in the IAB-BIBB data, the last three years in the 
GSOEP, and the last 12 months in the BSW. The second difficulty stems from the needs of 
our difference-in-differences analysis. Not only does it require training incidence observations 
before and after the maternity leave extension, but these can only be done properly by 
focusing on the most drastic reform, that which lengthens maternity leave from 18 to 36 
months. However, the post-1992 reform surveys differ enormously in timing: 1994 for the 
BSW, 1998 for the IAB-BIBB, and 2000 for the GSOEP. Variation also exists in the timing of 
the pre-1992 reform surveys, which refer to the following years: BSW, 1988; GSOEP, 1989; 
and IAB-BIBB, 1991. Obviously, these differences must be taken into account. For example, 
by asking for training in the five years previous to 1991, the prereform survey refers to a 
period during which three smaller extensions of maternity leave benefits occurred (see the 
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 In our analysis, training participation in the Micro Census was only less than half as high as in the other three 
datasets. 
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grey-shaded boxes in Figures 3 to 5). The surveys also differ somewhat in their sample sizes, 
with the largest, the IAB-BIBB, containing more than 16,000 observations per wave. GSOEP 
and BSW are smaller, the former with over 2,700 observations in 1989 but more than 5,000 in 
2000 because of refreshment samples, and the latter with more than 3,000 and 2,000 
observations before and after the reform, respectively. 
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2.1 Introduction to Chapter 2 
Sick pay and disability insurance programs, while reducing exposure to risk and 
seeking to promote equity through support of people in need, entail moral hazard problems. 
Several studies on U.S. and Canadian disability schemes find negative labor supply and 
positive take-up effects of increased benefit generosity as well as effects of economic 
conditions on benefit take up (Black, Daniel and Sanders (2002), Gruber (2000), Johnson and 
Ondrich (1990), Kreider and Riphahn (2000), Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995), Neuhauser 
and Raphael (2004), on screening, see Campolieti (2004)). Gruber (2000) stresses that the 
U.S. disability program is ‘one of the largest social insurance programs’ with an expenditure 
that amounts to $46 billion, which was 0.13 percent of U.S. GDP in 1998.  
Unlike the U.S. or the U.K., several continental European countries require employers 
to provide sick pay from day one of each sickness spell. In Germany, Europe’s largest 
economy, sick pay is 100 percent of the wage for the first six weeks of sickness. Combined 
with the high level of employment protection typical of many continental European 
economies, these regulations make absence hard to sanction.16 As a consequence, presence at 
the workplace is – at least in the short run when promotion is disregarded – a form of 
voluntary cooperation by the worker. Absence from work carries a high cost in terms of 
workdays lost, with rates ranging from 2.0 percent in the U.S. to 4.2 or 7.2 percent in 
continental European countries like Germany or France, respectively (Osterkamp (2002)). If 
the cost of sick pay regulations in Germany were compared to the U.S. disability program, a 
back-of-the envelope calculation would dwarf the size of the U.S. disability program in terms 
of percentage of GDP spent in the respective country: if labor contributed two-thirds to the 
GDP, a reduction in working days lost from the German to the U.S. level would raise the 
                                                 
16
 In Germany and Sweden, a worker can remain absent from work for 2 and 7 days, respectively, without a 
physician’s certificate (Johansson and Palme (2005), Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001)). 
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GDP by about 2.2 x (2/3) = 1.5 percent, more than eleven times the cost of the U.S. disability 
program in percentage of U.S. GDP.17  
In this study, we extend the recent literature using natural experiments to estimate the 
effects of incentives on absence (Henrekson and Persson (2004), Ichino and Riphahn (2005), 
Johansson and Palme (2002, 2005), Riphahn (2004), Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001)). 
However, unlike previous studies, we do not only consider absence from work as an outcome, 
but also estimate the reform’s effects on health-related outcomes like the duration of hospital 
stays and subjective health indicators and show that moral hazard problems of sick pay extend 
to inefficient use of the medical system. We further add to the literature by estimating the 
effects of the introduction (switch on) and the repeal of a reform (switch off) that reduced sick 
pay in Germany from 100 to 80 percent of the wage. Methodologically, because this reform 
affected only workers not covered by collective bargaining contracts, we can apply a 
difference-in-differences identification strategy to German Socio-Economic Panel data so as 
to distinguish the effects of the reform from time- or group-specific effects. Fixed-effects 
regressions provide an additional control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
The relationship between financial incentives and absence is amply shown in earlier 
papers using regression analysis on observational data (i.e., without natural experiments). 
Fewer studies, however, use natural experiments to relate the cost of absence to its incidence 
or duration. Ichino and Riphahn (2005), Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001), and Riphahn (2004) 
exploit probationary periods or time to reach virtually ‘undismissable’ status as a natural 
experiment which leads to high employment protection. The authors find that absence rates 
increase with employment protection in Italy and Germany. For Sweden, Henrekson and 
Persson (2004) use time series data for 1955–1999 to show that reforms that make sick pay 
more generous increase absence from work and vice versa. Likewise, Johansson and Palme 
                                                 
17 Admittedly, this number may be somewhat lower if genuinely sick employees going to work are not only less 
productive but may also decrease the productivity of others through infection, yet 1.5 percent of the GDP is a 
large enough number to illustrate the potential importance of policies affecting workers’ absence. 
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(2002, 2005) use person-level data to evaluate the Swedish sick pay reform of 1991, which 
resembled that investigated here for Germany but applied only to blue-collar workers. The 
authors identify reactions to the incentives created by the reform: both the incidence and the 
duration of absence decreased when the cost of absence increased.  
This present paper investigates the case of the late 1996 German reform that reduced 
sick pay from 100 to 80 percent during the first 6 weeks of sickness for workers without 
collective bargaining contracts. However, unlike previous studies using natural experiments to 
evaluate the incentives linked to sick pay, we can also evaluate the effects of the early 1999 
repeal of the reform, which re-set sick pay to 100 percent of the wage rate from day 1. Apart 
from absence from work (the outcome considered in the previous literature), we also evaluate 
the reform’s effects on use of the medical system and on subjective health indicators. 
Specifically, we find that for workers aged 20 to 55 years who remained with their firm 
during the estimation period, the average number of days absent from work fell by 2.4 days 
per year (according to a fixed-effects estimate). Furthermore, we show that the reform 
particularly reduced long durations of absence and that part of this decrease (0.4 days) 
coincides with a reduction in the average number of days spent in hospital, although we 
cannot find any robust effects of the reform on subjective health indicators. The results also 
indicate that the switch-on effects of the reform might be slightly smaller than the switch-off 
effects on absence from work. However, this difference is not statistically significant. 
Altogether, it seems that the reform reduced the – in international comparison – long and 
frequent contacts of Germans with their health care system. These contacts are costly both for 
employers and the health care system, but their reduction due to the sick pay reform 
seemingly had no statistically robust negative effects on subjective health indicators or in 
terms of long-term sickness. We also find no negative effects of the reform on liquidity 
constraints, measured as the perception of financial security in case of sickness. 
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2.2 Sick pay in Germany 
Germany has one of the most generous sick pay regulations among industrialized 
countries. German federal law dictates that employees reporting sick are entitled to 100 
percent of their pay for the first 6 weeks of sickness, to be paid by the employer 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz (2003), Schmitt (2005)). Only after this period does the 
percentage reduce to the 70 percent covered by mandatory health insurance 
(Bundesministerium der Justiz (2008)).18 Moreover, in contrast to regulations in the U.S., the 
U.K. or Switzerland, German federal law regulates sick pay for the first few days of illness 
(Osterkamp (2002)).  
As of October 1, 1996, the Christian Democrat and Liberal coalition government 
reformed the federal law regulating sick pay in Germany so that all employees (whether blue- 
or white-collar) were entitled to only 80 percent (rather than 100 percent) of their previous 
wage from day 1 of sickness through the first 6 weeks of absence (Schmitt (2005)).19 This 
law, however, was heavily resisted by the trade unions, which prior to 1970 had fought for 
years to gain 100 percent sick pay for all workers. Hence, the implementation of the new law 
was followed in 1996 and 1997 by a plenitude of lawsuits (each referring to a particular 
collective bargaining contract) in which the unions argued that collective bargaining contracts 
based on the old version of the law were still valid and implied sick pay corresponding to 100 
                                                 
18
 Some employees are subject to more generous sick pay rules arrived at through collective bargaining 
agreements. For example, public sector employees already in place before July 1, 1994, receive sick pay of 100 
percent of their wage for more than 6 weeks depending on their tenure (9, 12 15, 18 and 26 weeks for 2, 3, 5, 8 
and 10 years of tenure, respectively). For public sector employees hired after this date, the 6-week rule applies 
(Clemens et al. (2006)). However, after the first 6 weeks, public sector employers must pay an additional 
allowance into the 70 percent sick pay covered by the mandatory health insurance. Such allowances in addition 
to health insurance sick pay after the sixth week of sickness also exist in other sectors of the economy and 
depend on the specific collective bargaining contract.  
19
 Besides reducing the sick pay covered by the employer for the first 6 weeks, the January 1, 1997, changes to 
the law on mandatory health insurance reduced sick pay from the 7th week onwards (covered by mandatory 
health insurance) from 80 to 70 percent (Bundesministerium der Justiz (1996)). This type of sick pay is paid for 
up to 78 weeks within 3 years for a single type of sickness (Bundesministerium der Justiz (2008)). It should also 
be noted that this reform (the reduction from 80 to 70 percent) had not been reversed by the time of writing. 
There was also a small reform of hospital stay co-payments. In 1994, co-payments were DEM 14 (€7) per day in 
Western Germany and DEM 9 (€4.50) in Eastern Germany. In 1997, they were slightly raised to DEM 17 
(€8.50) and DEM 14 (€7) in Western and Eastern Germany, respectively. Although the reform of 1997 concurs 
with the treatment period, the raise of co-payments by €1.50 in Western Germany (€2.50 in Eastern Germany) is 
minute compared to the cut in wages by 20 percent for each sickness day.  
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percent of the wage. According to Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv (1997), these lawsuits were 
generally won. Hence, as of December 1997, over 15 million employees were covered by 
collective bargaining contracts that guaranteed them sick pay of 100 percent of their wage, 
which implies full coverage of about 55 percent of all employees (not counting civil servants, 
who were not affected by the reform). Indeed, according to a 1998 publication by the German 
Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag), 80 percent of employees were receiving sick pay 
corresponding to 100 percent of their wage, and the remaining 20 percent were largely those 
not covered by collective bargaining contracts (Deutscher Bundestag (1998), p. 17).20  
This group of workers without collective bargaining coverage comprises our treatment 
group, which we compare to the control group of workers covered by collective bargaining 
contracts using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Nevertheless, some 
measurement error can be expected in the treatment status for two major reasons. First, some 
workers in our control group did in fact receive ‘treatment’ because their collective contract 
did not provide for sick pay covering 100 percent of their wage. Second, more workers 
received treatment immediately after the reform became effective (October 1, 1996) than by 
the middle of 1997 or later because it took time for lawsuits to establish that the old rules 
applied for most workers covered by collected bargaining. Both these sources of measurement 
(classification) error are likely to lead to an attenuation bias; that is, because estimates of the 
treatment effect are biased toward zero, the true effects might be larger than those estimates.21 
However, we assessed the second measurement problem by producing estimates using only 
                                                 
20
 We could not find other statistics on the share of employees who still obtained 100 percent of their wage as 
sick pay. We did contact all major trade unions, but most information they provided referred to regulations in 
specific contracts rather than statistics on the number of employees covered by different sick pay regimes. 
21
 As surveyed in Bound, Bown and Mathiowetz (2001, p. 3725), classification error (measurement error in a 
binary variable) usually leads to bias towards zero, unless classification error is so prevalent that the sign of the 
estimate actually changes. The statement by the German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) above in the text, 
however, suggests that the overlap between collective bargaining coverage and not being affected by the reform 
turned out to be almost perfect so that we have to assume that classification error leads to small attenuation bias 
in our application. In the difference-in-differences context, the classification bias affects the coefficient of the 
dummy variable of the treatment group indicator. However, the interaction coefficient of interest, namely the 
coefficient on the interaction between the treatment indicator and the reform period will also be attenuated 
because only part of the indicated treatment group will actually have been treated. This implies that the true 
effects are probably even somewhat larger than the ones we estimate. 
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1998 as the treatment period thus ignoring 1997 (a time of ongoing lawsuits). These estimates 
were similar to our main results, so we could not find evidence for attenuation bias. 
Two years after the late 1996 reduction in sick pay, the right-wing coalition 
government between the Christian Democrats and the Liberals ended after a regular election 
installed a left-wing coalition government between the Social Democrats and the Green Party. 
As a result, on January 1, 1999, only two months after the change of government, the 1996 
sick pay reform was repealed. This introduction and then repeal of the reform within such a 
short period allows us to estimate the effects of reduced sick pay through both the switch-on 
and switch-off effects of the policy change.  
Methodologically, the question arises whether policy endogeneity or anticipation 
effects may bias our estimates. However, any transitory developments in absence from work 
or other health related outcomes that might have triggered policy reforms are taken care of by 
our difference-in-differences estimation strategy (as long as these shocks affected treatment 
and control groups similarly). Furthermore, an electronic search of a major German 
newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for articles on sick pay revealed that a 
motivation for the reduction in sick pay were not a recent rise in absence rates, but a gradual 
realization that the German labor market regulations built up over decades had reduced labor 
market competitiveness. Furthermore, the debate on the reform only heated up after April 6th 
1996, when the Minister of Labor proposed changes to sick pay, which is already after our 
pre-reform years 1994 and 1995. The law was passed on September 13, 1996, only slightly 
more than 2 weeks before it became effective. 
 
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
To the best of our knowledge, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), in 
existence since 1984, is the only person-level dataset providing information on both workers’ 
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absence from work and worker coverage by collective bargaining contracts. Whereas 
information on absence, asked as the number of days the worker was absent from work in the 
previous year, is collected annually, information on a worker’s coverage by a collective 
bargaining contract is only available for the 1995 survey. However, because average tenure in 
Germany is longer than in the U.K. or the U.S. (in 1998, 10.4 years versus 8.2 and 6.6 years, 
respectively; Auer and Cazes (2000)), one option for the empirical strategy is to use the 1995 
information on coverage by a collective bargaining contract and impute this value for each 
individual in all other waves. Nevertheless, because an employee may alter the treatment 
status by changing employer, this procedure may blur the partition of the sample into 
treatment and control groups to produce a third source of potential attenuation bias in our 
estimates (see Section 2.2). We therefore restrict the sample to workers who did not change 
employer during the years under consideration (hereafter, ‘firm stayers’).22 Specifically, this 
means that when defining treatment and control groups, we include only workers who 
responded to the 1995 question on collective bargaining coverage and did not change 
employer during the 1996/1997/1998 period when reduced sick pay was in place (the 
treatment period). Appendix 2.1 and Appendix 2.2 detail our selection of the estimation 
sample for this study.23 
For the years prior to the reform, we use GSOEP data for 1994 and 1995 (days absent 
surveyed in 1995 and 1996, respectively) but exclude 1996 data because they could be partly 
affected by the October 1 implementation of the reform. In addition, 1996 was the beginning 
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 It should be noted that in Germany, in contrast to some other countries, employers agreeing to a collective 
bargaining contract must apply its terms to all workers in the company, not simply to workers that belong to the 
trade union negotiating the contract. Employers can avoid collective bargaining contracts, however, by leaving 
the employers’ federation. However, if employers had so changed their status, it would be yet another source of 
attenuation bias.  
23
 In order to gauge whether these restrictions generate a selected sample, we regressed indicators for a) being a 
mover, b) for answering to the question on collective bargaining and on c) leaving the panel survey between 
1995 and 1997 (panel attrition is an especially important issue for the fixed-effects estimators) on days of 
absence in 1995 (before the reform) and other controls. It turns out that a) being a mover and b) answering the 
question on collective bargaining coverage is not related to pre-reform absence, whereas c) leaving the panel is 
positively correlated with days of absence. Here, for the age group 20-55, which we mainly focus on, increasing 
the days of absence by 50 days (50 days is already the 98th percentile of days of absence) raises the probability of 
leaving the sample by 9.5 percentage points. 
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of the lawsuits clarifying that previous collective bargaining contracts made the reform 
ineffective for most workers these contracts covered (see Section 2.2). These exclusions leave 
1997 and 1998 as the viable years for examining effects when the reduced sick pay reform 
was in place (because of the 1997 lawsuits, we also check the sensitivity of our results when 
only 1998 is considered as the treatment year). Because the reform was repealed on January 1, 
1999, GSOEP data referring to the years 1999 and 2000 provide the sample for the post-
reform period. 
Table 2.1 displays the sample means by reform period (pre-reform, reform, post-
repeal) and by coverage by collective bargaining contracts. The sample consists of workers 
aged between 20 and 64 years who are not self-employed nor students or apprentices. 
Although the sample size changes across the years due to panel attrition and panel 
refreshment samples, it is lowest during the reform years because we exclude workers who 
changed employer during these years. Nevertheless, not only should the rich set of control 
variables contained in the GSOEP account for attrition based on observables, we also present 
fixed-effects estimates (see Section 2.4 below) that account for attrition based on unobserved 
variables as long as their effects are constant over time. 
It should be noted, however, that as the outcome variable, we only observe the total 
number of absence/sickness days in a calendar year, not the number and length of specific 
sickness spells. Moreover, although the original GSOEP question asks about workdays lost 
due to illness, the fact that we observe some people reporting sickness durations exceeding the 
number of working days indicates that the measurement of absence might be a mix of lost 
workdays and the total number of sick days (including weekends and public holidays).24 
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 The Ministry of Health also collects data on absence from the public health insurance system and publishes it 
on an annual basis. The average absence rates (percent of working days lost due to sickness) are 4.74, 4.79, 5.08, 
and 4.75, for 1993-1996, respectively, 4.19, 4.13 for 1997 and 1998, and 4.27 and 4.22 for the years 2000 and 
2001, respectively. These absence rates, which refer to the population of workers covered by public health 
insurance (which is the vast majority), correspond to what we observe in the GSOEP data (based on 253 working 
days and on all workers: 4.99, 5.06, and 4.78 percent in 1993, 1994 and 1995, respectively. Then during the 
reform these shares are 4.20 and 4.64 percent in 1997 and 1998 and after the reform 4.39 and 4.29 percent in 
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As illustrated in the upper part of Figure 2.1, the average number of days absent 
differs between treatment (not covered by a collective agreement) and control (covered 
workers) groups, indicating that the former generally report fewer days of absence. This 
finding holds true before, during and after the reform, except for workers under 40 following 
repeal (see the lower part of Figure 2.1). Nevertheless, the raw means also suggest that the 
reform did have an effect on absence. That is, whereas the absence gap between treated and 
control observations prior to the reform was -3.4 days (8.8 days for workers without coverage 
and 12.2 days for covered workers), this gap widened to -4.7 days during the reform years 
only to shrink again to -2.0 days after its repeal. The rise and fall of this gap between treated 
and control observations is even more pronounced when the analytical focus shifts to younger 
workers. As the lower part of the figure illustrates, younger workers (below 55 or 40 years of 
age) seem to have reacted more strongly to the reform. For treated workers younger than 55 
years of age, the average number of days absent decreased from 8.1 to 6.4 days during the 
reform period but rose to 9.3 days following repeal. The change in the gap between treated 
and control observations is even more pronounced, moving from -3.3 pre-treatment to -5.6 
during treatment and down to -1.4 after treatment (repeal). For workers younger than 40, these 
averages are -2.5, -4.3 and +0.9, respectively.  
Although these numbers represent raw gaps that do not take observed or unobserved 
heterogeneity into account, they nevertheless suggest that the reform did have an effect on 
workers, especially those younger than 55 years of age. Older workers, in contrast, are likely 
to be less credit constrained and may thus be less sensitive to reduced sick pay. Their absence 
may also be more strongly driven by genuine health concerns and hence less influenced by 
financial incentives. We therefore conduct an analysis of the treatment effects for all workers 
(aged 20 to 64) and then examine restricted age groups. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1999 and 2000, respectively. So despite the slightly different populations, the GSOEP and the Ministry of Health 
data seem to indicate similar absence rates. 
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As Table 2.1 shows, treatment and control groups not only differ systematically in 
their average number of days absent but also in other characteristics. For instance, the 
treatment group earns lower hourly wages than the control group (by between 4 and 9 percent, 
depending on the period considered).25 Moreover, although both groups have roughly the 
same average age, gender, civil status and health indicators, the treatment group is somewhat 
more educated and somewhat less likely to be blue collar or work part time.26 However, the 
most striking differences between the treatment and control groups are in terms of tenure, firm 
size, industry and civil service status. That is, workers without collective bargaining coverage 
(the treatment group) have lower tenure; work in smaller firms; are much more likely to work 
in services like trade, real estate and business activities; and are generally no civil servants.27 
These differences between the two groups persist across the observation period: there are no 
major compositional changes between the covered and uncovered groups across time. 
Nevertheless, the regression analysis reported below controls for any compositional changes 
related to observed or time-constant unobserved characteristics.  
Table 2.2 displays the distribution of the outcome variable, the annual number of days 
a worker was absent from work. In almost all periods, the 4th decile of the absence days’ 
distribution is 0 or 1, meaning that almost half the workers are not absent from work for a 
single day. Moreover, even though the median number of days absent is 2 in the treatment 
group and 4 or 5 among the controls, the distribution is highly skewed to the left with the 7th 
decile between 6 and 12 days, the 9th decile between 20 and 30 days and the 99th percentile 
                                                 
25
 Based on the assumption that reduced sick pay might lead to lower (efficiency) wages and thus might have 
both a direct effect on absence and an indirect effect through the wage rate, we estimated the effects of the sick 
pay reform on regular wages using standard difference-in-differences models with control variables and fixed-
effect estimates. However, contrary to what efficiency wage theory might predict, all estimates of wage effects 
are insignificant, with most point estimates positive. This observation is consistent with experimental evidence in 
Dürsch, Oechsller and Vadovic (2008) who find barely any effort response by workers to sick pay. In our study, 
both these results support the interpretation that changes in the raw wage gap between treatment and control 
groups can be explained by compositional effects. 
26
 Detailed information on the variables contained in the GSOEP is provided in Haisken-DeNew and Frick 
(2001). 
27
 Treated observations indicating that the individual is a civil servant most probably represent classification 
error in the civil service or the collective bargaining status in the original GSOEP data. The coding error affects 
only 2 percent of the sample assigned ‘treatment’ status. We remain conservative by keeping the data as they are, 
because if these observations were in fact controls, this classification error would generate attenuation bias. 
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at 98 or more days. Thus, our estimation strategy must take into account the heavy censoring 
of the outcome distribution at zero.  
 
2.4 Effects of the sick pay reform on absence from work 
We begin by estimating linear difference-in-differences models with the following 
specification: 
 
absenceit = α + β1X it + β2reformt + β3nocoveragei + τ(reformt × nocoveragei ) + ε it  
 (1) 
where absence denotes the number of days of absence and reform is a dummy variable 
indicating the time period during which the reduced sick pay reform was in place (1997 and 
1998) and valued at zero pre-reform and post-repeal. Likewise, nocoverage is a dummy 
variable indicating that a worker was not covered by a collective bargaining contract (the 
treatment group). This nocoverage indicator controls for differences in absence rates between 
the treatment and control groups, which in the absence of any reform are assumed to be 
constant across time (the identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences estimator).  
Time-specific variations in absence affecting both groups similarly are controlled for 
by the reform dummy as well as further time effects.28 The difference-in-differences estimator 
is given by τ , which indicates the change in the absence differential between treatment and 
control groups after sick pay was reduced from 100 to 80 percent. Specification (1) includes 
no control variables. However, specifications (2)-(4) stepwise add control variables to allow 
for compositional changes in the two groups across time and improve the efficiency of the 
                                                 
28 These time effects control for macro shocks as long as these affect treatment and control groups similarly. 
Separate time effects for treatment and control groups would make the treatment effect unidentified. However, 
because treatment and control groups are distributed differently across industries, we could allow for industry-
specific time and treatment effects and thereby allow for different effects of the macroeconomy on treatment and 
control groups. Because sample sizes shrink too much to estimate the industry-specific effects precisely, we have 
compared the average treatment effects on the treated, obtained as a weighted average of industry-specific 
treatment effects, with the main estimates reported in this paper. The differences in the point estimates were 
mostly minor. 
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difference-in-differences estimator as long as they can be regarded as exogenous. The first 
group of variables, included in specification (2), are the regional unemployment rate, the log 
hourly wage, age, civil status (married, children), gender and some interactions between them. 
We employ these standard controls from the absence literature because of their likely impact 
on the incidence of sickness through their effect on the benefits and costs of shirking through 
absence. Specification (3) then integrates a further set of controls by including education, 
citizenship, and job and firm characteristics, as well as a dummy for West Germany (see 
Table 2.1 for details). The full specification (4) adds a last set of controls that refer to ‘health 
at present’ and ‘satisfaction with health’ as asked in the GSOEP. If respondents answer these 
health-related questions truthfully irrespective of their potential shirking behavior and if the 
reform had no impact on health (see Section 2.5), these variables are valid controls; otherwise, 
they are endogenous.  
Table 2.3 shows the results for the OLS difference-in-differences estimator when both 
the pre-reform and post-repeal period are simultaneously included as the reference period 
(here and in the following, we use robust standard errors clustered at the person level). Hence, 
this phase of the analysis does not distinguish between the reform’s switch-on and switch-off 
effects but rather compares the difference between the treatment and control groups during the 
reform with that before or after its repeal. This approach increases the sample size and hence 
the precision of the estimates. 
To check the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the control variables just 
described (the coefficients of the control variables are reported in Appendix 3.3), in Table 2.3, 
we report the estimated treatment effects for specification (1) through (4). In this table, we 
also report the marginal effects at the mean of the difference-in-differences estimates of a 
count-data model, which is expected to fit the data better because of the dependent variable’s 
count nature. We use the negative binomial model, NEGBIN, where the right hand side index 
of equation (1) enters an exponential function to model the expected value of absence days; 
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for an application in the context of absence, see Winkelmann (1999); technical descriptions of 
the NEGBIN II model that we apply here can be found in Cameron and Trivedi (1998, p. 
70ff.) or Winkelmann (2008, p.134ff.); nonlinear difference-in-differences models are 
discussed in Athey and Imbens (2006). The parameters reported here are the incremental 
effects of the treatment indicator (the interaction term) at the data mean.29  
However, because the restriction of the sample to firm stayers may cause systematic 
attrition not only based on observed characteristics (which we control for in the OLS and 
NEGBIN estimates) but also based on unobserved characteristics, we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity by reporting (linear) fixed-effects estimates. More specifically, we identify the 
policy reform effect using only the ‘within individual variation’, because the fixed-effects 
estimator effectively assesses the response to the reform by considering only treated and 
control individuals observed both during the reform and in a period without reform. 
In terms of the estimate’s sensitivity to the inclusion of control variables, controlling 
for compositional changes matters mostly for the estimated standard errors (and hence the 
statistical significance of the estimates). The point estimates are rather similar across 
specifications. Therefore, below we report estimates from the full specification (4) that have 
lower standard errors. 
As regards the different modeling strategies, the differences in the point estimates 
between OLS and NEGBIN are minor, meaning that despite its theoretical deficiencies, the 
OLS model seemingly provides a very good approximation of the treatment effect at the 
mean. However, not surprisingly, most standard errors are somewhat smaller in the NEGBIN 
model, which is tailored to fit the count data. In addition, even though both the OLS and 
NEGBIN models suggest that the decrease in sick pay reduced the number of absence days 
per year by 2, this effect is only statistically significant in the NEGBIN model. Once we 
                                                 
29
 Ai and Norton (2003) derive a correct presentation of the cross derivative and cross difference in nonlinear 
models with interaction terms. However, this cross difference is not equal to the treatment effect shown in 
Puhani (2008). 
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control for unobserved heterogeneity in a (linear) fixed-effects model, the point estimate 
becomes somewhat smaller (and insignificant) with an estimated reduction of 1.2 days in 
specification (4). Given that for the treated group the mean number of days absent was 8.8 
before the reform, this figure amounts to a reduction in absence of between 14 and 24 percent, 
which is sizable. 
As hinted at in the previous section, based on the raw data, we might expect the effect 
of the reform to be higher among younger workers. Therefore, in Table 2.4, we provide the 
difference-in-differences estimates for the different age groups (here and subsequently, for 
full specification (4) with all control variables). We find that in all models, the point estimates 
become larger when older workers (aged 56–64) are excluded. More specifically, for the age 
group 20–55, the fixed-effects estimate shows a significant 2.4 reduction in days absent per 
year. For the further restricted age group 20–40, at 2.2 days, this reduction is somewhat 
smaller. We do not provide separate point estimates for older workers, because the precision 
of these estimates is too low (for the age group 56-64, the standard errors range between 4 and 
6 days, so that all estimates are statistically insignificant; the point estimates even change 
sign). Similarly, if we estimate the effects separately for men and women, the estimates 
become too imprecise to reach firm conclusions on gender differences: point estimates are 
negative for both genders and there is no clear pattern for whom the point estimates are larger. 
 
2.4.1 Effects at different points of the distribution 
The skewed nature of the distribution of absence days, with a high probability mass at 
zero, raises the question of whether the reform had a larger effect on longer or on shorter 
durations of absence. To answer this question, we describe the reform’s effect at different 
parts of the distribution by difference-in-differences quantile regressions (for a technical 
description see Athey and Imbens (2006), p. 446f.; another application is Song and 
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Manchester (2007), Koenker (2005), Chapter 2, provides a general introduction to quantile 
regression). Quantile regression difference-in-differences implies stronger identifying 
assumptions than does OLS because we must assume that the differences in the distributions 
(not simply the differences in the means) between treatment and control groups would have 
remained constant in the absence of reform. Hence, in Table 2.5, we show difference-in-
differences quantile estimates by decile, again for the three age groups sampled. 
Theoretically, the OLS estimate is the mean of the coefficients at all quantiles; however, as 
the results show, up to the 4th decile, the effect is (virtually) zero. This finding is not 
surprising given that around 40 percent of all workers in the sample report not having been 
absent for a single day. The point estimates of the reform’s effect on days absent then grow 
even more negative with increasing deciles. For all workers (i.e., aged 20–64), by the 9th 
decile, the point estimate is a statistically significant 4.8 days reduction in absence.30 It should 
also be noted that the 9th decile of the number of days absent for the treatment group is 23, 
which corresponds to a sizable reduction in absence of more than 20 percent. In other words, 
the quantile regressions reveal that it is mainly absence durations of several weeks (cumulated 
over the year) that are reduced by the reform. 
Once the sample is restricted to workers aged 20–55 or 20–40, we obtain statistical 
significance from the 7th decile onwards, with 7th decile estimates of -0.8 in both cases. 
Given that the 7th decile of absence days in the treatment group before the reform was 8 days, 
this figure constitutes a reduction of almost one tenth. The reduction becomes larger at higher 
deciles (both absolutely and relatively) for the group aged 20–55. In the 20–40 age group, the 
point estimates at the very high quantiles (95th and 98th) are the largest of all quantiles but 
are statistically insignificant because of the large standard errors associated with the 
sensitivity to outliers of quantile regressions for extreme quantiles of the distribution.  
                                                 
30
 The displayed quantile regression estimates, obtained using the econometric software package Stata 10, take 
sampling weights into account. Standard errors reported for the quantile regressions do not allow for clustering; 
however, we find that block-bootstrapped standard errors that do take clustering into account differ little from 
the asymptotic standard errors ignoring clustering in an unweighted regression.  
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In results not shown here both OLS and probit estimates cannot detect any effect of 
the reform on the incidence of absence (i.e. a binary indicator of whether a person has been 
absent for at least one day or not). This is in line with the quantile regression estimates which 
do not find any effect near the median of the days of absence distribution.  
 
2.4.2 Switch-on and switch-off effects 
Because our dataset includes information on absence before and during the reform and 
after its repeal, we can estimate the effect of the reduction in sick pay (switch on) separately 
from the subsequent repeal and increase in sick pay (switch off). Doing so has two 
advantages. First, the difference-in-differences approach used here relies on the identifying 
assumption that in the counterfactual absence of the reform, the gap in absence days between 
treatment and control groups would have remained constant. One reason for violating this 
assumption would be another incident or reform of which the researcher is unaware that might 
have had a differential impact on absence days for both groups. To dissipate such doubts, 
research designs that introduce and subsequently take back a reform are very helpful. If both 
effects have similar values and both indicate that absence is lower with lower sick pay, we can 
have more confidence that the effects estimated are genuinely caused by the sick pay reform.  
In fact, the above-mentioned estimates do not distinguish between the pre-reform and 
post-repeal periods, which implies that the introduction of the reform has the same impact on 
absence (in absolute terms) as its repeal. To check this assumption, we estimate the effects of 
the reform’s implementation (switch on) and repeal (switch off) separately. Table 2.6 presents 
the switch-on and switch-off estimates separately by age group based on data for the years 
1994, 1995, 1997 and 1998 for the switch-on effects and for the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 
2000 for the switch-off effects. Table 2.7 then reports the corresponding quantile regression 
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estimates. The models are specified so that a negative estimate always implies that, as 
expected, absence is lower during the period of reduced sick pay.  
In Table 2.6, all switch-on and switch-off point estimates are negative in absolute 
value. In the NEGBIN model, all coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. 
Hence, we argue that the reform had a genuine effect on days absent. Interestingly, however, 
when we compare the absolute size of the switch-on and switch-off effects in Table 2.6, we 
find that in all cases (except for the age group 20-64 in the fixed-effects estimates) the switch-
off point estimates are larger than the switch-on effects (this holds at virtually all quantiles, as 
shown in Table 2.7). However, this difference is only statistically significant in OLS 
specifications that neither take into account the count data nature of the outcome variable nor 
unobserved heterogeneity. In the NEGBIN model the point estimate is an insignificant 0.44 
days larger for the switch-off effect compared to the switch-on effect, but this difference 
amounts only to insignificant 0.14 days in the fixed-effects model for workers aged 20-55. 
Because these differences are not statistically significant, one choice would be to ignore them; 
however, the difference becomes larger – albeit insignificant – for the 20–40 age group at 
1.47 days (marginally insignificant at the 10 percent level) in the NEGBIN, and at 1.37 
(insignificant) in the fixed-effects model. 
One possible basis for interpreting these larger switch-off point estimates is the 
experimental and psychological literature on extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation. According 
to Pinder (2008, p. 81), intrinsic motivation, roughly defined, relates to ‘behavior that is 
performed for its own sake rather than for the purpose of acquiring any material or social 
rewards’. The fact that the switch-off effects are larger than the switch-on effects is congruent 
with experimental evidence from Gächter, Kessler and Königstein (2007) that incentive 
contracts negatively impact voluntary cooperation among individuals, and that these negative 
effects persist even after the incentive contract is repealed. It also relates to an ongoing debate 
in the psychological literature on whether extrinsic motivation may crowd out intrinsic 
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motivation (Pinder, 2008, p. 86ff.). That is, because sick pay before the reform was 100 
percent, showing up for work in Germany had an aspect of voluntary cooperation, at least for 
workers not seeking promotion, and such voluntary cooperation can be linked to intrinsic 
motivation. Reduced sick pay then added an element of immediate extrinsic motivation that 
was abolished after the reform was repealed. Hence, in light of Gächter, Kessler and 
Königstein’s (2007) findings, the experience of extrinsic motivation may have crowded out 
some intrinsic motivation even after repeal. Nevertheless, the extrinsic motivation of reduced 
sick pay during the reform period was effective in reducing absence, which supports the 
economist’s paradigm that people react to incentives. 
 
2.4.3 Placebo estimates and estimates by calendar year 
Because we have two years of observations for each ‘regime’ (pre-reform, reform, 
after repeal), we can in theory test the identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences 
estimator by, for example, testing whether a ‘placebo treatment effect’ estimate for the year 
1995 (pre-reform) with 1994 as the base year (also pre-reform) is equal to zero. In Table 2.8, 
we therefore define 1994 as the base year and estimate ‘treatment effects’ for all further years 
used in the previous estimates: 1995 (pre-reform), 1997, 1998 (both reform) and 1999, 2000 
(both post-repeal). If the difference-in-differences identifying assumption is correct, only the 
grey-shaded coefficients (reform period) should be different from zero.  
Table 2.8 shows that standard errors become very large when estimating treatment 
effects by calendar year (most standard errors are between 1 and 2 days, some are even 
larger), so that hardly any coefficient is statistically significant. Still, larger negative 
coefficients are (with few exceptions) observed mainly during the reform period. After the 
repeal of the reform, some point estimates turn quite large and positive, especially for the year 
2000 (two of them even significant), but the standard errors are large as well. We cannot 
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determine whether this finding is due to crowding out of intrinsic motivation as mentioned in 
the previous subsection or due to a violation of the identifying assumption. In general, we 
observe a clear decrease in absence with the onset of the reform period and a subsequent 
increase after the repeal of the reform. This holds both across the defined age group samples 
and across estimation methods (OLS, NEGBIN, and linear fixed-effects). 
 
2.5 Effects of the sick pay reform on other health-related outcomes 
Although reduced sick pay decreased absence from work, it remains unclear whether 
this means that the reform was beneficial from a welfare perspective. In this section, we show 
that the reform surprisingly even reduced the average number of days spent in hospital. This 
suggests that at least part of the absence reduced by the reform was genuinely health related. 
However, we also show that the reform was not associated with a significant reduction in 
indicators of subjective health or long-term sickness. Taken together, the reform might have 
reduced inefficient use of the health care system. 
According to the OECD, in 1995, just before the sick pay reform, health expenditure 
in Germany as a percentage of the GDP was 10.1 percent, higher than in the U.K. (6.9 
percent) but lower than in the U.S. (13.3 percent). Life expectancy at birth, however, was 
rather similar in these three countries (between 75.7 and 76.7 years). The number of doctor 
visits per year was highest in Germany (6.4), followed by the U.K. (6.1) and the U.S. (3.3); by 
2003, these gaps had become even larger, at 7.6, 5.2 and 3.9, respectively. The average 
number of hospital stays per person was 0.18, 0.21 and 0.12 and the average length of stay for 
acute care was 11.4, 7.1 and 6.5 days for Germany, the U.K. and the U.S., with Germany 
having by far the longest average duration of acute care stays. Hence, contacts with the 
medical system are seemingly more frequent and longer in Germany. Because these OECD 
figures (for the whole population) correspond roughly to the sample means in the GSOEP (for 
Chapter 2   
 75 
a sample of workers aged 20–64), we consider three further outcome variables: the number of 
doctor visits in the last 3 months (asked in the GSOEP), number of days in hospital (including 
zeros) and number of hospital stays (see Table 2.9 for the sample distributions). We then go 
on to investigate the reform’s effects on two subjective health indicators and an indicator for 
long-term sickness before we conclude by investigating the reform’s effects on satisfaction 
with financial security in case of sickness.  
 
2.5.1 Effects on usage of the health care system 
In Table 2.10, we report difference-in-differences estimates for the three outcomes 
concerning usage of the health care system by age group. Not only are all point estimates 
negative, but those for number of days in hospital and number of hospital stays are all 
statistically significant. Moreover, the fixed-effects estimates for these two variables are 
similar to the OLS results, implying that the OLS findings are not driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity. Because of the extreme extent of censoring of the hospital visit outcome 
variables, we place special emphasis on the NEGBIN estimates. The NEGBIN point estimates 
are somewhat smaller in absolute value; however, they still remain economically and 
statistically significant. For the 20–64 age group, compared to a pre-reform treatment group 
average of 1.35, the reform reduced the average number of days in hospital by 0.41 days 
(almost one third, 30 percent) on average. Given that it also reduced the number of stays by an 
estimated 0.045 (41 percent) at least part of the reduction in the number of days hospitalized 
is explained by the actual elimination of some hospital stays. Although these estimates may 
seem large, they can be made plausible by doctors’ incentives given the low occupancy rates 
of hospital beds: these ranged between only 76 and 82 percent in Germany in the period 1996 
through 2006 (data from the German Hospital Society, Deutsche Krankenhaus Gesellschaft). 
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2.5.2 Effects on health indicators  
Given the reform’s effects on absence from work and hospital stays, we ask whether 
the estimated reductions had a detrimental effect on health. Hence we use the two subjective 
health indicators asked in the GSOEP (health at present and satisfaction with health) as 
outcome variables. Subjective health measures have been critically discussed in the literature. 
On the one hand, economists usually postulate that each person should be the best judge of his 
or her utility and this may also be true for health (Dolan (2000), p. 1732). In a literature 
survey, Idler and Benyamini (1997) find that ‘global self-rated health is an independent 
predictor of mortality in nearly all of the studies, despite the inclusion of numerous specific 
health status indicators’ (p. 21). On the other hand, inter-person comparisons of self-rated 
health seem to be plagued by people’s adaptation to changing states of health as well as 
changing reference groups over the life cycle and with changing health (Groot, 2000).  
In addition to subjective health, we check whether the reform had an impact on the 
incidence of continuous sickness spells lasting for at least six weeks. This is the only indicator 
in the GSOEP that we could find as an objective proxy for serious illness. The subjective 
health measures are recorded on Likert scales and have been normed to range between 0 and 
1. Control variables are the same as in specification (3) of Table 2.3. We report OLS and 
fixed-effects estimates, for the whole sampling period and separately for switch-on and 
switch-off effects. The reform’s effects on the subjective health indicators are presented in 
Table 2.11.31  
In the table, most of the estimates are statistically insignificant. For health at present, 
two of the switch-off fixed effects estimates are negative and statistically significant at the 10 
percent level. However, neither the corresponding estimates for satisfaction with health nor 
the corresponding switch-on estimates are statistically significant. For satisfaction with health 
                                                 
31
 We use the same sample as for the estimation of the reform’s effects on absence. Hence, in order to be in the 
sample, a person has to have valid responses in the current and in the consecutive year. The reason is that the 
information on absence is obtained from retrospective information in the following year’s GSOEP questionnaire. 
Our sample definitions guarantee that the estimates of absence and health effects refer to the same population. 
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as the outcome, three of the nine OLS estimates are statistically significant and negative, but 
none of the fixed-effects estimates is statistically significant. Hence, from these estimates, 
there is no convincing evidence that the sick pay reform had a negative effect on subjective 
health.  
Nevertheless, health may be deteriorating over time: in Table 2.11, we have 
considered subjective health in the current year (1997 and 1998 for the reform years). In 
Table 2.12 we investigate whether the reform had an impact on subjective health a year later 
(so the outcomes for the reform years are measured in 1998 and 1999; for the control years, 
we also lag the outcomes by one year accordingly). As the table shows, all point estimates are 
close to zero and none of them is statistically significant. Hence, when considering subjective 
health indicators for all employees, either in the current or in the following year, there is no 
robust evidence for the reform to have had any significantly negative effects.  
Because the population of employees consists of a lot of people who have not been 
sick during the entire year, we narrow down the population of interest in the following: first, 
we consider the reform’s effects on subjective health only on employees who state to have 
visited the doctor at least once during the previous three months (i.e. people who experienced 
some sort of sickness). Second, we restrict the sample further by considering only employees 
who have been in hospital during the current year. We then estimate the reform’s effects on 
subjective health for these subpopulations. Again, we distinguish between the effects on 
subjective health in the current year and between effects on subjective health in the 
subsequent year to capture any potentially protracted effects. The results for workers who 
have been to the doctor are presented in Table 2.13 and Table 2.14 and those for workers who 
have been to hospital in Table 2.15 and Table 2.16, respectively. As can be seen from Table 
2.13 and Table 2.14, there is no convincing indication that the sick pay reform decreased 
subjective health outcomes either in the current or in the following year. There is one negative 
and statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) coefficient in the fixed effects model: the 
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switch-off effect for the age group 20-40 in the estimate for health at present. However, the 
corresponding estimate for satisfaction with health is statistically insignificant. The two OLS 
estimates which are negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level in Table 2.13 
are close to zero and statistically insignificant when a fixed-effects model is estimated. The 
one statistically significant fixed-effects estimate in Table 2.14 (effect on health at present in 
the following year) is positive instead of negative and insignificant in the corresponding 
estimate for satisfaction with health as the outcome. When we restrict the sample to workers 
who have been in hospital (see Table 2.15 and Table 2.16), there are again no statistically 
significant negative effects on subjective health.32 
To investigate at least a proxy for an objective health outcome in the GSOEP, we use 
the question on a continuous sickness spell of 6 weeks or longer. The way this question will 
be understood by most Germans is referring to being sick as declared by a physician, because 
for sickness spells longer than 2 days, employees have to provide a doctor’s certificate. Note 
that although we have already shown in the previous section that the reform predominantly 
reduced longer durations of absence, as demonstrated by the quantile regression estimates, 
longer duration there meant longer days of absence accumulated over a calendar year, that is, 
a long duration of absence might be an accumulation of many shorter spells. Here, we look at 
a continuous sickness spell of at least 6 weeks. As Table 2.17 shows, the sick pay reform 
seems to have decreased, not increased the incidence of long and continuous sickness spells. 
The estimates indicate a 2 to 3 percentage point reduction in long-term sickness due to the 
reform and they are statistically significant. One explanation for the reduced incidence of 
long-term sickness may again be the incentive effects provided by the reform that seem to 
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 Note that in these estimates, the number of observations who are treated during the reform years is reduced to 
only 29 to 75 workers (depending on the age group considered). This may explain why there is a positive and 
fairly large estimate of the reform for the age group 20-40 in Table 16. We report no fixed-effects estimates for 
this age group, because we would only have 10 persons in the treatment group during the treatment period with a 
within variation in the treatment status that is needed to identify the fixed-effects estimate. For the age group 20-
64, inference in the fixed effects estimates is also plagued by the low number of persons with a within variation 
in the treatment indicator, which is 26 in this case. 
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have dominated any potentially negative effects on health. To investigate the possibility of 
negative health effects further, we check whether the incidence of long continuous sickness 
spells was increased with a delay of one year: these estimates are provided in the lower panel 
of Table 2.17. Only one of the estimates is statistically significant using OLS (again 
suggestion a reduction in long-term sickness), whereas the corresponding fixed-effects 
estimate is virtually zero and statistically insignificant. All other point estimates are also close 
to zero and statistically insignificant.  
Hence, we conclude that there is no convincing evidence that the sick pay reform 
impaired health outcomes, despite of the fact that it reduced stays in hospital. 
 
2.5.3 Effects on the perception of liquidity constraints in case of sickness 
As a last check, we estimate whether the reform changed the employee’s ‘satisfaction 
with their financial security in the case of sickness’. Again, this question was asked on a 
Likert scale in the GSOEP, which we normalize between 0 (very bad) and 1 (very good). 
During our observation period, this question was only asked in 1997 and 2002, so that we 
only provide switch-off estimates. The results are presented in Table 2.18. For all workers and 
for the restricted sample of workers who have visited the doctor in the last three months at 
least once, none of the point estimates is statistically significant and all point estimates are 
small. If we restrict the sample further to workers who have been to hospital in the current 
year, the number of treated persons in the treatment period becomes very small: there are only 
59, 49, and 22 such persons for the OLS estimates and only 3, 3, and 1 person with a within 
variation in the treatment indicator for the age groups 20-64, 20-55 and 20-40, respectively, so 
that we do not report fixed-effects estimates. We are also cautions in interpreting the estimates 
based on 59, 49, and 22 treated persons in the sample of people who have been to hospital for 
the age groups 20-64, 20-55 and 20-40, respectively, and conclude that at least from the 
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sample of people who have been to the doctor as well as for all workers, we cannot find any 
evidence for negative effects of the reform on the satisfaction with financial security in case 
of sickness. 
 
2.6 Conclusions of Chapter 2 
The economic costs of absence from work can be influenced by economic policy. For 
example, in contrast to the cases of Switzerland, the U.K. or the U.S., German federal law (as 
well as statutes in other continental European countries) dictates that employees receive 100 
percent of their wages as sick pay from day 1 of their absence spell. However, whereas the 
literature to date does suggest that such absence is influenced by economic incentives like 
wages, local unemployment, probationary periods or sick pay, few studies estimate the effects 
of sick pay on absence by way of natural experiments. Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge, ours is the first study to analyze health-related outcomes of sick pay reform and 
also the first to estimate both the switch-on and switch-off effects; that is, the effects of the 
reform’s implementation and its subsequent repeal by a changed federal government.  
The basis of our empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences approach that controls 
for time and group effects. In some specifications, we also control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity by explicitly using the panel nature of the data in a fixed-effects estimation. 
Overall, we estimate that the reduction in sick pay from 100 percent of the wage to 80 percent 
decreased absence days by about 2 days per annum on average, which is equal to about one 
percent of annual working days in Germany (about half the difference between U.S. and 
German absence rates). As our quantile regressions find, this reduction is primarily driven by 
a shortening of very long spells. These results are confirmed by separate estimates for switch-
on and switch-off effects. Our finding is significant in that if labor contributes two-thirds of 
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the GDP, then the ceteris paribus effect of the reform amounts to an increase in the GDP of 
about two thirds of a percent through the reduction of absence from work alone. 
Besides reducing absence from work, decreased sick pay also reduces reliance on the 
health care system, which in Germany has almost zero marginal costs to most individuals (the 
system is mostly public). We find that the reduction in absence due to the reform (by about 2 
days) also reduces the average number of days spent in hospital (by not quite half a day, a 
reduction of 30 percent). Data from the German Hospital Society (Deutsche Krankenhaus 
Gesellschaft) report hospital costs as a percent of GDP at a fairly steady 2.4 percent. This 
would imply that the sick pay reform had saved 0.72 percent of GDP through hospital costs 
alone, and in addition to the two thirds of GDP saved for employers. In sum, the reform might 
have saved up to 1.38 percent of GDP. Although costs saved might be lower if the reduction 
in absence and hospital stays referred to less than average productivity days at work and less 
than average costs per day in hospital, even half a percent of GDP saved would be sizable. 
The policy relevance of these results is reinforced by the fact that we did not find any 
remarkable effect of the reform on subjective health indicators nor on long-term sickness, 
indicating that the reform might have reduced the inefficient use of the medical system. 
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Tables and Figures of Chapter 2 
Table 2-1: Sample means by year and treatment status 
  
Treated Control 
  1994/95 1997/98 1999/00 1994/95 1997/98 1999/00 
Days absent 8.8 8.0 9.7 12.2 12.7 11.7 
Hourly wage 2.47 2.65 2.65 2.56 2.69 2.70 
Regional unemployment rate 10.6 12.6 11.3 10.4 12.4 11.3 
Civil status indicators 
      
Age 38.8 42.9 41.6 40.5 43.5 42.7 
Married 0.60 0.64 0.57 0.63 0.68 0.65 
Female 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.42 0.42 0.41 
Children younger than 16 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.34 
Female × children younger than 16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 
Female × married 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.26 
Educational attainment 
      
Higher education - University degree 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.15 
Higher education - no degree 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.26 
 Apprenticeship 0.53 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.46 
No apprenticeship 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.13 
Job and firm characteristics       
Temporary work contract 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 
Working fulltime 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.85 0.86 0.85 
Blue-collar worker 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.37 0.35 
White-collar worker 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.50 0.51 0.54 
Civil servant 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.11 
Citizenship/region       
German 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.91 
West Germany 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Firm size       
Firm size (1–19) 0.41 0.40 0.34 0.14 0.12 0.14 
Firm size (20–199) 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.28 
Firm size (200–1,999) 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.27 
Firm size (>2,000) 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.32 0.32 0.30 
Tenure       
Tenure (<1 year) 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.08 
Tenure (1–3 years) 0.31 0.06 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.09 
Tenure (3–5 years) 0.18 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.08 
Tenure (5–10 years) 0.19 0.37 0.25 0.21 0.31 0.25 
Tenure (10–15 years) 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Tenure (15–20 years) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.12 
Tenure (>20 years) 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.23 0.29 0.24 
Industry       
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Mining and quarrying 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Manufacturing 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.30 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Construction 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.10 
Transport and communication 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.05 
Financial intermediation 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
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Table 2-1: Sample means by year and treatment status (continued) 
  
Treated Control 
  1994/95 1997/98 1999/00 1994/95 1997/98 1999/00 
Industry       
Real estate and business activities 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Public administration and defense 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.15 
Education 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.06 
Health and social work 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12 
Other social and personal service  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Satisfaction with health       
Very poor 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 Poor 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Satisfactory 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.30 
Good 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.44 0.47 0.45 
Very good 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.17 
Health at present       
Very poor 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 Poor 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 
Satisfactory 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.36 
Good 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.45 
Very good 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 
n 2,227 1,056 1,620 8,024 5,044 5,731 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
 
 
Table 2-2: Percentiles of absence days by period and treatment status 
1994 / 1995  1997 / 1998  1999 / 2000 
  (Pre-reform) (Treatment Period) (Repeal) 
 Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
Percentile 
 (no coll. 
agreement) 
 (coll. 
agreement) 
 (no coll. 
agreement) 
 (coll. 
agreement) 
 (no coll. 
agreement) 
 (coll. 
agreement) 
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 0 1 0 0 0 1 
50 2 5 2 4 2 4 
60 5 8 4 7 5 6 
70 8 12 6 10 8 10 
80 14 16 10 15 12 15 
90 23 30 20 30 21 28 
95 40 49 30 50 36 44 
96 42 60 30 60 42 53 
97 51 65 40 75 52 64 
98 65 90 50 110 80 90 
99 105 125 98 165 117 124 
100 210 365 365 365 365 365 
Mean 8.8 12.2 8.0 12.7 9.7 11.7 
n 2,227 8,024 1,056 5,044 1,620 5,731 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-3: Difference-in-differences estimates 
  
OLS NEGBIN FE 
    
Specification (1) -1.82 -1.97 -1.19 
 (1.44) (1.50) (1.27) 
    
Specification (2) -1.92 -2.07 -1.18 
 (1.42) (1.28) (1.25) 
    
Specification (3) -1.74 -1.94* -1.28 
 (1.37) (1.11) (1.24) 
    
Specification (4) -1.99 -2.07** -1.24 
 (1.33) (0.91) (1.22) 
n 23,702 23,702 23,702 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The specifications 
are distinguished by the set of control variables: specification (1) includes no controls; specification 
(2) adds state unemployment, log hourly wage, civil status indicators, gender and some interaction 
terms to account for compositional changes: specification (3) adds education, citizenship, job and firm 
characteristics, and a dummy for West Germany; specification (4) extends the set of control variables 
by adding reported health status and satisfaction with health. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-4: Difference-in-differences estimates for restricted age groups 
  
OLS NEGBIN FE 
 
   
Age 20-64 -1.99 -2.07** -1.24 
n=23,702 (1.33) (0.91) (1.22) 
    
Age 20-55 -2.85** -2.30*** -2.35** 
n=21,451 (1.24) (0.83) (1.10) 
    
Age 20-40 -2.56** -2.04*** -2.24** 
n=12,097 (1.14) (0.75) (0.98) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
Chapter 2   
 88 
Table 2-5: Difference-in-differences quantile regression estimates 
Percentile 
Age            
20-64 
Pre-
treatment 
percentile 
of 
treatment 
group 
Age           
20-55 
Pre-
treatment 
percentile 
of 
treatment 
group 
Age          
20-40 
Pre-
treatment 
percentile 
of 
treatment 
group 
       
40 0.02 0 -0.07 0 -0.04 0 
 (0.21)  (0.14)  (0.15)  
       
50 -0.20 2 -0.39 2 0.01 3 
 (0.32)  (0.29)  (0.59)  
       
60 -0.28 5 -0.28 5 -0.71 5 
 (0.45)  (0.53)  (0.72)  
       
70 -0.79 8 -0.77* 8 -0.76** 8 
 (0.56)  (0.45)  (0.36)  
       
80 -1.33 14 -1.32** 14 -1.18*** 14 
 (0.99)  (0.58)  (0.36)  
       
90 -4.83** 23 -4.85*** 21 -3.94** 20 
 (2.05)  (1.69)  (1.53)  
       
95 -9.30*** 40 -7.66*** 35 -4.01 30 
 (2.86)  (2.06)  (2.52)  
       
98 -10.49* 65 -15.84** 60 -7.31 50 
 (6.04)  (6.30)  (6.49)  
       
OLS -1.99 - -2.85** - -2.56** - 
 (1.33)  (1.24)  (1.14)  
              
n 23,702   21,451   12,097 
  
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Percentiles of 30 
and lower are zero because more than 30% of the sample did not report a single day of absence. ‘pre-
treatment percentile of treatment group’ refers to the corresponding percentile of the treatment group 
in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-6: Switch-on versus switch-off difference-in-differences estimates 
  
Age 20-64 Age 20-55 Age 20-40 
  
Switch-on Switch-off Switch-on Switch-off Switch-on Switch-off 
       
OLS -1.39 -3.04** -1.97 -4.46*** -1.35 -5.49*** 
 
(1.43) (1.53) (1.29) (1.52) (1.11) (1.86) 
       
Difference  
(off-on) 1.65 2.49* 4.14** 
(p-value) (0.23) (0.07) (0.02) 
n 16,351 13,451 14,865 11,959 8,552 6,338 
 
      
NEGBIN -2.03** -2.05** -2.19** -2.63*** -1.55* -3.02*** 
 
(1.03) (0.91) (0.93) (0.80) (0.84) (0.84) 
       
Difference  
(off-on) 0.02 0.44 1.47 
(p-value) (0.95) (0.54) (0.10) 
n 16,351 13,451 14,865 11,959 8,552 6,338 
 
      
FE -1.39 -1.05 -2.29* -2.43* -1.66 -3.03* 
 
(1.45) (1.39) (1.34) (1.33) (1.29) (1.55) 
    
Difference  
(off-on) -0.34 0.14 1.37 
(p-value) (0.82) (0.93) (0.50) 
n 23,702 21,451 12,097 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The fixed-effects 
switch-on and switch-off estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-7: Switch-on versus switch-off quantile regression difference-in-differences 
estimates  
  
Aged 20–64 Aged 20–55 Aged 20–40 
Percentile Switch-on Switch-off Switch-on Switch-off Switch-on Switch-off 
       
40 0.31 -0.05 -0.00 -0.28 0.27 -0.67*** 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.01) 
       
50 0.10 -0.65** -0.20 -0.88*** 0.41** -1.49*** 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.55) (0.28) (0.20) (0.37) 
       
60 0.25 -0.93** 0.08 -1.10** -0.32 -2.42*** 
 (0.29) (0.39) (0.56) (0.51) (0.61) (0.21) 
       
70 -0.49 -1.57*** -0.51 -1.68*** -0.18 -2.30*** 
 (0.45) (0.38) (0.45) (0.46) (0.37) (0.49) 
       
80 -0.94 -2.81*** -1.19 -2.19*** 0.10 -3.44*** 
 (0.84) (0.72) (0.85) (0.38) (0.63) (0.31) 
       
90 -3.86** -4.33** -3.94** -5.31*** -2.05* -7.71*** 
 (1.95) (1.75) (1.90) (1.29) (1.08) (1.94) 
       
95 -7.74*** -10.16*** -7.28** -10.75*** -4.37 -8.72*** 
 (2.65) (2.56) (3.05) (1.84) (3.34) (2.85) 
       
98 -10.68 -8.20 -9.62* -13.05* -2.80 -12.63*** 
 (8.66) (6.34) (10.91) (6.88) (10.44) (4.77) 
       
OLS -1.39 -3.04** -1.97 -4.46*** -1.35 -5.49*** 
 
(1.43) (1.53) (1.29) (1.52) (1.11) (1.86) 
              
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Percentiles of 30 
and lower are zero because more than 30% of the sample did not report a single day of absence. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-8: ‘Treatment effects’ by calendar year (base year 1994) – including placebo 
estimates  
  
OLS NEGBIN FE 
Age 20-64 
   
1995 * no coll. agr. -1.20 1.84 -0.91 
 (1.50) (1.60) (1.33) 
    
1997 * no coll. agr. -1.94 -1.69 -2.17 
 (1.81) (1.13) (1.53) 
    
1998 * no coll. agr. -2.45 -0.63 -1.52 
 (2.29) (1.80) (2.28) 
    
1999 * no coll. agr. 0.90 0.77 -0.32 
 (1.68) (1.39) (1.54) 
    
2000 * no coll. agr. 0.46 1.66 -1.42 
  (2.63) (1.71) (2.34) 
    
Age 20-55 
   
1995 * no coll. agr. -0.31 2.48 -1.12 
 (1.30) (1.58) (1.35) 
    
1997 * no coll. agr. -1.95 -1.27 -2.94* 
 (1.60) (1.06) (1.51) 
    
1998 * no coll. agr. -2.76 -0.91 -2.90** 
 (1.79) (1.58) (1.80) 
    
1999 * no coll. agr. 1.54 1.28 -0.76 
 (1.48) (1.36) (1.51) 
    
2000 * no coll. agr. 2.85 3.45* -0.21 
  (2.71) (1.89) (2.51) 
    
Age 20-40 
   
1995 * no coll. agr. -0.68 1.49 -2.11 
 (1.41) (1.13) (1.69) 
    
1997 * no coll. agr. -2.01 -1.12 -3.15* 
 (1.53) (1.09) (1.61) 
    
1998 * no coll. agr. -1.58 -0.7 -2.60 
 (1.58) (1.33) (1.72) 
    
1999 * no coll. agr. 1.20 1.62 -1.76 
 (1.57) (1.62) (1.88) 
    
2000 * no coll. agr. 6.77 5.18** 2.37 
  (4.57) (2.60) (4.05) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-9: Percentiles of other health-related outcomes 
  
Doctor visits 
(last 3 months) 
Days in 
hospital 
Number of 
hospital stays 
30 0 0 0 
40 1 0 0 
50 1 0 0 
60 2 0 0 
70 2 0 0 
80 3 0 0 
90 6 0 0 
95 10 7 1 
96 10 10 1 
97 10 12 1 
98 12 15 1 
99 17 24 2 
100 90 220 20 
Mean 2.41 1.16 0.12 
n 23,701 23,680 23,612 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-10: Effects on other health-related outcomes 
  
OLS NEGBIN FE Pre-reform 
mean 
Age 20–64    (n=23,702) 
    
Doctor visits (last 3 months) -0.26 -0.21 0.03 2.2 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.15)  
     
Days in hospital -0.65** -0.41*** -0.62* 1.35 
 (0.30) (0.11) (0.32)  
     
Number of hospital stays -0.061*** -0.045*** -0.065** 0.111 
 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.028)  
 
    
Age 20–55    (n=21,451) 
    
Doctor visits (last 3 months) -0.25 -0.23 -0.01 2.21 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.16)  
     
Days in hospital -0.67** -0.37*** -0.73** 1.12 
 (0.28) (0.10) (0.34)  
     
Number of hospital stays -0.068*** -0.046*** -0.065** 0.108 
 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.031)  
  
    
Age 20–40    (n=12,097) 
    
Doctor visits (last 3 months) -0.42* -0.34** -0.26 1.91 
 (0.22) (0.17) (0.19)  
     
Days in hospital -0.53** -0.25* -0.68** 0.65 
 (0.23) (0.15) (0.29)  
     
Number of hospital stays -0.079*** -0.050*** -0.085* 0.084 
 
(0.031) (0.012) (0.047)  
          
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The ‘pre-reform 
mean’ refers to the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-11: Effects on subjective health indicators (full sample) 
  
OLS OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  
switch off FE 
FE – 
switch on 
FE – 
switch off 
Pre-reform 
mean 
Health at present 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
   
Age 20-64 -0.008 -0.000 -0.022 -0.007 0.003 -0.021* 0.63 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)  
 
       
n 23,702 16,351 13,451 23,702 23,702  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.011 -0.005 -0.024 -0.006 0.005 -0.020 0.63 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)  
 
       
n 21,451 14,865 11,959 21,451 21,451  
 
       
Age 20-40 0.003 0.018 -0.034 -0.002 0.020 -0.031* 0.66 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018)  
 
      
 
n 12,097 8,552 6,338 12,097 12,097  
 
      
 
Satisfaction with health 
 
  
 
  
 
       
Age 20-64 -0.021* -0.019 -0.025** -0.011 -0.008 -0.015 0.69 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)  
 
       
n 23,702 16,351 13,451 23,702 23,702  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.019 -0.018 -0.023* -0.005 -0.002 -0.010 0.70 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)  
 
       
n 21,451 14,865 11,959 21,451 21,451  
 
       
Age 20-40 -0.009 -0.005 -0.023 -0.009 -0.006 -0.012 0.71 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)  
 
      
 
n 12,097 8,552 6,338 12,097 12,097  
 
      
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present is coded in 5, Satisfaction 
with Health in 11 different values. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off estimates are obtained 
from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The ‘pre-reform mean’ refers to the treatment group in 
the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-12: Effects on subjective health indicators in the following year (full sample) 
  
OLS OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  
switch off FE 
FE – 
switch on 
FE – 
switch off 
Pre-reform 
mean 
Health at present (next year) 
  
 
  
  
  
 
   
Age 20-64 0.008 0.004 0.017 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.63 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)  
 
       
n 23,674 16,328 13,438 23,674 23,674  
 
       
Age 20-55 0.005 -0.002 0.018 0.011 0.010 0.014 0.64 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)  
 
       
n 21,426 14,844 11,948 21,426 21,426  
 
       
Age 20-40 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.010 0.67 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017)  
 
      
 
n 12,085 8,543 6,334 12,085 12,085  
 
      
 
Satisfaction with health (next year) 
  
 
  
 
       
Age 20-64 -0.005 -0.010 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.69 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)  
 
       
n 23,674 16,328 13,438 23,674 23,674  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.007 -0.014 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.69 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)  
 
       
n 21,426 14,844 11,948 21,426 21,426  
 
       
Age 20-40 -0.010 -0.014 -0.004 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 0.72 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)  
 
      
 
n 12,085 8,543 6,334 12,085 12,085  
 
      
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present (next year) is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health (next year) in 11 different values. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off 
estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The ‘pre-reform mean’ refers to 
the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-13: Effects on subjective health indicators for the sample of people with positive 
number of doctor visits 
  
OLS OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  
switch off FE 
FE – 
switch on 
FE – 
switch off 
Pre-reform 
mean 
Health at present 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
   
Age 20-64 -0.012 -0.009 -0.020 -0.005 0.005 -0.017 0.61 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)  
 
       
n 15,664 10,790 8,906 15,664 15,664  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.015 -0.012 -0.024 -0.010 -0.001 -0.021 0.61 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)  
 
       
n 13,903 9,631 7,724 13,903 13,903  
 
       
Age 20-40 -0.015 0.002 -0.053 -0.030 -0.010 -0.059* 0.64 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.032)  
 
      
 
n 7,637 5,411 3,977 7,637 7,637  
 
      
 
Satisfaction with health 
 
  
 
  
 
       
Age 20-64 -0.028* -0.029* -0.028 -0.009 -0.007 -0.011 0.67 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)  
 
       
n 15,664 10,790 8,906 15,664 15,664  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.025 -0.027 -0.023 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.67 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)  
 
       
n 13,903 9,631 7,724 13,903 13,903  
 
       
Age 20-40 -0.014 -0.011 -0.019 -0.018 -0.015 -0.023 0.69 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024) (0.016)  
 
      
 
n 7,637 5,411 3,977 7,637 7,637  
 
      
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present is coded in 5, Satisfaction 
with Health in 11 different values. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off estimates are obtained 
from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The ‘pre-reform mean’ refers to the treatment group in 
the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
Chapter 2   
 97 
Table 2-14: Effects on subjective health indicators in the following year for the sample of 
people with positive number of doctor visits in the current year 
  
OLS OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  
switch off FE 
FE – 
switch on 
FE – 
switch off 
Pre-reform 
mean 
Health at present (next year) 
  
 
  
  
  
 
   
Age 20-64 0.006 -0.000 0.017 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.60 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)  
 
       
n 15,652 10,780 8,898 15,652 15,652  
 
       
Age 20-55 0.006 -0.003 0.022 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.60 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)  
 
       
n 13,893 9,623 7,717 13,893 13,893  
 
       
Age 20-40 0.016 0.014 0.025 0.033* 0.045** 0.015 0.64 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024)  
 
      
 
n 7,633 5,409 3,974 7,633 7,633  
 
      
 
Satisfaction with health (next year) 
  
 
  
 
       
Age 20-64 -0.012 -0.017 -0.004 0.003 0.012 -0.009 0.66 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)  
 
       
n 15,652 10,780 8,898 15,652 15,652  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.014 -0.021 -0.003 0.005 0.013 -0.006 0.66 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)  
 
       
n 13,893 9,623 7,717 13,893 13,893  
 
       
Age 20-40 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 0.012 0.029 -0.013 0.68 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)  
 
      
 
n 7,633 5,409 3,974 7,633 7,633  
 
      
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present (next year) is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health (next year) in 11 different values. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off 
estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The ‘pre-reform mean’ refers to 
the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-15: Effects on subjective health indicators for the sample of people with positive 
number of days in hospital  
  
OLS OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  
switch off FE 
FE – 
switch on 
FE – 
switch off 
Pre-reform 
mean 
Health at present 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
   
Age 20-64 -0.036 -0.044 -0.025 0.045 0.113* 0.016 0.56 
 
(0.043) (0.047) (0.045) (0.061) (0.067) (0.064)  
 
       
n 2,183 1,533 1,242 2,183 2,183  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.040 -0.066 -0.001 0.062 0.070 0.057 0.58 
 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.083) (0.086) (0.093)  
 
       
n 1,890 1,334 1,041 1,890 1,890  
 
       
Age 20-40 0.034 0.009 0.073 - - - 0.62 
 
(0.058) (0.056) (0.072)     
 
      
 
n 1,034 726 555     
 
      
 
Satisfaction with health 
 
  
 
  
 
       
Age 20-64 -0.055 -0.071 -0.026 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.63 
 
(0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.045) (0.057) (0.049)  
 
       
n 2,183 1,533 1,242 2,183 2,183  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.047 -0.073 -0.000 0.031 0.024 0.036 0.63 
 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.058) (0.070) (0.031)  
 
       
n 1,890 1,334 1,041 1,890 1,890  
 
       
Age 20-40 0.106** 0.066 0.163*** - - - 0.66 
 
(0.042) (0.050) (0.053)     
 
      
 
n 1,034 726 555     
 
      
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present is coded in 5, Satisfaction 
with Health in 11 different values. The OLS results for the age group 20-40 are only based on 29 
persons who are in the treatment group in the treatment period. Hence, statistical inference on these 
coefficients may be invalid, so that we do not take the statistical significance of the positive 
coefficients for ‘Satisfaction with Health’ seriously. We do not report fixed-effects estimates for this 
age group because we only have 10 persons with a within variation in the treatment indicator. For the 
age groups 20-64 and 20-55 the number of persons with a within-variation in the treatment indicator is 
26 (13 switch on and 17 switch off) and 21 (11 switch on and 13 switch off), respectively. Hence, 
these estimates have to be taken with a grain of salt. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off 
estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The ‘pre-reform mean’ refers to 
the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-16: Effects on subjective health indicators in the following year for the sample of 
people with positive number of days in hospital in the current year 
  
OLS OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  
switch off FE 
FE – 
switch on 
FE – 
switch off 
Pre-reform 
mean 
Health at present (next year) 
    
 
  
  
 
   
Age 20-64 0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.006 -0.066 0.038 0.52 
 
(0.045) (0.048) (0.052) (0.056) (0.068) (0.056)  
 
       
n 2,181 1,532 1,241 2,181 2,181  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.008 -0.015 0.020 -0.021 -0.079 0.015 0.54 
 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.059) (0.054) (0.072) (0.054)  
 
       
n 1,888 1,333 1,040 1,890 1,890  
 
       
Age 20-40 0.053 0.048 0.109 - - - 0.60 
 
(0.064) (0.060) (0.071)     
 
      
 
n 1,033 725 555     
 
      
 
Satisfaction with health (next year) 
    
 
 
       
Age 20-64 -0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.059 -0.062 -0.057 0.59 
 
(0.041) (0.044) (0.050) (0.053) (0.065) (0.054)  
 
       
n 2,181 1,532 1,241 2,181 2,181  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.012 -0.022 0.022 -0.068 -0.079 -0.061 0.60 
 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.057) (0.056) (0.063) (0.061)  
 
       
n 1,888 1,333 1,040 1,890 1,890  
 
       
Age 20-40 0.001 -0.010 0.075 - - - 0.65 
 
(0.057) (0.061) (0.071)     
 
      
 
n 1,033 725 555     
 
      
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present (next year) is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health (next year) in 11 different values. The OLS results for the age group 20-40 
are only based on 29 persons who are in the treatment group in the treatment period. Hence, statistical 
inference on these coefficients may be invalid. We do not report fixed-effects estimates for this age 
group because we only have 10 persons with a within variation in the treatment indicator. For the age 
groups 20-64 and 20-55 the number of persons with a within-variation in the treatment indicator is 26 
(13 switch on and 17 switch off) and 21 (11 switch on and 13 switch off), respectively. Hence, these 
estimates have to be taken with a grain of salt. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off estimates 
are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The ‘pre-reform mean’ refers to the 
treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-17: Effects on continuous sickness for at least 6 weeks 
  
OLS OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  
switch off FE 
FE – 
switch on 
FE – 
switch off 
Pre-reform 
mean 
6 continuous weeks ill 
  
 
  
  
  
 
   
Age 20-64 -0.024** -0.018 -0.027** -0.022* -0.029** -0.014 0.032 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)  
 
       
n 23,702 13,451 16,351 23,702 23,702  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.031** 0.028 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)  
 
       
n 21,451 11,959 14,856 21,451 21,451  
 
       
Age 20-40 -0.021** -0.029* -0.019* -0.015 -0.012 -0.018 0.020 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)  
 
      
 
n 12,097 6,338 8,552 12,097 12,097  
 
      
 
6 continuous weeks ill (next year) 
 
 
  
 
       
Age 20-64 -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.034 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)  
 
       
n 23,702 13,451 16,351 23,702 23,702  
 
       
Age 20-55 -0.012 -0.019 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 0.031 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)  
 
       
n 21,451 11,959 14,856 21,451 21,451  
 
       
Age 20-40 -0.016 -0.042* -0.003 -0.002 0.013 -0.022 0.016 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016)  
 
      
 
n 12,097 6,338 8,552 12,097 12,097  
 
      
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The fixed-effects 
switch-on and switch-off estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The 
‘pre-reform mean’ refers to the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 2-18: Effects on satisfaction with financial security in case of sickness 
 
OLS switch-off FE switch-off Pre-reform mean 
 All workers    
    
20-64 0.014 -0.013 0.66 
 (0.020) (0.019)  
n 5,559 5,559  
    
20-55 0.027 -0.000 0.65 
 (0.020) (0.018)  
n 4,930 4,930  
    
20-40 0.007 0.000 0.63 
 (0.031) (0.030)  
n 2,388 2,388  
 Doctor visits > 0    
    
20-64 0.014 -0.033 0.64 
 (0.026) (0.030)  
n 3,579 3,579  
    
20-55 0.032 -0.010 0.64 
 (0.027) (0.030)  
n 3,103 3,103  
    
20-40 0.001 -0.000 0.62 
 (0.045) (0.050)  
n 1,407 1,407  
 Days in hospital > 0    
    
20-64 0.105** - 0.63 
 (0.052)   
n 662   
    
20-55 0.097* - 0.63 
 (0.055)   
n 560   
    
20-40 -0.150** - 0.64 
 (0.067)   
n 262   
    
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The indicator 
ranges between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating a high satisfaction. The original variable is coded in 11 
different values. The OLS result for the age groups 20-64, 20-55 and 20-40 for those who have been in 
hospital is only based on 59, 49 and 22 persons who are in the treatment group in the treatment period, 
respectively. Hence, statistical inference, especially on the negative point estimate for the age group 
20-40 may be invalid, so that we do not take the statistical significance of this estimate seriously. We 
do not report fixed-effects estimates for the restriction on persons who were in hospital because we 
only have 3, 3, and 1 person with a within variation in the treatment indicator for the age groups 20-
64, 20-55, and 20-40, respectively. The ‘pre-reform mean’ refers to the treatment group in the pre-
treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Figure 2-1: Number of days absent over time by treatment status and age group  
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Note: We only observe the total number of days absent by calendar year, not the length of single spells 
of absence. The sample includes only firm stayers. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix 2-1: Sample selection 
Year 
Sample size 
(including all 
years) 
Individual is in 
the sample this 
year 
Individual is 
also in the 
sample the 
following year 
Including only 
employed 
persons 
between 20 
and 64 years 
of age 
No missings 
for questions 
on absence 
No missings 
for questions 
on income and 
other 
explanatory 
variables 
1994 56,150 13,417 12,520 6,288 6,040 5,134 
1995 56,150 13,768 12,851 6,526 6,278 5,576 
1997 56,150 13,283 12,180 5,931 5,658 4,964 
1998 56,150 14,670 13,373 6,394 6,160 5,428 
1999 56,150 14,085 13,035 6,443 6,196 5,263 
2000 56,150 24,586 21,233 10,083 9,690 8,527 
n 336,900 93,809 85,192 41,665 40,022 34,892 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2-2Selection of treatment and control groups 
Year Treated Control Movers Rest n 
1994 1,021 3,702 0 411 5,134 
1995 1,206 4,322 0 48 5,576 
1997 585 2,691 962 726 4,964 
1998 471 2,353 1,104 1,500 5,428 
1999 845 2,956 0 1,462 5,263 
2000 775 2,775 0 4,977 8,527 
n 4,903 18,799 2,066 9,124 34,892 
Note: To be part of either the treatment or control group in this study, an individual must have 
answered the question on collective bargaining in 1995. Hence, the number of observations is highest 
for both treated and control individuals in 1995. Panel attrition then works both backward and forward 
in time. So that observations can be classified into treatment and control, a worker must not have 
changed employer between 1996 and 1998 (i.e., until the end of the treatment period). Workers that 
have changed (termed ‘movers’) are deleted from the sample. If, however, an individual answered the 
question on collective bargaining coverage in 1995 but changed employer before 1995 or in 
1999/2000, we retain that employee in the sample. The last column, labeled ‘rest’, includes workers 
who did not answer the question on collective bargaining in 1995, meaning that they cannot be 
classified as either treated or control and are therefore deleted from the sample. The allocation to the 
treatment or control group here is based on the 1995 information on collective bargaining coverage. It 
should also be noted that misclassification outside the treatment period is harmless because neither the 
treatment nor the control group was treated either before or after the repeal of the reform. Thus, 
keeping all persons who answered the 1995 question on collective bargaining coverage may improve 
precision in the repeated cross-section difference-in-differences estimates. In the fixed-effects 
estimates, the coefficient on treatment is driven only by observations present at least once in the 
treatment period and at least once in a non-treatment period.  
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Appendix 2-3: Full estimation results  
  
OLS NEGBIN FE 
No collective agreement -1.02 -0.93  
 (0.79) (0.65)  
Year 1995 0.58 0.79* 0.20 
 (0.58) (0.47) (0.54) 
Year 1997 0.04 0.35 0.35 
 (1.18) (0.68) (1.08) 
Year 1998 1.80 1.29* 1.42 
 (1.27) (0.71) (1.09) 
Year 1999 -0.02 0.18 -0.16 
 (0.81) (0.58) (0.76) 
Year 2000 1.05 0.47  
 (0.96) (0.59)  
No coll. agreem. × Year of Reform  -1.99 -2.07** -1.24 
 (1.33) (0.91) (1.22) 
Unemployment rate 0.04 -0.05 -1.33 
 (0.18) (0.10) (1.54) 
Hourly wage -1.74* -1.58* -0.11 
 (0.98) (0.82) (0.29) 
Civil status indicators 
   
Age -0.14 -0.27 -2.71*** 
 (0.39) (0.22) (0.86) 
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Married 0.34 -0.06 -1.27 
 (1.46) (0.81) (1.67) 
Female 1.94 -3.14  
 (9.89) (6.29)  
Children younger than 16 -2.12** -1.08* 0.79 
 (0.86) (0.63) (1.80) 
Female × children younger than 16 -2.21 -1.68* -1.40 
 (1.83) (0.99) (2.65) 
Female × Married -0.09 0.31 1.88* 
 (0.55) (0.35) (1.06) 
Female × age 0.00 0.00 -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Female × age squared 3.28** 1.60 0.11 
 (1.32) (1.14) (2.18) 
Education (ref. Apprenticeship) 
   
Higher education (university degree) -1.88** -2.41*** -1.47 
 (0.92) (0.65) (1.22) 
Higher education (no degree) -0.14 0.07 3.34** 
 (0.78) (0.58) (1.34) 
No degree 0.95 0.27 4.92* 
 (0.99) (0.60) (2.88) 
    
Job and firm characteristics 
   
Temporary work contract 0.41 -0.10 -1.51 
 (1.74) (1.09) (2.70) 
Working fulltime 3.91*** 3.24*** 2.58* 
 (0.81) (0.51) (1.49) 
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Appendix 2-3: Full estimation results (continued) 
  
OLS NEGBIN FE 
Job and firm characteristics 
   
Blue-collar worker 4.18*** 4.57*** 3.26** 
 (0.78) (0.64) (1.58) 
Civil servant 3.15 3.22** -0.63 
 (2.10) (1.33) (2.88) 
Citizenship 
   
German -1.81 -1.17 1.86 
 (1.12) (0.80) (3.29) 
West-Germany 0.94 -0.20 -3.06 
 (1.37) (0.87) (2.74) 
Firm size (ref. 1-19) 
   
Firm size (20-199) 2.42*** 2.04*** -0.06 
 (0.77) (0.67) (1.37) 
Firm size (200-1999) 2.17** 2.29*** -1.63 
 (0.86) (0.73) (1.51) 
Firm size (>2000) 3.45*** 3.36*** -1.39 
 (0.88) (0.79) (1.72) 
Tenure (ref. < 1 year) 
   
Tenure (1-3 years) -0.08 -0.06 3.30* 
 (1.65) (1.45) (2.00) 
Tenure (3-5 years) 1.21 1.13 4.66*** 
 (1.66) (1.60) (1.46) 
Tenure (5-10 years) 0.03 0.60 4.22*** 
 (1.56) (1.54) (1.55) 
Tenure (10-15 years) 0.01 -0.37 3.63** 
 (1.65) (1.46) (1.65) 
Tenure (15-20 years) -0.26 0.01 3.93** 
 (1.68) (1.55) (1.80) 
Tenure (>20 years) 0.46 0.03 5.91*** 
 (1.72) (1.53) (2.23) 
Industry (ref. manufacturing) 
   
Agriculture, hunting and forestry -2.81* -0.78 -2.21 
 (1.47) (1.47) (2.10) 
Mining and quarrying 5.64 7.80 17.82 
 (7.77) (8.80) (17.60) 
Electricity, gas and water supply -1.66 -0.46 -1.64 
 (1.22) (1.12) (2.02) 
Construction 1.07 1.22 1.78 
 (1.10) (0.84) (1.64) 
Wholesale & retail trade 0.33 0.65 0.31 
 (0.88) (0.84) (1.96) 
Transport and communication 4.81** 3.56*** 1.46 
 (2.18) (1.34) (2.11) 
Financial intermediation -0.36 -0.60 -1.67 
 (0.89) (0.81) (2.29) 
Real estate and business activities 0.59 1.22 0.90 
 (1.04) (0.95) (1.64) 
Public administration and defence 0.59 1.29 -0.67 
 (1.43) (0.87) (1.93) 
Education -0.26 0.59 1.24 
 (1.49) (1.07) (2.88) 
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Appendix 2-3: Full estimation results (continued) 
  
OLS NEGBIN FE 
Industry (ref. manufacturing) 
   
Health and social work 2.84** 2.50*** 0.04 
 (1.23) (0.95) (1.79) 
Other social & personal service  2.28* 2.74* 1.96 
 (1.28) (1.56) (1.77) 
Health at present  
(ref. satisfactory) 
   
Very poor 38.52*** 21.65*** 30.70*** 
 (6.40) (4.06) (6.07) 
 Poor 11.54*** 6.69*** 8.16*** 
 (1.52) (1.02) (2.16) 
Good -2.47*** -2.66*** -1.06 
 (0.58) (0.43) (0.75) 
Very good -5.02*** -4.66*** -1.73* 
 (0.86) (0.56) (0.96) 
Satisfaction with health  
(ref. satisfactory) 
   
Very poor 7.59 4.84** 1.76 
 (6.44) (2.35) (6.75) 
 Poor 4.32** 2.24*** 3.50* 
 (1.79) (0.85) (2.10) 
Good -1.96*** -2.14*** -1.94*** 
 (0.56) (0.41) (0.72) 
Very good -1.22 -1.60*** -1.15 
 (0.84) (0.60) (0.88) 
n 23,702 23,702 23,702 
R2 0.11   0.04 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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3.1 Introduction to Chapter 3 
Obesity seems to be one of the most severe health problems in industrialized countries 
in the last decades. Among countries belonging to the European Union, the ‘International 
Association for the Study of Obesity’ ranks Germany at top position with respect to having 
the highest share of overweight and obese people. According to self-reported data from a 
large German individual-level dataset, the German Micro Census, the share of overweight and 
obese women is 40 percent while the share of overweight or obese men is 57 percent.33 
Overweight and obese persons face significant health limitations, like cardiovascular diseases 
or Type 2 diabetes mellitus.34 In Germany, around 25 percent of the adults suffer from 
cardiovascular diseases (e.g. high blood pressure) which are one of the most common 
consequences of overweight. 
Besides health limitations, overweight persons might also face discrimination in their 
private and in their business environment. Reduction of well-being, a negative body image, 
social exclusion, and decreased concentration ability are potential consequences of obesity 
which could lead to a reduced quality of life. This might also have an impact on productivity 
and therefore result in lower wages or less success in the labor market. For the U.S., several 
studies find a negative impact of obesity on labor market outcomes, especially on wages. This 
negative effect of a higher body weight on earnings is especially true for overweight white 
women, who earn significantly less than their healthy-weight counterparts (Cawley (2004), 
Averett and Korenman (1996)). This result is partly reconfirmed in European studies (for 
Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland) by Fahr 
(2006), Brunello and D`Hombres (2006) and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006) based on 
the European Community Household Panel.  
                                                 
33
 As stated in Cawley and Danziger (2004), these numbers are likely to be underreported. 
34
 See: http://www.iotf.org/cardiovascular.asp 
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This paper finds that these patterns are also true for Germany: overweight and obese 
women earn significantly less than women of healthy weight, while there seems to be no 
relationship between overweight and wages for men. In contrast to most papers, the focus of 
this study is to uncover through which channel the negative relationship between wages and 
obesity can be explained. I test two hypotheses that could be possible explanations for the gap 
in wages between overweight women and women of healthy weight. The first hypothesis 
states that lower wages are due to reduced productivity of overweight women (productivity 
hypothesis); while the second hypothesis claims that it is due to discrimination 
(discrimination hypothesis). In order to find support for either the productivity or the 
discrimination hypotheses, I set up four different subgroup designs and estimate the effect of 
weight on wages for each subgroup. At first, I sort women according to the gender-
composition of their coworker into jobs that are ‘male-dominated’, ‘female-dominated’ or 
‘male-female-balanced’. Secondly, women are categorized by whether their job is interactive 
(with contact to customers) or non-interactive. Thirdly, correlations between overweight and 
wages are estimated for employed and self-employed women. Lastly, the dataset is divided 
into young and older women. Since the correlation between weight and wages differs 
significantly between subgroups, results clearly support the discrimination hypothesis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a literature 
review on studies on obesity and on the effect of overweight on wages. Section 3.3 introduces 
the dataset and discusses the four hypotheses in detail. Results are presented in Section 3.4 
and can be summarized as follows: obese women earn 2.4 percent less than women of healthy 
weight; while women belonging to the heaviest 10 percent earn 4.3 percent lower wages. The 
subgroup analyses reveal that women with mainly male coworkers face a higher penalty for 
being overweight than overweight women in jobs with female coworkers or in male-female-
balanced jobs. In addition, overweight women in interactive jobs receive much higher wage 
reductions than overweight women in non-interactive jobs. Moreover, only overweight 
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employed women face lower wages, while the obesity-effect on wages in non-existing in self-
employment. Finally, young women get much higher wage reductions when overweight than 
older women. Section 3.5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
In the last 20 years, the study of obesity and labor market outcomes has come into the 
interest of economists. Obesity seems to be one of the most severe health problems in 
industrialized countries and it also has economic consequences. In the last decades, several 
studies emerged, bringing together obesity and labor market outcomes such as wages or 
employment. Most studies focus on the U.S. since the prevalence of obesity is extremely high 
there. But also European countries have rising obesity rates, with Germany heading the 
countries belonging to the European Union with respect to the share of overweight and obese 
persons.35 The literature on obesity can be divided into two parts: Studies that detect the 
prevalence and potential reasons for rising obesity rates and those focusing on the impact of 
obesity on labor market outcomes such as employment and wages. 
For the U.S., Chou et al. (2004) show, that prevalence of obesity has been relatively 
constant between 1960 and 1980, while is has doubled between 1980 and 2000. But what are 
the reasons for the enormous increase of obesity in the last 30 years? Chou et al. (2004) find 
that lower fast food prices, higher per capita number of restaurants, risings cigarette prices 
and anti-smoking campaigns are the most important factors for rising obesity rates. Similar 
results are found by Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002). They show that reduced food prices 
and declining physical activity from agricultural innovations and technological changes 
account for a significant increase of obesity in the United States. Other studies on the 
determinants of obesity (Conley and Glauber (2005), Costa-Font and Gil (2004), Robert and 
                                                 
35
 Source: International Association for the Study of Obesity. 
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Reither (2004), Sobal and Stunkard (1989), Zhang and Wang (2004)) find that a higher body 
weight is associated with a lower socioeconomic status; although Zhang and Wang (2004) 
show that this trend has decreased over the last 30 years. 
Empirical literature has a clear focus on the impact of overweight and obesity on 
wages (Register and Williams (1990), Gortmaker et al. (1993), Averett and Korenman (1996), 
Pagán and Dávila (1997), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001), Cawley (2004), Baum and Ford 
(2004)). Most of these U.S. studies find a significant reduction in wages for overweight and 
obese white women. Results for men and for black and Hispanic women are not clear.  
Studies for European countries also find negative consequences of a higher body 
weight: Johansson et al. (2007) provide evidence that waist circumference is negatively 
related to wages for women in Finland. Paraponaris (2005) shows that overweight and obese 
people spend significantly more time in unemployment in France. Like in U.S. studies, 
Sargent and Blanchflower (1994) find for Great Britain a strong and negative association of 
overweight and wages for women, but no effect for men. Other European studies find mixed 
results based on the European Household Panel (for Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Austria, 
Ireland, Denmark, Belgium and Finland): Brunello and D’Hombres (2006) show that men get 
a higher wage deduction when overweight or obese (except for Finland and Portugal), while 
Fahr (2006) finds that lower wages are associated with higher body weight for women but not 
necessarily for men. The only German study by Cawley et al. (2005), based on GSOEP data, 
finds a negative correlation between overweight and wages for women, although these results 
do not hold in an IV estimation. 
Besides finding an association between overweight and wages, many studies try to 
estimate a causal effect of overweight on wages. If there were no unobserved factors, which 
are correlated with weight, an OLS regression would estimate a causal effect of weight on 
wages. But since there could be unobserved factors (for example discipline or self-esteem) 
that are correlated with weight, OLS results become biased. In order to solve this endogeneity 
Chapter 3   
 112 
problem, recent studies use instrumental variable estimation. Pagán and Dávila (1997) use 
family poverty level, health limitations and self-esteem as instruments, but by using a 
Hausman specification test, they cannot reject the hypothesis of weight being not endogenous 
in a wage regression. As pointed out by Cawley (2004), this is probably due to a correlation of 
the instruments with the error term in the wage regression.  
Most studies using IV estimation to address the endogeneity problem take weight of a 
family member as an instrument for a respondent’s own weight. Cawley et al. (2005), Cawley 
(2000), and Brunello and D’Hombres (2006) use the weight of children or parents as 
instruments. IV estimates generally go into the same direction as OLS results (coefficients are 
mostly larger than for OLS estimates), but some become insignificant due to reduced sample 
sizes and much larger standard errors. Cawley (2004) takes the weight of a sibling as an 
instrument for a respondent’s weight. His finding, that white women (in contrast to white 
men) receive lower wages when they have a higher BMI can be confirmed through this IV 
estimation, although a Hausman specification test cannot reject the hypothesis that OLS and 
IV results are equal. Therefore, he concludes that OLS should be preferred over IV since it 
has lower standard errors. Moreover, any potential endogeneity of weight does not seem to 
have an impact on OLS results. 
Since a person shares the same genes with his or her children and siblings, the weight 
of children and siblings seems to be the most convincing instrument for a person’s own 
weight in this context. But still, one cannot be sure whether the exogeneity condition is met. If 
a mother’s weight is correlated with the child’s weight through genetics, she might also pass 
on other characteristics that are correlated with labor market success (discipline, motivation). 
In this case, the weight of a child is not a valid instrument for the mother’s weight. 
Analogously, if siblings share the same genes when it comes to weight, they might also have 
the same genes in other personal characteristics that affect labor market outcomes. Again, in 
this case, the weight of a sibling cannot be used as an instrument of a persons own weight. 
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In contrast to papers that concentrate on estimating the impact of weight on wages, 
this paper does not try to estimate a causal effect, since there is no natural experiment to 
evaluate in this context and no suitable instrument in this dataset. But even if there was a 
causal effect of weight on wages, the question of whether overweight persons are being 
discriminated or whether lower wages are due to reduced productivity of overweight women 
could not be answered. Therefore, this paper focuses on this question and results clearly favor 
the discrimination hypothesis over the productivity hypothesis. 
 
3.3 Data and identification strategy 
This study is carried out on basis of the German Micro Census. It is a large German 
dataset; consisting of a one-percent sample of the entire German population (the scientific 
community receives a 70 percent sample of that one percent). Only more recent waves contain 
information on weight and height. Therefore, trends in overweight and obesity over time 
cannot be shown.36 For this analysis, I take a pooled sample of observations for the years 
2003 and 2005. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the monthly net wage. Wages are 
reported in 24 categories, with the highest limit at a net of 18,000 Euros per month, which 
puts only 142 individuals (0.04 percent of all women and 0.13 percent of all men) into a right-
censored category. To estimate the relationship between weight and wages, I use interval 
regressions to account for wages being reported in intervals. As in other studies on this topic, 
analyses will be carried out separately for men and women. But since I will not be able to find 
any effects for men, further analyses will be carried out for women only. 
Persons older than 55 years of age are excluded, since many employers offer early 
retirement programs to their employees. In this case, an employee receives lower wages while 
                                                 
36
 For more information, please see: 
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/press/abisz/Mikrozensus__e,templateId=re
nderPrint.psml 
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working, retires earlier than in the age of 65 and still receives a lower salary until the 
retirement payments start at the usual retirement age of 65. In this case, information on wages 
would be biased. Compared to other datasets that have information on weight and height, the 
Micro Census dataset has the advantage that it has enough observations to conduct separate 
analysis for subgroups, which is described in detail in the next section. The sample of 
employed women between 20 and 55 years of age consists of more than 63,000 observations; 
the sample of men is a bit larger with more than 75,000 observations since more men than 
women join the labor force. In the full sample of all persons between 20 and 55 years of age, 
20 percent of all men and 26 percent of all women do not participate in the labor market. The 
fact that more women tend not to participate in the labor market might lead to problems of 
sample selection. For example, if women of higher body weight are less likely to be 
employed, one had to determine whether these women do not want to work or whether they 
do not find a job (which might be due to discrimination). But in this sample, there is no 
significant difference in weight or BMI of women who participate in the labor market and 
those who do not, although age seems to matter. While the difference in BMI between 
employed and non-employed women is virtually zero (0.2 BMI units) for women between 20 
and 35 years of age, the difference in weight becomes larger (1.3 BMI units) for women older 
than the age of 35, although both differences are not statistically significant different from 
zero. 
Descriptive statistics of the average height and different measures of weight for 
employed persons (excluding self-employed and unemployed persons) are shown in Table 
3.1. While the average woman is 1.67m tall and weighs 66.1kg, her BMI of 23.7 is in the 
recommended range. The average BMI of men is 25.9 which is classified as slightly 
overweight (corresponding to an average height and weight of 1.80m and 83.4kg, 
respectively). In this paper, standard definitions of BMI (defined as (weight in kg)/(height in 
m)2 ) and the classification into four clinical categories ‘underweight’ (BMI lower than 18.5), 
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‘healthy weight’ (BMI between 18.5 and 25), ‘overweight’ (BMI between 25 and 30), and 
‘obese’ (BMI higher than 30) are used. Due to the fact that height and weight are self-
reported, height might be overstated while weight is likely to be understated.37 To account for 
this problem, I will not only rely on OLS regressions with BMI or dummies for the clinical 
categories as explanatory variables, but also introduce the deciles of the distribution of BMI 
as explanatory dummy variables. By sorting persons into the deciles of the distribution of 
BMI, they are classified relatively to the other respondents. If all respondents follow the same 
pattern by reporting a lower weight and overstating their height, the reported measures of 
BMI do not matter, since only the position of a person relative to the other respondents is of 
interest. In the tables, results for all three regression types (correlation with BMI, with clinical 
categories of weight and with deciles of BMI) are presented. 
The main interest of this paper is to answer the question through which channel lower 
wages for obese women can be explained. Therefore, I introduce two hypotheses. First 
hypothesis: Overweight persons are less productive due their corpulence. If they are paid 
according to their productivity, it would be fair that they earn less (Productivity Hypothesis). 
Second hypothesis: Employers perceive overweight and obese persons to be less productive 
because of prejudices against them. According to Roehling (1999), the most common 
prejudices against overweight persons are that they are lazy, less conscientious, less 
competent, emotionally unstable, or have less self-discipline or self-control. If these 
prejudices are not true, it would be discrimination if employers pay lower wages to 
overweight persons (Discrimination Hypothesis). Moreover, there might be unobserved 
factors (like self-esteem) that influence both, weight and wages. But since the true (causal) 
effect is hard to estimate in the absence of a natural experiment or a suitable instrument for 
body weight, this cannot be tested. Therefore, I concentrate on finding evidence to support 
                                                 
37
 Cawley and Danziger (2004) account fort his problem by using reference weight and height measures in their 
study. They show that female current and former welfare-recipients report 8 to 12 pounds lower body weight and 
about 0.7 inches taller height. Nevertheless, this procedure to account for misreporting cannot be used for 
German data, since we do not have reference measures of weight and height. 
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either the productivity hypothesis or the discrimination hypothesis, using four different 
subgroup designs. 
First, I divide the dataset of employed women by gender-dominance in their 
workplace. Based on more than 340 occupations, those jobs with more than 70 percent males 
or females are labeled ‘male-dominated jobs’ or ‘female-dominated jobs’, respectively. The 
rest are called ‘male-female balanced jobs’. If overweight and obese women were less 
productive than women of healthy weight (productivity hypothesis), one would expect similar 
effects of weight on wages irrespective of gender-dominance in the workplace, since they 
should be less productive in all working environments. Nevertheless, it might be the case that 
being slightly overweight could be an advantage in some male-dominated jobs such as 
manufacturing jobs or jobs that demand physical power, where it bit more body mass might 
be useful (e.g. farmer or construction worker). In this case, one would expect the effect of 
weight on wages to be smaller in male-dominated jobs (if the productivity hypothesis holds). 
Results would be in favor of the discrimination hypothesis, if effects were larger for male-
dominated jobs, since not only most of the coworkers are male, but also the supervisor is 
likely to be male and empirical studies find that men have more prejudices against overweight 
women than women do (Harris et al. (1991)), and are therefore more likely to discriminate 
against overweight women. 
Second, two categories of jobs are built: interactive and non-interactive jobs. 
Interactive jobs are jobs that require communication skills, the ability to work with others 
(including coworkers and customers), while non-interactive jobs do not require these skills. 
Based on the task-based approach by Spitz-Oener (2006) interactive tasks include negotiating, 
lobbying, coordinating, organizing, teaching or training, selling, buying, advising customers, 
advertising, entertaining or presenting, and employing or managing personnel. Since the 
Micro Census dataset does not have information on which tasks are included in each job, I 
take the Qualification and Careers Survey (Qualifikation und Berufsverlauf, IAB-BIBB) 
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dataset to determine whether or not a job is an interactive job.38 Results can be re-matched to 
the Micro Census since in both datasets jobs are categorized by a standard classification. 
Spitz-Oener (2006) defines five groups of tasks (non-routine analytic, non-routine interactive, 
routine cognitive, routine manual, and non-routine manual tasks), while in this paper, I am 
only interested in whether a job is classified as an interactive job. Following Spitz-Oener 
(2006), a task measure is calculated as the number of activities in the task category performed 
by each person divided by the total number of activities in the task category.39 In this paper, a 
job is classified as an ‘interactive’ job if more than 70 percent of the respondents in this job 
report to do interactive tasks at least sometimes and if their task measure is higher than 0.5 
(indicating that people do at least 50 percent of all interactive tasks).40 Following this 
definition, nearly 30 percent of all employed women work in interactive jobs. According to 
the productivity hypothesis, overweight and obese women are supposed to face about the 
same wage reductions in interactive and non-interactive jobs if they were less productive than 
women of healthy weight. Higher wage cuts for overweight and obese women in interactive 
jobs would in turn favor the discrimination hypothesis, indicating that overweight women in 
jobs with contact to customers (interactive jobs) face higher wage reductions than overweight 
women in non-interactive jobs. 
Third, I divide the dataset of all women into employed and self-employed women. By 
definition, self-employed women cannot be discriminated by their employer in terms of 
receiving lower wages. If overweight and obese women were less productive than women of 
healthy weight (productivity hypothesis), similar effects of weight on wages for both groups 
are expected: employed and self-employed women. But if overweight women are being 
discriminated by their employer and therefore face lower wages (discrimination hypothesis), 
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 The IAB-BIBB dataset focuses on job descriptions and detailed information on qualification profiles and 
occupational development. More information is available at 
http://www.gesis.org/Datenservice/Themen/38Beruf.htm. 
39
 For a more detailed description of tasks and task-measures, please see Spitz-Oener (2006) p.242f. 
40
 Results remain robust against using different definitions of ‚interactive jobs’. 
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one would expect to estimate a negative effect of weight on wages for employed women and 
no such effect for self-employed women. Nevertheless, selection could be a problem in this 
case. For example, Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006) find in their study on several 
European countries that obese women have a higher probability to be self-employed in 
countries like Greece, Ireland, and Italy, which might be because they do not find an 
employment relationship due to their obesity. On the other hand, there is no correlation 
between self-employment and obesity in other European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Portugal, and Spain). Also for Germany (see Appendix 3.3), these findings 
do not seem to hold: there is no difference in average weight or BMI between employed and 
self-employed women. In contrast, self-employed women have, on average, a lower BMI 
(23.4 compared to 23.7), although this difference is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. Summary statistics of employed and self-employed women can be found in 
Appendix 3.3 (first and second column). 
Fourth and lastly, the dataset of employed women is divided into young and older 
women. Young women are defined to be between 20 and 39 years of age and older women 
between 40 and 55. Both groups have roughly the same number of observations. If one thinks 
of discrimination against overweight women, we would expect larger coefficients for younger 
women, since they could not demonstrate their competence yet, while older overweight 
women might already achieved a higher position and proved that possible prejudices against 
them are wrong. Again, if the productivity hypothesis was true, the effect of overweight on 
wages for young and older women should be about the same (it might also be larger for older 
women, since their accumulated lifetime-productivity is lower). If the effect of weight on 
wages is higher for young women, the discrimination hypothesis might fit better. 
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3.4 Results 
Summary statistics of all relevant variables are shown in Table 3.2. Descriptive 
statistics already illustrate that wages are lower for overweight or obese women, while this 
does not hold for overweight or obese men. In general, overweight and obesity is associated 
with lower education, which is also found in Zhang and Wang (2004). It is a bit surprising 
that heavier women have a higher probability to be married, while Averett and Korenman 
(1996) show that for women, a higher BMI is associated with a lower probability to be 
married. This is probably due to the fact that overweight and obese persons are, on average, 
older than healthy- or underweight persons and that these summary statistics do not control 
for age effects.  
First results test the hypothesis that a higher weight is correlated with lower wages. 
Previous studies for different countries find that this relationship only holds for women while 
there is no such effect for men (Johansson et al. (2007), Paraponaris (2005), Cawley (2004), 
Averett and Korenman (1996), Sargent and Blanchflower (1994)). Germany does not seem to 
be an exception; results are found in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. The first column in Table 3.3 
shows the correlation between weight and wages using BMI as a measure of weight without 
any further control variables. The effect for women is large and negative, while there is a 
positive relationship between BMI and wages for men. Both effects are highly significant. If 
there were no other factors that had an influence on wages, women would earn 0.8 percent 
lower wages for each higher unit of BMI. In order to increase the BMI by one unit, a person 
has to gain about 3 kilograms. This means that a woman who is 30kg heavier than the average 
woman earns 8 percent less. In contrast, a 30kg heavier man would earn 3.5 percent more than 
a man having an average BMI. But since there are many factors, besides BMI, that influence 
wages, further control variables are added stepwise. Most importantly, educational controls 
are included in column 2. Schooling is included in three categories (lower, intermediate and 
higher education – ‘Hauptschule’, ‘Realschule’, and ‘Gymnasium’) and further vocational 
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education in four categories (no apprenticeship, apprenticeship, master craftsman, university 
degree). For women, the effect becomes much smaller, which means that heavier women tend 
to have a lower education. This is different for men: the effect becomes larger when education 
is controlled for, which shows that heavier men have, on average, a higher education.41 But 
keeping in mind that a man of average weight is already overweight, this is not very 
surprising. In the third column, personal characteristics are added (age and age squared, 
dummy for having children, marital status, nationality and state of residence). The last column 
shows the estimates for the full set of control variables, adding job characteristics such as 
dummies for temporary work contract and for fulltime employment, tenure, tenure squared, 
14 industry dummies, dummies for blue- and white-collar workers, civil servants, firm size, 
usual hours of work per week and usual hours of work squared. The coefficient for women 
remains unchanged, while the effect for men becomes smaller and insignificant as personal 
and job characteristics are included. For men there seems to be no relationship between BMI 
and wages, but women with a higher BMI earn significantly less. An increase in weight of 
about 30kg (or 10 units of BMI) is associated with 2.6 percent lower wages for women. In the 
following, all results will include the full set of control variables and only the coefficients of 
the weight variables are shown. 
Results for the effects of all other control variables on wages are shown in Appendix 
3.1. As expected, schooling is positively related to wages, people in the eastern part of 
Germany earn less, wages increase with age and tenure, white-collar workers and civil 
servants earn more than blue-collar workers, and larger firms pay higher wages. Most of the 
other control variables also have expected signs. 
Besides BMI as explanatory variable to measure a person’s physical appearance, I also 
use dummies for the clinical categories ‘underweight’, healthy weight’, ‘overweight’ and 
‘obese’ as regressors, with healthy weight as base category. Since measures of weight and 
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 The term ‘effect’ should not be interpreted as a causal effect of weight on wages, but rather in the sense of a 
correlation. 
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height are self-reported, the third alternative to measure ‘weight’ is to use dummies for the 10 
deciles of the distribution of BMI as explanatory variables. By doing so, not the person’s 
reported BMI matters, but the BMI of a person in relation to other persons is of interest. If all 
data on weight and height are biased in the same way (by understating weight and overstating 
height), this procedure is a good indicator for whether heavier persons earn less. Table 3.4 
shows results for the different measures of weight, separately for men and women. The table 
contains coefficients of three different regressions using BMI, the clinical categories of 
weight, or the deciles of BMI as explanatory variables of interest. Obviously, there is virtually 
no effect for overweight or obese men in all three regressions, but effects for women become 
much stronger for heavier women. This can be seen by comparing the coefficients of 
‘overweight’ and ‘obese’. While the wage reduction for overweight women is 1.3 percent, it is 
almost twice as much for obese women (2.4 percent). By using the deciles of the distribution 
of BMI as regressors, it can be observed that higher values of BMI (the highest 20 percent) 
are associated with much higher wage reductions (about 4 percent lower wages) than for those 
women between the 40th and the 80th percentile (about 2.5 percent lower wages). 
For women, there is no relationship between underweight and wages. This finding 
could be interpreted as supportive of the discrimination hypothesis: Assuming that, from a 
health point of view, underweight is as unhealthy as overweight. Then, both underweight and 
overweight women should receive lower wages if they were less productive than women of 
healthy weight. However, since underweight is socially accepted (if not preferred, since it 
represents the current ideal of beauty), we only observe lower wages for overweight women, 
which supports the discrimination hypothesis. In contrast to women, underweight seems to be 
strongly negatively related to wages for men. Being male and underweight is associated with 
about 3-times the wage reduction of being female and obese. The problem with these numbers 
is that only 0.6 percent (or n=416) men are classified as underweight. Therefore, it might be 
better to compare men and women in the lowest (highest) deciles of BMI since each decile 
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has more than 7,000 and 6,000 observations for men and women, respectively. The negative 
effect of belonging to the thinnest 10 percent for men is as high as being in the highest decile 
for women (more than 4 percent lower wages in both cases). But since this paper focuses on 
the relationship between overweight and wages, I will rely on results for women only, since 
there is no such correlation for men. Potential discrimination of underweight men is not part 
of this study. 
 
3.4.1 Results by gender dominance in the workplace 
To come back to find evidence for the productivity or the discrimination hypothesis, 
previous results for employed women are compared to results estimated separately by gender 
dominance in the workplace. As motivated above, I expect roughly the same coefficients in 
all three categories or lower effects for male-dominated jobs if the productivity hypothesis 
holds, because there should be no difference in productivity between these three working 
environments. Contrary, I interpret results as supportive of the discrimination hypothesis if 
coefficients of male-dominated jobs are larger, because literature on discrimination reveals 
that men are more likely to discriminate against overweight women than women (Harris et al. 
(1991)). Summary statistics (in Appendix 3.2, first three columns) show that there are no 
major differences between the four clinical weight categories in male-dominated, female-
dominated, or male-female-balanced jobs; which can also be seen when comparing the 
average values of BMI at 23.8, 23.7, and 23.5, respectively. Thus, there seems to be no 
sorting of overweight women into a particular working environment. 
Table 3.5 provides the results by gender dominance in the workplace. For comparison, 
results for all employed women are repeated in the first column. The coefficient of BMI in 
male-dominated jobs is almost twice as large as the average effect. Moreover, it is 1.5 times 
and 2.5 times larger than for male-female balanced and female-dominated jobs, respectively. 
Chapter 3   
 123 
The same patterns are true for the clinical categories ‘overweight’ and ‘obese’: Correlations 
are strongest for male-dominated jobs. The reason why large effects (for example for obese 
women in male-dominated jobs) are not statistically significant is probably due to the fact that 
only few women work in male-dominated jobs (by definition), so that sample size is much 
smaller here. Nevertheless, taking deciles of BMI as regressors reveals that from the 70th 
percentile onwards effects for women in male-dominated jobs are two to three times larger 
than the coefficients of these deciles in female-dominated and in male-female balanced jobs. 
Thus, results can be interpreted as first support of the discrimination hypothesis, since effects 
are much stronger in male-dominated jobs. 
 
3.4.2 Results: interactive vs. non-interactive jobs 
Following the arguments above, there should be no difference in wage cuts for 
overweight women in jobs with contact to customers (interactive jobs) and those without 
customer contact (non-interactive jobs). In this classification, problems might arise if 
overweight women tend to sort themselves into non-interactive jobs while women of healthy 
weight prefer working in interactive jobs. Summary statistics in Appendix 3.2 (last two 
columns) show that women in non-interactive jobs tend to be heavier than women in 
interactive jobs. However, differences are not statistically significant, so that any sorting 
effects will be neglected. Moreover, differences in weight between women in interactive and 
non-interactive jobs could also be explained by differences in socioeconomic status. As stated 
in the literature (Zhang and Wang (2004)), social status is negatively related to weight. 
Appendix 3.2 reveals that women in non-interactive jobs have, on average, a lower status 
(lower education, more blue-collar worker) than women in interactive jobs, which is 
correlated with a higher probability to be overweight.  
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Table 3.6 reveals that there are huge differences in wage reductions for overweight 
women in interactive jobs compared to overweight women in non-interactive jobs. The effect 
of an increase in BMI of 10 points is more than three times higher for women in interactive 
jobs. They face 5.1 percent lower wages while women in non-interactive jobs only receive a 
wage reduction of 1.6 percent for each 10-point increase in BMI. The same patterns hold 
when taking weight categories as explanatory variables: Obese women in interactive jobs earn 
5.1 percent lower wages; underweight women working in interactive jobs earn 4.6 percent 
more than women of normal weight. There are no such effects for women in non-interactive 
jobs. When turning to the deciles of BMI distribution, the effect is strongest for women in 
interactive job belonging to the heaviest ten percent. Nevertheless, effects for women in non-
interactive jobs are also strong, all of them being negative and most of them statistically 
significant. Fewer significant results for women in interactive jobs are probably due to smaller 
samples size for women in interactive jobs. 
However, the most striking difference is that the thinnest ten percent receive higher 
wages in interactive jobs while they receive lower wages in non-interactive jobs. One 
explanation for this finding could be that belonging to the thinnest ten percent is not healthy 
(and therefore penalized in non-interactive jobs), nevertheless being very thin comes close to 
the current ideal of beauty which is why women in interactive jobs (with contact to 
customers) might receive higher wages. Many jobs with contact to customers are jobs in sales, 
so that an attractive look which is close to the current ideal of beauty (namely, very thin), can 
be productivity-enhancing and thus rewarded by paying a ‘beauty premium’.42 The question 
is, whether results in Table 3.6 can be interpreted as discrimination by the employer or 
whether results are driven by customer discrimination. In this case, customers prefer to buy 
from more attractive salespeople, which in turn makes them more productive than overweight 
persons. Nevertheless, there are two reasons, why lower wages for overweight women are due 
                                                 
42
 This term was introduced by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), who find that attractive persons earn higher 
wages while plain people earn less. 
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to discrimination by the employer and not due to customer discrimination (which could be 
interpreted as lower productivity of overweight women in interactive jobs). First, being 
overweight is not necessarily related to a less attractive appearance. Therefore, it cannot be 
concluded that thin people receive a ‘beauty premium’ while overweight persons face a 
‘homely-penalty’. Second, when focusing on self-employed women, the only type of 
discrimination they could possibly face is customer discrimination. The next section shows 
that this is not the case. Therefore, I interpret results in Table 3.6 as supportive of the 
discrimination hypothesis.  
 
3.4.3 Results: employed vs. self-employed women 
In this section the dataset of all working women is divided into employed and self-
employed women. If overweight women receive lower wages due to lower productivity, there 
should be no difference in the weight-coefficients between employed and self-employed 
women, since in this case overweight self-employed women should also be less productive 
than self-employed women of healthy weight and therefore supposed to earn lower wages. If 
the discrimination hypothesis holds, one might expect a negative effect of weight on wages 
for employed women only. There should be no effect for self-employed women since there is 
no employer who might discriminate them because of prejudices against heavier persons. 
In general, self-employed women differ from employed women when it comes to 
wages. The share of self-employed women with very low or very high wages is much higher, 
whereas there are less self-employed women with intermediate wages. Summary statistics of 
wages and the explanatory variables for employed and self-employed women are shown in the 
first two columns of Appendix 3.3 (first two columns). Self-employed women are, on 
average, older than employed women. Moreover, they are better educated, more likely to be 
married, more likely to work fulltime and have more working hours per week than employed 
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women. Controlling for these differences, Table 3.7 shows clearly that heavier self-employed 
women do not receive lower wages than their healthy weight counterparts, while significant 
differences are found for employed women. 
For self-employed women, the point estimate for BMI is positive, though not 
significantly different from zero. The absolute value of the coefficient of BMI for employed 
women is of similar size: a 10-point increase of BMI is associated with 2.6 percent lower 
wages for employed women, while it is associated with 2.2 percent higher wages for self-
employed women (not significant). Results for the clinical categories also go into this 
direction: while employed obese and overweight women earn 2.4 and 1.3 percent less than 
employed women of healthy weight, respectively, obese and overweight self-employed 
women earn more than self-employed women of healthy weight, although the effect for self-
employed women is not significant. These results also favor the discrimination hypothesis, 
indicating than overweight women are discriminated by their employer in terms of receiving 
lower wages than women of healthy weight.  
 
3.4.4 Results: young vs. older women 
In a last step, I divide the dataset of employed women into young and older women. 
Different results for these two groups might also be an indicator for whether the productivity 
or the discrimination hypothesis fits better. As motivated in Section 3.3, one would expect 
larger effects of weight on wages for younger women if the discrimination hypothesis is 
favorable, while coefficients are supposed to be of equal size (or larger for older women) in 
order to support the productivity hypothesis. Summary statistics of young and older women 
can be found in column 3 and 4 of Appendix 3.3. As expected, older women are on average 
notably heavier than young women. Nevertheless, this does not seem to result in larger 
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coefficients for older women. Table 3.8 provides the results for young and older women for 
all three measures of body weight. 
Supporting the discrimination hypothesis, results are indeed stronger for young than 
for older women. In both groups, I find a significant negative association between weight and 
wages. The coefficient of BMI indicates that young women receive 2.9 percent lower wages 
for a 10-point increase of BMI, which is almost 50 percent larger than the effect for older 
women (at 2 percent for a 10-point higher BMI). For the clinical category ‘obese’ effects for 
young and older women are about equal. A reason for the insignificance of the ‘obese’-
dummy for younger women might be larger standard errors since there are only few women 
who are young and obese (in the sample are twice as many obese older women than obese 
young women). Interestingly, the clinical category ‘overweight’ is not associated with lower 
wages for older women, while there is a large and significant effect for young women (2.4 
percent lower wages for overweight young women compared to young women of healthy 
weight). This could be due to the fact that older women have, on average, a higher BMI. If all 
older women were overweight, there would be no discrimination among them. But in this 
sample, the average BMI of older women is 24.5 which is classified as ‘healthy weight’. The 
coefficients for the deciles also indicate that there are larger effects for young women. 
Women above the 7th decile in the BMI distribution receive 3.2 to 4.8 percent lower wages 
when young, while results show between 0.8 and 3.2 percent lower wages for the heaviest 30 
percent older women. 
Table 3.9 combines the classification into young and older women with the other three 
classifications (into employed vs. self-employed women, by gender dominance in the 
workplace into interactive and non-interactive jobs). Previous results hold, since the expected 
results to support the discrimination hypothesis are again more pronounced for young women 
than for older women in all groups: The correlation of BMI and wages for young self-
employed women becomes much larger and remains positive (0.011 for young and self-
Chapter 3   
 128 
employed women compared to -0.0006 for older self-employed women). Coefficients for 
young women in male-dominated job are also much larger in absolute value than for older 
women in male-dominated jobs (6 percent wage reduction for a 10-point increase in BMI 
compared to 3.3 percent). This puts young women who work in male-dominated jobs in a 
position with most discrimination against overweight and obese women. Comparing the 
effects of overweight on wages in interactive and non-interactive jobs between young and 
older women, it is found that young women in interactive job face much higher wage 
reductions than all other age-job combinations (7.6 percent lower wages compared to 1.8 to 
3.5 percent for the other three categories). All in all, it can be summarized that all four 
subgroup designs favor the discrimination hypothesis over the productivity hypothesis. 
 
3.5  Conclusions of Chapter 3 
This paper analyses the relationship between weight and wages, especially for women, 
who seem to face higher wage reductions when they are overweight or obese. I find that obese 
women receive 2.4 percent lower wages than women of healthy weight, while women who 
are in the top 10 percent of the body mass index get 4.3 percent lower wages than thinner 
women. Based on papers that find a causal effect of overweight on wages for (white) women, 
this paper asks the question whether observed differences in wages between overweight 
women and women of healthy weight are due to reduced productivity of heavier women or 
due to discrimination. I set up four different subgroup designs to find support for either the 
productivity or the discrimination hypothesis. In all four subgroup designs, estimates are in 
favor of the discrimination hypothesis: First, overweight or obese women in jobs with mainly 
male coworkers seem to experience higher wage reductions than overweight or obese women 
with mainly female coworkers or in male-female balanced jobs. To find support for the 
productivity hypothesis, one would expect roughly the same coefficients in all working 
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environments. Second, women in interactive jobs (e.g. jobs with a lot of contact to customers, 
clients or co-workers) face higher wage cuts when being overweight than women in non-
interactive jobs. Third, in contrast to overweight employed women, overweight self-employed 
women do not experience any wage reductions. Fourth, the association between lower wages 
and higher weight is stronger for young women in contrast to older women, although one 
would expect the same wage reductions if overweight women were generally less productive. 
To conclude, all four subgroup designs favor the discrimination hypothesis over the 
productivity hypothesis, indicating that overweight women receive lower wages although they 
are not less productive than women of normal weight. 
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Tables of Chapter 3 
Table 3-1: Summary statistics (I) 
  
Women Men 
BMI 23.7 25.9 
Weight in kg 66.1 83.4 
Height in cm 167 180 
 Underweight 0.04 0.01 
 Healthy weight 0.67 0.45 
 Overweight 0.21 0.43 
 Obese 0.08 0.12 
n 63,388 74,416 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3-2: Summary statistics (II) 
  
Women Men 
  
healthy- or 
underweight 
overweight 
or obese 
healthy- or 
underweight 
Overweight 
or obese 
Net wage     
Wage (300-700) 0.20 0.23 0.03 0.02 
Wage (700-1100) 0.26 0.26 0.12 0.11 
Wage (1100-1700) 0.44 0.43 0.52 0.52 
Wage (1700-2900) 0.08 0.06 0.21 0.23 
Wage (2900-4000) 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.08 
Wage (>4000) 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 
Education     
Lower secondary school 0.20 0.29 0.29 0.39 
Intermediate secondary school 0.46 0.49 0.35 0.35 
Higher secondary school 0.33 0.22 0.36 0.26 
No further education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Apprenticeship 0.81 0.87 0.76 0.83 
University degree 0.18 0.11 0.23 0.16 
Personal Characteristics     
Age 37.8 41.8 37.2 41.2 
Married 0.56 0.65 0.52 0.69 
Children 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.37 
German nationality 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.94 
Living in West-Germany 0.80 0.74 0.83 0.80 
Living in East-Germany 0.20 0.26 0.17 0.20 
Job characteristics     
White-collar worker 0.80 0.72 0.54 0.47 
Blue-collar worker 0.13 0.23 0.38 0.45 
Civil servant 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 
Temporary work contract 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.05 
Fulltime employed 0.62 0.61 0.96 0.97 
Hours worked per week 31.9 31.7 39.1 39.5 
Tenure 8.76 10.28 9.29 11.79 
Firm size (1-10) 0.26 0.24 0.15 0.13 
Firm size (11-49) 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.25 
Firm size (> 50) 0.48 0.48 0.60 0.61 
n 44,856 18,532 34,067 41,349 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3-3: BMI as explanatory variable, stepwise including control variables 
  
Dep. Variable: net ln(wage)  
Women (n=63,388) 1. 2. 3. 4. 
BMI -0.0080*** -0.0020*** -0.0023*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
     
controlled for education 
 
x x x 
     
controlled for personal 
characteristics 
  
x x 
     
controlled for job 
characteristics 
   
x 
Men (n=75,416) 1. 2. 3. 4. 
BMI 0.0035*** 0.0086*** 0.0016*** 0.0009 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
     
controlled for education 
 
x x x 
     
controlled for personal 
characteristics 
  
x x 
     
controlled for job 
characteristics 
    
x 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates 
stepwise increase the set of control variables. In the first column, no control variables are included. 
The second column controls for education: lower, intermediate, higher education, university degree 
and apprenticeship. In the third column, personal characteristics are added: age and age squared, 
children, marital status, nationality and state, while the last column shows the estimates for the full set 
of control variables, adding job characteristics such as temporary work contract, fulltime working, 
tenure, tenure squared, industry, dummy for white-collar worker, civil servant, firm size, usual hours 
of work per week and usual hours of work squared. 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3-4: Results for women and men 
  
Women Men 
 
  
BMI -0.0026*** 0.0009 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) 
   
Obese – 
BMI higher than 30 -0.024*** 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Overweight – 
BMI between 25 and 30 -0.013** 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.004) 
Underweight – 
BMI lower than 18.5 0.000 -0.078*** 
  (0.013) (0.026) 
BMI - 10. Percentile -0.007 -0.044*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) 
BMI - 20. Percentile -0.009 -0.020** 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
BMI - 40. Percentile -0.023** -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.008) 
BMI - 50. Percentile -0.015 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.009) 
BMI - 60. Percentile -0.032*** -0.014* 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
BMI - 70. Percentile  -0.025** -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
BMI - 80. Percentile -0.022** -0.013 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
BMI - 90. Percentile -0.037*** -0.016* 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
BMI - 100. Percentile -0.043*** -0.014 
  (0.010) (0.009) 
n 63,388 75,416 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: Age and age squared, education 
(lower, intermediate, higher education), university degree, apprenticeship, children, marital status, 
nationality, state, temporary work contract, fulltime working, tenure, tenure squared, industry, dummy 
for white-collar worker, civil servant, firm size, usual hours of work per week and usual hours of work 
squared. 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3-5: Results based on gender-dominance in the job 
  
Women  
(all) 
Women in  
male- 
dominated jobs 
Women in 
female-
dominated jobs 
Women in 
male-female 
balanced jobs 
 
    
BMI -0.0026*** -0.0048** -0.0019** -0.0032*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
     
Obese – 
BMI higher than 30 -0.024*** -0.033 -0.019* -0.034** 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.011) (0.016) 
Overweight – 
BMI between 25 and 30 -0.013** -0.045** -0.008 -0.017 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011) 
Underweight – 
BMI lower than 18.5 0.000 0.038 -0.012 0.006 
  (0.013) (0.052) (0.015) (0.022) 
     
BMI - 10. Percentile -0.007 -0.017 -0.018 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.035) (0.014) (0.019) 
BMI - 20. Percentile -0.009 -0.017 -0.006 -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.038) (0.013) (0.019) 
BMI - 40. Percentile -0.023*** -0.064* -0.013 -0.051*** 
 (0.010) (0.034) (0.014) (0.018) 
BMI - 50. Percentile -0.015 -0.077** -0.020 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.035) (0.013) (0.019) 
BMI - 60. Percentile -0.032*** -0.058 -0.033** -0.008 
 (0.011) (0.039) (0.014) (0.018) 
BMI - 70. Percentile  -0.025** -0.070* -0.025* -0.033* 
 (0.010) (0.036) (0.014) (0.019) 
BMI - 80. Percentile -0.022** -0.097*** -0.014 -0.021 
 (0.011) (0.035) (0.014) (0.019) 
BMI - 90. Percentile -0.037*** -0.085** -0.026* -0.040** 
 (0.011) (0.040) (0.014) (0.018) 
BMI - 100. Percentile -0.043*** -0.080** -0.042*** -0.052** 
  (0.010) (0.036) (0.013) (0.019) 
n 63,388 5,631 37,152 20,605 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. An allocation into 
male and female-dominated job is based on the proportion of men and women in the different jobs. If 
more than 70 percent of the employees in a job category are male or female, this job is labeled male or 
female-dominated, respectively. The remaining jobs are labeled male-female balanced jobs. This 
division is based on a job classification into 342 jobs. The estimates are based on regressions with the 
following set of control variables: Age and age squared, education (lower, intermediate, higher 
education), university degree, apprenticeship, children, marital status, nationality, state, temporary 
work contract, fulltime working, tenure, tenure squared, industry, dummy for white-collar worker, 
civil servant, firm size, usual hours of work per week and usual hours of work squared. 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3-6: Results: interactive vs. non-interactive jobs 
  
Interactive 
 job  
Non-interactive 
 job  
 
  
BMI -0.0051*** -0.0016** 
  (0.0012) (0.0007) 
   
Obese – 
BMI higher than 30 -0.051** -0.015 
 (0.020) (0.009) 
Overweight – 
BMI between 25 and 30 -0.008 -0.014** 
 (0.012) (0.007) 
Underweight – 
BMI lower than 18.5 0.046* -0.017 
  (0.024) (0.015) 
BMI - 10. Percentile 0.039** -0.029** 
 (0.019) (0.013) 
BMI - 20. Percentile 0.007 -0.017 
 (0.019) (0.013) 
BMI - 40. Percentile -0.018 -0.027** 
 (0.018) (0.013) 
BMI - 50. Percentile -0.012 -0.019 
 (0.019) (0.013) 
BMI - 60. Percentile -0.039* -0.032** 
 (0.020) (0.013) 
BMI - 70. Percentile  -0.017 -0.030** 
 (0.020) (0.012) 
BMI - 80. Percentile -0.008 -0.028** 
 (0.020) (0.013) 
BMI - 90. Percentile -0.024 -0.043*** 
 (0.021) (0.012) 
BMI - 100. Percentile -0.061*** -0.038*** 
  (0.021) (0.012) 
n 18,501 44,887 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: Age and age squared, education 
(lower, intermediate, higher education), university degree, apprenticeship, children, marital status, 
nationality, state, temporary work contract, fulltime working, tenure, tenure squared, industry, dummy 
for white-collar worker, civil servant, firm size, usual hours of work per week and usual hours of work 
squared. 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3-7: Results: employed vs. self-employed women 
  
Women 
(employed) 
Women 
(self-employed) 
 
  
BMI -0.0026*** 0.0022 
  (0.0006) (0.0050) 
Obese – 
BMI higher than 30 -0.024*** 0.042 
 (0.008) (0.079) 
Overweight – 
BMI between 25 and 30 -0.013** 0.011 
 (0.006) (0.047) 
Underweight – 
BMI lower than 18.5 0.000 -0.049 
 (0.013) (0.098) 
BMI - 10. Percentile -0.007 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.077) 
BMI - 20. Percentile -0.009 -0.068 
 (0.011) (0.076) 
BMI - 40. Percentile -0.023*** -0.131* 
 (0.010) (0.074) 
BMI - 50. Percentile -0.015 -0.149** 
 (0.011) (0.075) 
BMI - 60. Percentile -0.032*** -0.025 
 (0.011) (0.075) 
BMI - 70. Percentile  -0.025** -0.107 
 (0.010) (0.079) 
BMI - 80. Percentile -0.022** -0.066 
 (0.011) (0.076) 
BMI - 90. Percentile -0.037*** -0.025 
 (0.011) (0.082) 
BMI - 100. Percentile -0.043*** -0.052 
  (0.010) (0.081) 
n 63,388 5,172 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: Age and age squared, education 
(lower, intermediate, higher education), university degree, apprenticeship, children, marital status, 
nationality, state, temporary work contract, fulltime working, tenure, tenure squared, industry, dummy 
for white-collar worker, civil servant, firm size, usual hours of work per week and usual hours of work 
squared. 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3-8: Results: young vs. older women 
  
Women 
(20-39 years of age) 
Women 
(40-55 years of age) 
 
  
BMI -0.0029*** -0.0020** 
  (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Obese – 
BMI higher than 30 -0.021 -0.022** 
 (0.014) (0.011) 
Overweight – 
BMI between 25 and 30 -0.024*** -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
Underweight – 
BMI lower than 18.5 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.026) 
BMI - 10. Percentile -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.018) 
BMI - 20. Percentile -0.016 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.017) 
BMI - 40. Percentile -0.025* -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.016) 
BMI - 50. Percentile -0.030** 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.016) 
BMI - 60. Percentile -0.041*** -0.017 
 (0.014) (0.016) 
BMI - 70. Percentile  -0.007 -0.036** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
BMI - 80. Percentile -0.032** -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
BMI - 90. Percentile -0.045*** -0.025* 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
BMI - 100. Percentile -0.048*** -0.032** 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
n 30,670 32,718 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are 
based on regressions with the following set of control variables: Age and age squared, education 
(lower, intermediate, higher education), university degree, apprenticeship, children, marital status, 
nationality, state, temporary work contract, fulltime working, tenure, tenure squared, industry, dummy 
for white-collar worker, civil servant, firm size, usual hours of work per week and usual hours of work 
squared. 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3-9: All results by age group 
 
1. by employment status  2. by gender dominance in the workplace  3. by contact to customer 
  
 
Employed 
women 
Self-employed 
women 
 
Male- 
dominated jobs 
Female-
dominated jobs 
Male-female 
balanced jobs 
 
Interactive  
jobs 
Non-interactive 
jobs 
 
  
 
   
 
  
BMI  -0.0029*** 0.0106  -0.0060** -0.0021* -0.0035**  -0.0076*** -0.0035** 
Young women (20-39) (0.0009) (0.0098)  (0.0028) (0.0011) (0.0017)  (0.0017) (0.0017) 
n 30,670 1,886  2,935 17,560 10,175  10,048 20,622 
   
 
   
 
  
BMI  -0.0020** -0.0006  -0.0033 -0.0014 -0.0029**  -0.0020 -0.0018** 
Older women (40-55) (0.0008) (0.0058)  (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0014)  (0.0018) (0.0009) 
n 32,718 3,286  2,696 19,592 10,430  8,453 24,265 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates are based on regressions with the following set of control 
variables: Age and age squared, education (lower, intermediate, higher education), university degree, apprenticeship, children, marital status, nationality, state, 
temporary work contract, fulltime working, tenure, tenure squared, industry, dummy for white-collar worker, civil servant, firm size, usual hours of work per 
week and usual hours of work squared. 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3-1: Results including all controls 
 
  
Women Men 
BMI -0.0026*** 0.0009 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) 
Education and personnel 
characteristics   
Lower secondary school -0.067*** -0.051*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Higher secondary school 0.065*** 0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
No apprenticeship -0.029 -0.070*** 
 (0.021) (0.017) 
Master craftsman 0.084*** 0.086*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
University degree 0.214*** 0.262*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) 
Children (<3) -0.172*** 0.083*** 
 (0.017) (0.007) 
Children (3-5) 0.024** 0.104*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) 
Children (6-9) 0.033*** 0.087*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
Children (10-14) 0.027*** 0.075*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Children (>14) -0.025*** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Married -0.162*** 0.116*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Nationality: German 0.035* 0.089*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) 
Nationality: Non-German, EU 0.043 0.088*** 
 (0.029) (0.021) 
Age 0.039*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
State - Reference: North Rhine-
Westphalia    
Schleswig-Holstein 0.000 0.004 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
Hamburg 0.044** -0.059*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Lower Saxony -0.025** -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.008) 
Bremen -0.004 -0.039** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Hesse 0.014 0.005 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
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Appendix 3-1: Results including all controls (continued) 
  
Women Men 
State - Reference: North Rhine-
Westphalia    
Rhineland-Palatinate -0.013 0.023*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) 
Baden-Wurttemberg 0.008 0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) 
Bavaria -0.011 0.017** 
 (0.009) (0.007) 
Saarland -0.050** -0.051*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) 
Berlin -0.005 -0.110*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Brandenburg -0.083*** -0.244*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania -0.112*** -0.242*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Saxony -0.124*** -0.263*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
Saxony-Anhalt -0.137*** -0.266*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) 
Thuringia -0.154*** -0.294*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
Job characteristics   
White-collar worker 0.152*** 0.156*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Civil servant 0.359*** 0.266*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) 
Firm size (1-10) -0.067*** -0.053*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Firm size(>50) 0.057*** 0.093*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
    Tenure 0.005*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   Tenure squared 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Temporary work contract -0.079*** -0.131*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Working fulltime 0.102*** 0.229*** 
 (0.010) (0.023) 
Hours worked per week 0.037*** 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Hours worked per week squared -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
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Appendix 3-1: Results including all controls (continued) 
  
Women Men 
Industry  - Reference: 
Manufacturing   
Agriculture, hunting and forestry -0.127*** -0.142*** 
 (0.024) (0.013) 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.094*** 0.016 
 (0.030) (0.016) 
Construction 0.016 -0.029*** 
 (0.022) (0.006) 
Wholesale & retail trade -0.078*** -0.083*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) 
Hotel and restaurant industry -0.135*** -0.223*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) 
Transport and communication 0.009 -0.089*** 
 0014) (0.008) 
Financial intermediation 0.054*** 0.053*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Real estate and business activities -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Public administration and defense -0.033*** -0.102*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) 
Education 0.037*** -0.108*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Health and social work -0.044*** -0.126*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Other social and personal service  -0.075*** -0.074*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
n 63388 75416 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Appendix 3-2: Summary statistics for subgroups (I) 
  
Male- 
dominated 
jobs 
Female-
dominated 
jobs 
Male-
female-
balanced 
jobs 
Women in 
interactive 
jobs 
Women 
 in non-
interactive 
jobs 
Net wage 
     
Wage (300-700) 0.12 0.26 0.15 0.21 0.22 
Wage (700-1100) 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.26 
Wage (1100-1700) 0.48 0.40 0.48 0.42 0.43 
Wage (1700-2900) 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.07 
Wage (2900-4000) 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Wage (>4000) 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Weight      
Underweight 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Healthy weight 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.66 
Overweight 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.22 
Obese 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 
Education      
Lower secondary school 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.24 
Intermediate secondary 
school 0.40 0.52 0.40 0.40 0.49 
Higher secondary school 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.40 0.27 
No further education 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Apprenticeship 0.73 0.90 0.73 0.75 0.85 
University degree 0.25 0.09 0.26 0.24 0.14 
Personal Characteristics      
Age 38.5 39.1 38.8 38.4 39.6 
Married 0.53 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.61 
Children 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.33 
German nationality 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Living in West-Germany 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78 
Living in East-Germany 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 
Job characteristics      
White-collar worker 0.62 0.83 0.71 0.74 0.71 
Blue-collar worker 0.32 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.18 
Civil servant 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.06 
Temporary work contract 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 
Fulltime employed 0.79 0.56 0.68 0.66 0.61 
Hours worked per week 35.8 30.4 33.3 33.5 31.5 
Tenure 8.55 8.74 10.20 8.48 9.43 
Firm size (1-10) 0.16 0.33 0.15 0.38 0.27 
Firm size (11-49) 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.22 0.27 
Firm size (> 50) 0.61 0.38 0.61 0.39 0.47 
n 5,631 37,152 20,605 18,501 44,887 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Appendix 3-3: Summary statistics for subgroups (II) 
  
Employed 
women 
Self-employed 
women 
Young women 
(20 - 39) 
Older women 
(40 - 55) 
Net wage  
   
Wage (300-700) 0.21 0.30 0.20 0.23 
Wage (700-1100) 0.26 0.16 0.27 0.24 
Wage (1100-1700) 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.42 
Wage (1700-2900) 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.09 
Wage (2900-4000) 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.02 
Wage (>4000) 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 
Weight     
Underweight 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 
Healthy weight 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.61 
Overweight 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.26 
Obese 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.10 
Education     
Lower secondary school 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.30 
Intermediate secondary 
school 0.47 0.37 0.50 0.45 
Higher secondary school 0.30 0.43 0.34 0.26 
No further education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Apprenticeship 0.83 0.68 0.83 0.82 
University degree 0.16 0.30 0.16 0.16 
Personal Characteristics     
Age 39.0 42.2 31.2 46.8 
Married 0.59 0.70 0.45 0.73 
Children 0.32 0.39 0.41 0.22 
German nationality 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.97 
Living in West-Germany 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.76 
Living in East-Germany 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.24 
Job characteristics     
White-collar worker 0.78 0 0.80 0.75 
Blue-collar worker 0.16 0 0.14 0.18 
Civil servant 0.06 0 0.05 0.07 
Temporary work contract 0.08 0 0.11 0.05 
Fulltime employed 0.62 0.68 0.67 0.56 
Hours worked per week 31.8 36.5 32.7 30.9 
Tenure 9.20 8.29 6.03 12.42 
Firm size (1-10) 0.25 0.95 0.26 0.25 
Firm size (11-49) 0.27 0.04 0.26 0.28 
Firm size (> 50) 0.48 0.01 0.48 0.47 
n 63,388 5,172 30,670 32,718 
Source: Micro Census 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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The Role of Birth Order and Sibling Relationships 
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4.1 Introduction to Chapter 4 
In most industrialized countries the share of overweight people has been rising over 
the last decades. While adulthood obesity is recognized as one of the most severe health 
problems with negative economic consequences, the interest in childhood obesity is relatively 
new. This is probably due to the fact that childhood obesity has been rising dramatically over 
the past years. Prevalence of overweight schoolchildren aged between 5 and 6 years has 
increased by 45 percent between 1982 and 1997 in the state of Bavaria (Kalies et al. (2002)).43 
Compared to the U.S. the share of overweight children is somewhat lower in Germany: while 
the prevalence of obese children aged between 6 and 11 was 19 percent in the U.S. in 2003 
(National Center for Health Statistics, 2007) it was around 7 percent during that time in 
Germany.  
As shown by Serdula et al. (1993) overweight children are more likely to become 
overweight adults than children of healthy weight. Therefore, one has to address the problem 
of childhood obesity and identify potential causes and consequences. Addressing the 
consequences, it is found that overweight children are more likely to be teased in school, 
which might have an impact on the development of their self-esteem, their educational 
achievements, and their social interaction with other children or classmates. Besides 
psychological consequences overweight children are facing severe physical side effects. Many 
chronic illnesses, once common among elderly persons, now appear among children. 
Examples for these illnesses are arthritis, orthopedic problems, or Type 2 diabetes mellitus, 
which was formally known as ‘Adult-Onset Diabetes’. In later life, additionally to physical 
effects, obese women have a lower probability to be married than women of healthy weight 
(Averett and Korenman (1996)). Economic consequences of adulthood obesity are 
investigated by Cawley (2004) who finds a negative impact of obesity on wages for women. 
                                                 
43
 There is no longitudinal dataset on childhood obesity available for Germany. Studies only refer to regional 
samples, for example schoolchildren in Bavaria. 
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The causes for increasing rates of childhood obesity cannot be determined as easily, 
although the physiological mechanism seems clear: a child becomes overweight if the daily 
calorie intake exceeds the amount of calories burned. This explanation provides two channels 
to become overweight: 1) they eat more calories (food channel) or 2) they burn fewer calories 
(activity channel) - or most likely a mixture of both. Possible reasons for the first channel are 
the availability of high-fat and high-calorie food in schools and in kindergartens or general 
trends that people eat out more often and spend less time cooking fresh and healthy food at 
home. The second channel might be explained by the fact that children tend to spend more 
time on playing computer games or watching television instead of playing outside. Moreover, 
due to a continuously improving transportation infrastructure getting to school has become 
easier for children living in suburban or rural areas. While 50 years ago, children had to walk 
to school or go by bicycle for several miles, today many children either take a bus or they are 
dropped off at school directly by their parents, which decreases their level of activity and thus 
their calories burned. 
Furthermore, changes in parental behavior have to be taken into account, as they 
influence a child’s overweight status through food and activity channels - at least in the early 
years of a child’s development. In this context, the most significant change in parental 
behavior in the last decades seems to be the increasing share of employed women. Due to less 
supervision, it is easier for children to eat unhealthy snacks or to play computer games during 
the afternoon. Thus, this might be a potential reason for the rapidly increasing share of 
overweight children over the last decades. Furthermore, if mothers are working longer hours, 
they spend less time cooking and rely more often on prepared food or fast food (Cawley and 
Liu (2007)). Accordingly, studies on the effect of maternal employment find a positive 
correlation between hours worked by the mother and the probability of the child being 
overweight for the U.S. (Anderson et al. (2003), Cawley and Liu (2007), Ruhm (2004)). 
However, fewer studies focus on countries different than the U.S. 
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This study adds to the literature in two ways: First, in contrast to most large datasets 
data used in this study contain detailed information on siblings (birth order, number of 
siblings and age differences between siblings). Therefore, I am able to estimate whether the 
correlation between maternal employment and overweight children varies between children of 
different birth ranks or between children with large age differences to their siblings. Studies 
on the impact of birth order on personality traits find that there are significant differences in 
personalities between children of different birth ranks. Sulloway (1995, 2001) shows that 
firstborns are more responsible and act in a way to meet their parents' expectations, whereas 
lastborns are found to be more rebellious. Because of these differences in personality traits, 
children might react differently to a working mother in terms of what they eat, how much they 
eat and how they spend their afternoon. Anecdotal evidence supports this theory by 
confirming that firstborns differ from laterborns when it comes to responsibility, grown-up 
behavior and reliability. Second, this paper uses German data. Germany is an interesting case 
in this context, since in contrast to most countries there is no full-day school available for 
most pupils. Therefore, children return from school in the early afternoon, which makes them 
spend more time without supervision if the mother works fulltime. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of 
the economic literature on overweight, the association between overweight and birth rank, and 
the relationship between maternal employment and childhood obesity. Section 4.3 introduces 
the dataset and motivates the hypotheses on birth order and the relationship between maternal 
employment and overweight children. In section 4.4 results are presented. I find a strong 
correlation between maternal employment and overweight children. Moreover, age 
differences between siblings and birth order are important factors to determine whether a 
child is overweight if the mother is working. Lastborns and children with large age 
differences to their siblings have a much higher probability to be overweight with increasing 
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maternal employment than firstborns or children with siblings of similar age. Section 4.5 
concludes the paper. 
 
4.2 Previous research 
When analyzing causes and economic consequences of overweight, most studies focus 
on adults.44 Recent literature also focuses on children: For the U.S. and the U.K., Case et al. 
(2002), Currie and Stabile (2003) and Currie et al. (2007) find a strong and positive 
relationship between socioeconomic status of the parents and good child-health. One health-
related outcome that is of particular interest is childhood obesity, since the share of 
overweight children is increasing dramatically and overweight children are likely to be the 
next generation of overweight adults. Guo et al. (2000) analyze consequences of childhood 
obesity; they find that being overweight as a child does not only have health-related but also 
psychological consequences. In their study, Guo et al. (2000) ask children which attributes 
they associate with overweight children. The answers were characteristics such as ‘lazy, dirty, 
stupid, ugly, cheats and lies’. Overweight children have to cope with these prejudices; 
therefore, it is harder for them to find friends. Out of boredom and due to reduced social 
activities they tend to eat even more which might lead to a vicious circle.45 Moreover, as 
stated by Guo et al. (2000), overweight children have a lower ability to exercise and therefore 
less motivation to do so. This again leads to even more weight due to fewer calories burned 
by doing sports.  
                                                 
44
 Studies analyzing the determinants of obesity (e.g. Sobal and Stunkard (1989), Zhang and Wang (2004)) find, 
that a higher body weight is associated with a lower socioeconomic status; whereas Zhang and Wang (2004) 
show that this trend has decreased over the last 30 years. For the U.S., Cawley and Danziger (2004) find that 
being overweight or obese is negatively correlated with employment, hours worked and earnings for current or 
former welfare recipients. Nevertheless, most interest is paid to effects of overweight on wages. Most studies 
find a negative relationship between overweight and wages for women (e.g. Register and Williams (1990), 
Averett and Korenman (1996), Cawley (2004)). 
45
 Physical and psychological consequences of childhood overweight are summarized in Loke (2002). 
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Anderson and Butcher (2006) study causes and consequences of childhood obesity and 
find that changes in the food market, in schools and child care settings, and in the role of 
parents (especially mothers who tend to work more than in the past) play important roles in 
explaining increasing rates of childhood obesity. Studies for the U.S. find a significant 
positive correlation between maternal employment and children’s weight problems (Anderson 
et al. (2003), Fertig et al. (2006)), especially when concentrating on mothers with a higher 
socioeconomic status or education. Cawley and Liu (2007) and Fertig et al. (2006) use time 
allocation data to show through which mechanism maternal employment and overweight 
children are related. Fertig et al. (2006) identify supervision and nutrition as the main 
channels while Cawley and Liu (2007) show that employed mothers spend less time cooking, 
eating, and playing with their children and attribute this to the correlation between maternal 
employment and overweight children. Anderson et al. (2003) estimate the causal effect of 
mothers' employment on children’s overweight. By taking state child care regulations, wages 
of child care workers, welfare benefit levels, the status of welfare reform in the state and the 
annual unemployment rate in the state as instruments for maternal employment, the effect on 
overweight status of the child remains comparable to the probit results, but insignificant due 
to larger standard errors. They find that both, fixed-effects and instrumental variable results 
do not differ too much from probit results, which might indicate that problems of unobserved 
heterogeneity or endogeneity were only a minor problem in their specification.  
Studies for countries different than the U.S. come to similar findings: Takahashi et al. 
(1999) find a positive correlation between maternal labor supply and overweight children in 
Japan, while Chia (2008) finds this relationship for Canada. Moreover, she identifies channels 
explaining this relationship by showing that weekly hours worked by the mother are 
associated with an increase in probability that the child watches three or more hours of 
television per day. During the course of my research, I did not find any German study relating 
overweight of children to their mothers' working activity. One might even expect larger 
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effects in countries like Germany, where children return from school in the early afternoon or 
at lunchtime. In case the mother works fulltime, children often have to prepare their own 
lunch or rely on snacks. On the other hand, the availability of fast food and unhealthy 
packaged food is probably higher in the U.S. Moreover, if a child stays at home in the 
afternoon instead of being in school, there is more time for activities, such as doing sports. 
Therefore, the association between maternal labor supply and overweight children could also 
be weaker in Germany than in the U.S. In the end, it remains an empirical question for which 
country stronger effects can be found.  
Another new aspect of this paper is that it takes detailed sibling information (birth 
order and age difference between siblings) as explanatory variables. These sibling 
relationships seem to be an important factor in explaining overweight, which has not been 
documented in the strand of literature investigating the effect of maternal employment on 
overweight children.46 Moreover, this paper analyzes whether the correlation between 
mother’s working activities and childhood overweight varies by birth order or by age 
differences between children. One reason for this hypothesis is that birth order has an 
influence on personality (Sulloway (2001)) which leads to different behavioral patterns that 
might have an impact on overweight.47 In context of maternal employment and overweight 
children, I find that birth order and age differences play an important role: the correlation 
between the mother’s working activities and overweight children is strongest for last-born 
children and children with large age differences to their siblings.  
 
                                                 
46
 There exists small literature on the correlation between birth order or family size and childhood overweight. 
Ravelli and Belmont (1979) find a negative correlation between number of siblings and the risk of being obese 
for Dutch males. Konziel and Kolodziej (2001) show that there is a negative relationship between overweight 
and birth order for girls in three sibling families, while older literature (Howell (1948), Zonta et al. (1975)) does 
not find a correlation between birth order and childhood overweight. 
47
 Other studies find a negative relationship between birth order and educational attainment (Kantarevic and 
Mechoulan (2006), Booth and Kee (2009)). 
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4.3 Data and research design 
This study uses German Micro Census data, a large individual-level dataset, which 
consists of a one-percent sample of the entire German population (the scientific community 
receives a 70 percent sample of that one percent). Information on weight and height are 
available for the years 1999, 2003 and 2005. I concentrate on children older than three years 
of age, since it is not uncommon for German mothers to stay at home with their children until 
they reach the age of three. Maternity leave regulations in Germany are very generous for 
mothers: they can stay at home for up to three years and then return to their previous 
employer. The Micro Census dataset of children aged between 3 and 14 years consists of 
more than 50,000 observations for the pooled sample.  
The dependent variable is an indicator variable whether the child is overweight 
(including obesity). Following the literature, I do not use BMI as a measure of children’s 
overweight, but whether the BMI is above the 90th percentile of the BMI distribution of an 
age- and sex-specific reference population surveyed in 17 regional studies between 1985 and 
1998.48 Explanatory variables are: age and age squared of mother and child, gender dummy, 
nationality, state of residence, availability of ‘full-day schools’ in the state, dummies for 
mother’s weight categories, mother’s schooling and education, household income, marital 
status, number of siblings, birth order, and age differences between siblings. 
Besides these control variables, the variable of interest is whether the employment 
status of the mother is significantly related to the probability that her child is overweight. In 
this study, different measures of employment status are used: dummies for working fulltime 
(at least 31 hours per week) and for part-time employment (working between 20 and 30 hours 
per week), mother’s weekly working hours and dummies for working hours (in sets of 10). In 
order to estimate a causal effect of maternal employment on childhood obesity, few papers 
use instrumental variable regression. The reason why maternal employment could be 
                                                 
48
 For Germany, these cut-off values are compiled by Kromeyer-Hauschild et al. (2001).  
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endogenous in an equation estimating a child’s probability to be overweight is that there 
might be unobserved factors influencing a child’s overweight status that are correlated with 
mother’s working activities. Most common instruments for maternal employment are local 
child care regulations or local economic conditions such as local unemployment rate, 
percentage of the local labor force that is female, percentage of labor force employed in 
services, the status of welfare reform in the state, child care regulations, wages of child care 
worker (Anderson et al. (2003), Baum (2003), James-Burdumy (2005)). Nevertheless, the 
Mirco Census dataset does not contain local information (on district or community level); the 
smallest unit of an observation is on state level. Using state unemployment rate or percentage 
of female workers in the state as instrument for maternal employment does not seem very 
convincing since there is enough variation over the 16 German states. Therefore, I rely on 
OLS results, keeping in mind that these results might be biased if, for example, working 
mothers differ form mothers who do not work in a way that is related to their children’s 
weight (and cannot be controlled for).49 As mentioned in Anderson et al. (2003), one could 
think of mothers who work more hours to be generally less attentive to their children’s health, 
irrespective of their work effort. In this case, OLS results would be biased. But since probit 
and IV results in Anderson et al. (2003) are very similar, the bias using probit (or OLS) is 
likely to be not too large.  
In a first step, I estimate the correlation between family characteristics (such as birth 
order, number of siblings, age differences between siblings) and overweight for children 
between 3 and 14 years of age. The second step is to analyse whether there exists an 
association between maternal labor supply and childhood overweight. Addressing this 
question, I focus on three points: 1) Is there a difference between single mothers and families? 
2) Are there different effects for children of different birth ranks? 3) Do age differences 
between siblings matter? Concentrating on the first point, I divide the dataset into single 
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 OLS results are very similar to probit results. In Appendix 4.1 both results are contrasted. 
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mothers and families. Here, I expect the correlation between maternal employment and 
overweight children to be stronger for single mothers; as shown in Cawley and Liu (2007) and 
Fertig et al. (2006) childhood overweight can be explained by a lack of supervision, bad 
nutrition and less time spent with children. Since working single mothers probably have less 
time to spend with their children and less time to cook the correlation is expected to be 
stronger for them. 
Addressing points 2) and 3), I divide the dataset by birth rank and by age differences 
between siblings, which is the main contribution of this paper. Most studies on the 
relationship between maternal employment and overweight children do not take detailed 
family characteristics such as birth order or age differences between siblings into account.50 
Nevertheless, these characteristics strongly correlate with overweight status since birth order 
affects personality. The correlation between birth order and personality and its potential effect 
on overweight if the mother is working is discussed in detail in the next sections. 
 
4.3.1 The correlation between birth order and personality 
Why should one expect different effects of maternal employment on a child’s 
probability to be overweight for children of different birth orders? As stated in the literature, 
birth order has an influence on personality. This correlation leads to different behavioral 
patterns for children of different birth ranks. My hypothesis is that due to these different 
behavioral patterns, children react differently if their mother spends less time with them due 
to longer working hours. Some children might easily cope with these circumstances because 
they learned to spend time on their own or have a sibling of similar age to play with, others 
might have a problem if they get less attention, which might lead to stress eating or to other 
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 Anderson et al. (2003) and Fertig et al. (2006) control for number of siblings and for being first born, while 
other birth ranks are not included. Ruhm (2004) and Cawley and Liu (2007) only control for number of siblings 
and do not include any information on birth order. 
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behaviors that are correlated with gaining weight such as watching television or playing 
computer games.  
Sulloway (1995, 2001) finds that birth order has an influence on ‘The Big Five’ 
personality traits, which are extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism (or emotional 
instability), openness and conscientiousness. Therefore it is likely to assume that children 
with different personalities have different behavioral patterns, which lead to different 
behaviors when staying at home if their mother is working. As stated by Sulloway (1995, 
p.77), firstborns score higher on ‘conscientiousness’ which means that they are more 
amenable to their parents' wishes, values, and standards, including many behavioral elements 
that reflect conformity to parental values. Moreover, they have a stronger identification with 
parents and authorities in general. In contrast, lastborns score higher on ‘openness’, which 
stems directly from their lesser identification with parental authority. According to Sulloway 
(1995, 2001), openness also entails traits like being daring, untraditional, and rebellious. 
While Sulloway (1995, 2001) focuses on differences between firstborns and laterborns, Feiner 
et al. (2003) studies differences between only children and firstborns. They come to similar 
findings for firstborns: they score higher on conscientiousness, extraversion, and 
agreeableness. Moreover, they find that only children differ significantly from firstborns, 
which could not be shown by Sulloway (2001). Differences between firstborns and only 
children might be explained by the fact that in contrast to only children, firstborns have to 
cope with the fact that they have to share their parents’ attention and behave in a responsible 
or more grown-up way as soon as their younger sibling arrives, which might lead to 
personality traits such as ‘conscientiousness’. 
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4.3.2 Personality and behavioral pattern if the mother is working 
Supporting Sulloway’s findings, what would children do if their mother is working 
fulltime and they return from school in the early afternoon? Following Sulloway, one would 
expect firstborns to behave in a way to meet their parents’ expectations, for example by eating 
what they are supposed to eat, doing their homework etc. In contrast, if we think of rebellious 
lastborns, one would not expect them to eat their vegetables, but rather to eat unhealthy 
snacks, watch TV or engage in other unhealthy behaviors that might lead to overweight.51 
Middleborns are characterized as somehow ‘in-between’. They did not get the full attention 
from their parents before birth of another child (as firstborns), yet they are not as spoiled or 
pampered as lastborns. For this reason, there might be differences between the correlation 
between maternal employment and childhood overweight for children of different birth ranks. 
I expect the effect to be stronger for laterborns, since they score lower on conscientiousness 
than first-born children. 
Whether the correlation between maternal employment and overweight children is 
stronger for only children than for children with siblings is not clear. While Sulloway (1995, 
2001) does not find a difference in personality between only children and firstborns, Feiner et 
al. (2003) find significant differences in the ‘Big Five’ personality traits. Moreover, there 
remain many prejudices against only children, for example that they are ‘spoiled, selfish, 
bossy and lonely’ (Blake (1981), Chang and Holmberg (2008)). Irrespective of whether these 
prejudices are found to be true or not, I would expect only children to react differently to a 
working mother than children with siblings. Compared to firstborns, they do not have to take 
responsibility for younger siblings, while compared to laterborns, they do not have anyone to 
take responsibility for. Moreover, they do not have siblings as playmates during the afternoon; 
and they probably tend to be more by themselves than children with siblings which could lead 
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 Argys et al. (2006) show that lastborns and middleborns generally have a higher probability to engage in risky 
behaviors such as smoking, drinking, marijuana use, sexual activity, and crime than firstborns or only children. 
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to more hours of watching TV, playing computer games or increased snacking behavior. On 
the other hand, only children are raised surrounded by adults, which may lead to more grown-
up and responsible behavior. Thus, whether or not only children have a higher probability to 
be overweight if their mother is working compared to children with siblings remains an 
empirical question. 
Besides birth order, more sibling relationships can be taken into account by focusing 
on age differences between siblings. Therefore, I divide the dataset into only children, 
children with siblings of similar age (age difference less than 3 years), and children with 
much older or much younger sibling (age difference more than 3 years). My hypothesis is that 
the effect of maternal employment on childhood overweight is stronger for only children or 
children with much younger or much older siblings (who are therefore grown-up similarly to 
only children). Due to the lack of playmates of similar age in the household, they might have 
a higher probability to stay indoors and engage in more inactive activities such as playing 
computer games or watching television. Moreover, it could be that employed mothers ‘spoil’ 
children who have to stay alone at home during the afternoon by giving sweets or unhealthy 
snacks as compensation. Correspondingly, I expect the correlation between maternal 
employment and childhood overweight to be less pronounced for children with siblings of 
similar age.  
 
4.4 Results 
Sample means of all variables are shown in Table 4.1. For most variables, there is not 
much variation between children of different birth ranks. Nevertheless, there are some 
differences: mothers of only children have a higher probability to work full-time, are less 
likely to be married and have a lower household income than mothers with more than one 
child (which is probably related to the fact that most single mothers have only one child). To 
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account for these differences, I restrict the sample to married mothers and to families with two 
children in later regressions. In a first step, I estimate the correlation between sibling 
relationships (such as birth order and age differences between siblings) and a child’s 
overweight status. The sample includes children between 3 and 14 years of age.52 However, 
information on younger and older siblings refers to the complete household, including siblings 
of all ages.  
The relationship between sibling relationships and the likelihood of a child to be 
overweight is shown in Table 4.2. Control variables are added stepwise from specification (1) 
to (5). In the first specification only characteristics of the child are included (gender, age, age 
squared, nationality, state of residence, year dummies, and the percentage rate of children 
visiting full-day schools in the state). The second specification additionally includes 
characteristics of the mother, such as age and age squared, indicator variables of whether she 
is underweight, overweight or obese and a dummy for being married. The third column adds 
indicator variables for four levels of educational attainment of the mother (1. low education 
and no further degree, 2. low education plus apprenticeship, 3. high school degree plus 
apprenticeship, 4. high school plus university degree). In the fourth column, mother’s 
occupational status is added in four stages (1. not working, 2. in education, apprenticeship or 
training, 3. self-employed without employees, blue-color workers 4. self-employed with 
employees, white-collar workers, civil servants), while specification 5 additionally controls 
for household income. In Table 4.2, as in all other tables, the standard errors are robust, 
clustered on the mother’s identification code, since there might be more than one child per 
mother. Moreover, all estimates are weighted using children’s sampling weight. 
The variables of interest are all kinds of sibling relationships or family characteristics. 
The first panel estimates the relationship between birth order and overweight. Birth order is 
included in four categories: Only children, firstborns with younger siblings (as reference 
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 All results remain robust against taking different age groups of children (not shown in the paper). Point 
estimates vary a bit in size; however, the story remains unchanged. 
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category), middle-born and last-born children. Middleborns build the smallest category, since 
this implies that there are at least three children in the household. The correlations with 
overweight are strong and point estimates become only a bit smaller, as more control 
variables are included. The fact that all point estimates are positive shows that children of all 
other birth ranks have a higher probability to be overweight than first-born children with 
younger siblings. Whereas middle-born children have a 1.7 percentage point higher 
probability to be overweight, only children and lastborns have a 4.1 and 4.7 percentage point 
higher probability, respectively. Figure 4.1 illustrates this relationship graphically using the 
raw data without any control variables. 
In the second panel, the relationship between age differences between siblings and 
overweight of the child is estimated. It can be seen clearly throughout the different 
specifications that age differences between siblings are positively correlated with overweight. 
Only children are included in these estimations, setting the age difference between siblings to 
30 years, which is about one generation. Results indicate that, for example, having a ten year 
older or younger sibling is associated with a 4.7 percentage point higher probability to be 
overweight compared to a child with a two year older or younger sibling. Given that 16.5 
percent of all children in the sample are overweight, this result is sizeable. Figure 4.2 clearly 
demonstrates this relationship graphically. 
Results of Table 4.2 indicate that sibling relationships, such as birth order and age 
differences between children, are highly correlated with a child’s probability to be overweight 
and therefore have to be included in a regression estimating the correlation between maternal 
employment and overweight children. Moreover, there could be differences between children 
of different birth ranks or with larger or smaller age difference to their siblings when 
estimating the relationship between mother’s labor supply and a child’s probability to be 
overweight. Section 4.4.3 focuses on this point, after estimating the overall correlation 
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between maternal employment and overweight children in Section 4.4.1 and turning to the 
role of the father in Section 4.4.2. 
 
4.4.1 The relationship between maternal employment and overweight children 
The first column of Table 4.3 shows that there is a correlation between a mother’s 
working behavior and the probability of the child to be overweight. While working less than 
10 hours per week is associated with a likelihood of being overweight of about 15 percent, 
nearly 20 percent of the children are overweight if their mother works more than 40 hours per 
week.53 It could be the case that the relationship between family characteristics and 
overweight can be explained by the fact that a mother’s working behavior differs with family 
size. For example, if a mother has only one child, her probability to work more hours might 
be higher than if she had three children. The causal effect of maternal employment on 
overweight children (as found in Anderson et al. (2003)) could be one explanation why only 
children have a higher probability to be overweight, namely because their mothers have a 
higher probability to work more hours. However, this can only explain part of the relationship 
between maternal employment and overweight children. Descriptive statistics in Table 4.3 
reveal that, for example, first-born children have a lower probability to be overweight in all 
stages of their mother’s employment level whereas only children and lastborns are heavier 
regardless of their mother’s working activities. The positive correlation between maternal 
employment and overweight children persists regardless of birth order, when we compare the 
probability to be overweight at each stage of the mother’s employment status (e.g. each line in 
Table 4.3) or for each kind of birth rank (e.g. each column in Table 4.3). 
Table 4.4 shows results of a regression using an indicator variable for overweight 
children as dependent variable and mother’s employment status as variable of interest. The six 
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 Mothers who are not working seem to be an exception, as their children tend to be heavier although they stay 
at home and were able to care for them all day long. Nevertheless, as Table 4.4 reveals, these differences are due 
to socioeconomic differences between working mothers and mothers staying at home. 
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columns represent six different specifications where control variables are added stepwise. The 
first specification shows the raw effect, i.e. no control variables are included. Specifications 2 
though 6 increase the set of control variables, first by including personal characteristics of 
mother and child (age and age squared of mother and child, state, nationality, weight category 
of mother – underweight, normal weight, overweight or obese, whether the mother is married 
and the availability of full-day schools in the state). In specification 3, education of the mother 
is included, while specification 4 additionally controls for the mother’s occupational status. 
Specification 5 adds household income and the last column, specification 6, takes family 
characteristics (number of siblings and its squares, age difference between siblings and its 
squares, birth order) into account. 
The difference to Table 4.2 is that the variable of interest is maternal employment, 
measured in different ways. The first panel includes a dummy for fulltime employment (more 
than 30 hours per week) and one for part-time employment (between 21 and 30 hours per 
week). The second panel has number of hours worked per week by the mother as regressor, 
while the third panel contains dummy variables for the number of hours worked per week in 
sets of ten. It is clearly shown that children are more likely to be overweight if their mother 
works more hours per week. Point estimates indicate that children of mothers who work 
fulltime have a 3.2 percentage point higher probability to be overweight compared to children 
of mothers who are not working or work less than 20 hours per week (first panel, last column 
of Table 4.4). Nevertheless, there is no difference in childhood overweight for women who 
work part-time and those who work less. The different specifications reveal that the 
correlation becomes stronger as more control variables are included. Recalling descriptive 
statistics in Table 4.3, children of women who do not work have a higher probability to be 
overweight, contrary to the general trend (that childhood overweight increases with hours 
worked by the mother). The small raw effect in Table 4.4 (first column) is driven by the fact 
that there are many overweight children in families where the mother is not working. As soon 
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as I control for education and job position of the mother, the point estimate becomes larger. If 
I exclude non-working mothers form the regression (not shown in a table), results stay more 
or less constant throughout all specifications and the effect including all controls remains 
unchanged (rounded to two decimal digits). This shows that the high probability of having an 
overweight child for non-working mothers is driven by observed characteristics of the mother 
(education and job position which can be interpreted as socioeconomic status) and vanishes if 
all controls are included. Therefore, I keep non-working mothers in the sample and 
concentrate on the specification with the full set of control variables. 
Taking number of hours worked per week as variable of interest, I find a strong 
relationship between hours worked by the mother and the likelihood that the child is 
overweight. Point estimates illustrate that 20 more hours of work (e.g. from part-time to 
fulltime employment) are associated with an increase of the probability to be overweight of 
2.4 percentage points. Dummies for working hours (panel 3) also indicate a strong 
relationship between hours worked and a child’s overweight status. The reference category 
(working between 21 and 30 hours per week) lies in the middle, while working less is clearly 
associated with a lower probability to have an overweight child, and working more is 
significantly positively related to childhood overweight.  
Comparing these results to U.S. finding by Anderson et al. (2003, Table 2) indicates 
that the correlation between maternal employment and overweight children is stronger in 
Germany.54 While Anderson et al. (2003) find that mothers who work 10 hours more per 
week increase a child’s likelihood to be overweight by 0.7 percentage points, results for 
Germany find an increase by 1.2 percentage points. These differences could partly be 
explained by differences in the school system. While in Germany only 15.2 percent of all 
pupils attended a full-day school in 2005 and otherwise return from school in the early 
                                                 
54
 The research design by Anderson et al. (2003) is slightly different. They use ‘average hours per week if 
working since child’s birth’ as explanatory variable. Moreover, they have some additional control variables and 
omit some control variable used in my specification. Nevertheless, to get an idea of whether the effect is stronger 
for the U.S. or Germany, results can be compared. 
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afternoon without having eaten lunch, nearly all pupils in the U.S. return from school in the 
late afternoon and generally eat lunch at school. More support for this presumption is given in 
Appendix 4.1 which shows point estimates for all control variables comparing OLS and probit 
results.55 Point estimates for the availability of full-day schools in the state are negatively 
related to overweight, indicating that full-day schools decrease the likelihood of being 
overweight. Unfortunately, there is no micro data on school type available in the Micro 
Census; therefore, I am not able to estimate the correlation between maternal employment and 
overweight children separately by school type. 
 
4.4.2 The role of a father in the family 
The Micro Census dataset includes information on whether children live with both 
parents or with a single parent, although it cannot be observed whether these are their 
biological parents.56 Taking this information, I divide the dataset into married mothers who 
live with their husband and single mothers. On average, single mothers work more hours per 
week if employed (29 compared to 24 hours per week), while in both groups about one third 
is not working. If the mechanism of the effect of maternal employment on overweight 
children works through the fact that working mothers spend less time cooking, playing and 
eating with their children and have less time for supervision (as found in Cawley and Liu 
(2007) and Fertig et al. (2006)), I would expect a stronger correlation between mother’s 
working activities and child’s overweight status for single mothers, since they have less time 
to spend with their children and children do not have a father to spend time with. 
Results for married and single mothers are presented in Table 4.5. For married 
mothers, I distinguish between an estimation using the same set of control variables as above 
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 Children living with their father only are excluded from the sample, while single mothers are included to 
estimate the effect of maternal employment on overweight children. 
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and a regression including father’s controls.57 As expected, results are much stronger for 
single mothers, supporting the theory that less time for supervision, cooking and eating might 
lead to a higher probability that the child is overweight. While for single mothers who work 
fulltime the probability to have an overweight child increases by 4.4 percentage points, it only 
increases by 3 percentage points higher for married mothers who live with their husband. 
When additionally controlling for father’s characteristics, the likelihood to have an 
overweight child is even somewhat lower for fulltime working mothers. This indicates that 
part of the correlation between maternal employment and overweight children can be 
explained by the father’s characteristics. Nevertheless, controlling for characteristics of the 
father reduces point estimates somewhat, but results stay significant and the story remains 
unchanged: there is a negative correlation between maternal employment and the likelihood 
for children to be overweight. In the following estimations, I will therefore rely on the full 
sample of married and single mothers and omit controlling for father’s characteristics. 
 
4.4.3 The role of birth order and age differences between siblings 
In Table 4.6 the dataset of all children is divided by birth order. It shows clearly that 
the correlation between mother’s labor supply and childhood overweight is much stronger for 
only children or lastborns than it is for firstborns or those in between two siblings. Point 
estimates indicate that mothers who work fulltime increase the likelihood that their child is 
overweight by 3.8 and 4.8 percentage points for only children and lastborns, respectively, 
both being highly significant. Effects for first-born or middle-born children are much smaller, 
some even insignificant. Explanations for these findings can be found in the literature on the 
effect of birth order on personality traits by Sulloway (1995, 2001). As stated above, 
firstborns want to please their parents and meet their expectations, while lastborns can be 
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described as the rebel of the family. As discussed in Section 4.3, the effect for only children is 
not clear: while Sulloway (1995, 2001) finds them to be similar to firstborns, Feiner et al. 
(2003) find significant differences between firstborns and only children, stating that only 
children have more similarities with lastborns. Results in Table 4.6 support these findings, at 
least when focusing on the correlation between maternal employment and childhood 
overweight.  
In order to compare effects of birth order without having different family sizes, I also 
estimate the effect for firstborns and lastborns in 2-child families only. In this case, all 
mothers have two children, so their working decision should not be influenced by the number 
of children. As shown in the lower part of Table 4.6, correlations remain basically unchanged. 
The effect of working fulltime on a child’s overweight is three times higher for lastborns and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, while point estimates for firstborns are 
insignificant. Therefore, family size effects, which might influence a women’s working 
behavior do not seem to play an important role in this case; the effects for lastborns remain 
much larger, regardless of family size. 
But not only birth order is supposed to have an influence on the correlation between 
maternal employment and childhood overweight. Theoretically, age differences between 
siblings could also influence a child’s behavior if the mother is working in the afternoon. If 
children are within a similar age range, they always have someone to play with. In contrast, 
only children and children with much older or much younger siblings might be more on their 
own, doing less active things like watching TV or playing computer games which might lead 
to overweight due to a lower activity level or due to increased snacking behavior. Table 4.7 
shows the estimates for children with at least one sibling of similar age (age difference less 
than three years), for children with siblings who are all much older or younger (age difference 
more than three years) and for only children. As expected, the effect is higher for children not 
having a sibling of similar age. In fact, this effect is about as high as it is for only children. 
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While children with siblings of similar age have a 2.4 percentage point increased probability 
to be overweight if their mother works fulltime, children with much older or younger siblings 
and only children have a 3.9 and 3.8 percentage points higher probability, respectively. 
Limiting the sample size to families with two children comes to more or less the same results.  
In this context, another interesting aspect is to combine birth order and age difference 
effects. To this end, I take families with two children and estimate the correlation between 
maternal employment and overweight status for firstborns and lastborns separately for 
children with siblings within the same age range and for children no having a sibling of 
similar age. Results are shown in Table 4.8. Effects of working fulltime on the probability to 
have an overweight child are large and highly significant for all groups, except for first-born 
children with siblings of similar age. This group does not seem to react to a working mother, 
which can be explained by a firstborns’ nature to behave in a conscientious and prudential 
way in combination with the fact that they have a younger sibling as playmate all day long, a 
sibling to teach or to explain things. Firstborns with siblings of similar age have to grow up 
faster than other children, take responsibility and are more self-dependent. Because they want 
(more than children of other birth ranks) to meet their parents’ expectations, they behave in a 
way that leads to a reduced probability to become overweight. In contrast, for all children of 
other birth ranks or ‘birth rank - age difference’ combinations, I find a strong and significant 
correlation between maternal employment and their overweight status.  
 
4.5 Conclusions of Chapter 4 
This paper analyses the correlation between maternal employment and overweight 
children. In contrast to papers trying to estimate a causal effect, this paper focuses on whether 
the correlation between maternal employment and overweight children is stronger or smaller 
for a certain group of children, namely children living with a single mother, children of 
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particular birth ranks or children having siblings of similar age. Therefore, the dataset of all 
children is divided by single or married mothers, by birth rank and by age differences between 
siblings. Results demonstrate that the correlation is stronger for single mothers, supporting 
theories by Cawley and Liu (2007) and Fertig et al. (2006), who provide evidence that 
supervision, time spend with children and nutrition are the main channels to relate mothers’ 
working activities to childhood overweight. Results on the effect of birth order reveal that the 
correlation between maternal employment and overweight children is much stronger for only 
children and for lastborns, which can be explained by studies on birth rank and personality, 
indicating that middleborns and lastborns are more likely to engage in risky behaviors and 
have a more ‘rebellious’ personality than firstborns who try to meet everyone’s expectations. 
Lastly, having a sibling of similar age seems to be negatively related to the probability to be 
overweight if the mother is working. These results indicate that children might spend time 
differently when having a sibling of similar age. Due to a lack of playmates, only children and 
children not having a sibling in their age might spend time doing more inactive things such as 
watching TV or playing computer games. These behaviors lead to a higher probability to 
become overweight, especially if the mother is working during the afternoon and therefore not 
able to supervise their children. 
In terms of policy implications, I would not conclude that mothers should stay at home 
and care for their children, but rather interpret results in the following way: If we had full-day 
schools and full-day kindergartens to supervise children, provide good and healthy food and 
offer sports activities, the prevalence of overweight children could possibly be reduced. 
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Tables and Figures of Chapter 4 
Table 4-1: Means for all children and by birth order 
  
All Only 
child 
First- 
born 
Middle- 
born 
Last- 
born 
Outcome variable      
Overweight (incl. obesity) 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.19 
Variable of interest      
Mother works full-time  0.22 0.32 0.19 0.14 0.22 
Mother works part-time  0.11 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.12 
Characteristics of the child      
Female 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 
Age 8.82 8.74 9.14 9.38 8.48 
Full-days school (in state) 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Nationality - German 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.97 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Hamburg 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Lower Saxony 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Bremen 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hesse 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 
Baden-Wurttemberg 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.15 
Bavaria 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.16 
Saarland 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Berlin 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Brandenburg 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Saxony 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Thuringia 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Characteristics of the mother      
Mother is underweight 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Mother is normal weight 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.62 0.67 
Mother is overweight 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.21 
Mother is obese 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.08 
Nationality - German 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.95 
Age  37.3 37.0 35.5 37.7 38.7 
Married 0.88 0.76 0.92 0.92 0.91 
Education of the mother      
Education - very low 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.28 
Education -  low 0.32 0.29 0.35 0.32 0.31 
Education -  intermediate 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.28 
Education - high 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 
 
Chapter 4   
 173 
Table 4-1: Means for all children and by birth order (continued) 
  
All Only  
child 
First  
born 
Middle 
born 
Last  
born 
Job position of the mother      
Not working 0.34 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.32 
Blue-collar worker 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.14 
Self-employed 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
White-collar worker 0.45 0.53 0.42 0.31 0.45 
Civil servant 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Household income (in EUR)      
less than 1300  0.10 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.07 
1301-1700 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.11 
1701-2300 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.22 
2301-2900 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.25 
2901-4000 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.21 
4001-5000 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 
more than 5000 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 
Family characteristics      
Number of siblings  1.09 - 1.22 2.53 1.29 
Age difference 9.49 - 3.38 2.29 4.01 
Only child 0.22 - - - - 
First-born children 0.30 - - - - 
Middle-born children 0.09 - - - - 
Last-born children 0.39 - - - - 
n 51,816 11,804 15,347 4,648 20,017 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 4-2: Correlation between family characteristics and the probability to be 
overweight: Stepwise including control variables 
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
Age difference 
     
Age differences between 
siblings 
0.0110*** 0.0110*** 0.0095*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Age differences between 
siblings (squared) -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Birth order 
     
      
Only child 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Middle-born children 0.024*** 0.021** 0.017** 0.016* 0.017** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Last-born children 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
n 51,816 51,816 51,816 51,816 51,816 
      
Child’s characteristics  x x x x x 
      
Mother’s characteristics  x x x x 
      
Education of mother   x x x 
      
Mother’s occupational status    x x 
      
Household income     x 
          
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The estimates 
stepwise increase the set of control variables. In the first column, characteristics of the child (gender, 
age, age squared, nationality, state of residence, year dummies, and the percentage rate of children 
visiting full-day schools in the state) are included. The second column controls for age and age 
squared of the mother and whether the mother is underweight, overweight or obese. The third column 
adds the educational level of the mother in four levels. In the fourth column, mother’s occupational 
status is added (white- or blue-color worker, civil servant, in education / apprenticeship / training), 
while specification 5 additionally controls for household income. 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
Chapter 4   
 175 
Table 4-3: Percent overweight children by mother’s employment status and by birth 
order 
 
All Only  
child 
First- 
born 
Middle- 
born 
Last- 
born 
All 16.5 18.0 13.2 15.5 18.5 
Mother is not working 17.7 21.1 14.4 17.7 19.3 
Mother works up to 10h 
per week 14.9 14.7 11.6 12.0 18.4 
Mother works 11-20h 
per week 14.7 17.0 12.4 12.2 15.5 
Mother works 21-30h 
per week 15.6 15.4 12.8 15.9 17.4 
Mother works 31-40h 
per week 17.5 17.8 12.1 14.8 21.4 
Mother works more than 
40h per week 19.6 23.0 18.8 15.4 18.5 
n 51,816 11,804 15,347 4,648 20,017 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 4-4: Correlation between maternal employment and overweight children:  
Stepwise including control variables 
  
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
  
     
Mother works full-time  0.015** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
(>30h per week) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
Mother works part-time  -0.009 0.013 0.007 0.014 0.015* 0.012 
(21 – 30h per week) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
No. of hours  0.0000 0.0003 0.0005*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 
mother is working (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
       
Mother works 0-10h 0.014* -0.000 -0.007 -0.022** -0.023** -0.019* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
      
Mother works 11-20h -0.009 -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014* -0.012 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
Mother works 31-40h 0.019** 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
       
Mother works >40h 0.040** 0.041** 0.045** 0.043** 0.044** 0.043** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
  
   
 
 
Personal characteristics  
(child and mother)  x x x x x 
       
Education of mother  
 x x x x 
       
Mother’s occupational 
status    x x x 
       
Household income  
   x x 
       
Family characteristics  
   
 x 
             
n 51,816 51,816 51,816 51,816 51,816 51,816 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The first 
specification shows the raw effect. Specifications 2 though 6 increase the set of control variables, first 
by including personal characteristics of mother and child (age and age squared of mother and child, 
state, nationality, weight category of mother – underweight, normal weight, overweight or obese, 
whether the mother is married, and the availability of full-day schools in the state). In specification 3, 
education of the mother is included, while specification 4 additionally controls for mother’s 
occupational (blue- or white-collar employee, civil servant, in education / apprenticeship / training). 
Specification 5 adds household income and the last column, specification 6, takes family 
characteristics (number of siblings and its squares, age difference between siblings and its squares, 
birth order) into account. 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 4-5: Correlation between maternal employment and overweight children:  
Dataset divided by mother’s marital status 
 
Mother married Mother not married 
 
Not controlling 
for father’s 
characteristics  
Controlling  
for father’s 
characteristics 
 
All families 
   
    
Mother works full-time  0.030*** 0.022*** 0.044** 
(>30h per week) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) 
    
Mother works part-time  0.015* 0.011 0.009 
(21 – 30h per week) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) 
    
No. of hours  0.0011*** 0.0009*** 0.0017** 
mother is working  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) 
    
Mother works 0-10h -0.020* -0.014 -0.025 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.031) 
Mother works 11-20h -0.015 -0.012 -0.008 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.020) 
Mother works 31-40h 0.009 0.004 0.031* 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) 
Mother works >40h 0.041** 0.038** 0.043 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.038) 
n 42,927 40,894 8,889 
2-child families    
    
Mother works full-time  0.028** 0.021* 0.036 
(>30h per week) (0.011) (0.011) (0.028) 
    
Mother works part-time  0.021* 0.019 -0.013 
(21 – 30h per week) (0.012) (0.012) (0.029) 
    
No. of hours  0.0012*** 0.0008** 0.0011 
mother is working  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0011) 
    
Mother works 0-10h -0.033** -0.027* 0.020 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.050) 
Mother works 11-20h -0.018 -0.017 0.011 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.030) 
Mother works 31-40h 0.004 -0.001 0.053* 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.031) 
Mother works >40h 0.002 -0.001 0.022 
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.057) 
n 24,148 23,121 3,662 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All results include 
the full set of control variables. 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 4-6: Correlation between maternal employment and overweight children: 
By birth order 
 
Only  
child  
First- 
born 
Middle- 
born 
Last- 
born 
All families 
    
     
Mother works full-time  0.038*** 0.011 0.030 0.046*** 
(>31h) (0.014) (0.011) (0.023) (0.012) 
     
Mother works part-time  -0.001 0.013 0.037 0.020 
(>20h & <31h) (0.015) (0.014) (0.033) (0.013) 
     
No. of hours  0.0015*** 0.0010** 0.0013* 0.0013*** 
mother is working (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0004) 
     
Mother works 0-10h -0.029 -0.026 -0.051 -0.009 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.036) (0.016) 
Mother works 11-20h 0.003 -0.006 -0.041 -0.025* 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.034) (0.013) 
Mother works 31-40h 0.026* -0.008 -0.021 0.029** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.036) (0.015) 
Mother works >40h 0.079** 0.060* -0.012 0.015 
  (0.033) (0.036) (0.058) (0.027) 
n 11,804 15,347 4,648 20,017 
2-child families     
     
Mother works full-time   0.013  0.044*** 
(>31h)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
     
Mother works part-time   0.017  0.018 
(>20h & <31h)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
     
No. of hours   0.0011**  0.0012*** 
mother is working  (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
     
Mother works 0-10h  -0.034*  -0.021 
  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Mother works 11-20h  -0.009  -0.019 
 
 (0.016)  (0.014) 
Mother works 31-40h  -0.011  0.028* 
   (0.016)  (0.016) 
Mother works >40h  0.052  -0.018 
   (0.039)  (0.028) 
n  12,519  15,291 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All results include 
the full set of control variables, except family characteristics. 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 4-7: Correlation between maternal employment and overweight children: 
By age differences between siblings 
 
Age difference<=3 Age difference>3 Only child 
All families 
   
    
Mother works full-time  0.024** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
(>30h) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
    
Mother works part-time  0.015 0.024 -0.001 
(>20h & <30) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) 
    
No. of hours  0.0009** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 
mother is working (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
    
Mother works 0-10h -0.015 -0.026 -0.029 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) 
Mother works 11-20h -0.016 -0.026 0.003 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) 
Mother works 31-40h 0.005 0.013 0.026* 
  (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) 
Mother works >40h 0.035 0.012 0.079** 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) 
n 24,652 15,360 11,804 
2-child families    
    
Mother works full-time  0.023* 0.037**  
(>31h) (0.013) (0.015)  
    
Mother works part-time  0.006 0.030*  
(>20h & <31) (0.014) (0.018)  
    
No. of hours  0.0009** 0.0013***  
mother is working  (0.0005) (0.0005)  
    
Mother works 0-10h -0.016 -0.040*  
 (0.017) (0.022)  
Mother works 11-20h -0.002 -0.031*  
 (0.015) (0.018)  
Mother works 31-40h 0.016 0.005  
  (0.017) (0.018)  
Mother works >40h 0.028 -0.025  
  (0.034) (0.034)  
n 16,097 11,713  
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All results include 
the full set of control variables, except family characteristics. 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 4-8: Correlation between maternal employment and overweight children: 
By age differences between siblings and by birth order (families with two children) 
 
First- 
born 
Last- 
born 
 
Age 
difference<=3 
Age 
difference>3 
Age 
difference<=3 
Age 
difference>3 
     
Mother works full-time  -0.001 0.037* 0.055*** 0.039** 
(>31h) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
     
Mother works part-time  -0.001 0.049* 0.016 0.022 
(>20h & <32)  (0.019) (0.025) (0.018) (0.022) 
     
No. of hours  0.0004 0.0021*** 0.0016*** 0.0010 
mother is working  (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
     
Mother works 0-10h -0.016 -0.066** -0.020 -0.024 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.022) (0.029) 
Mother works 11-20h 0.010 -0.043* -0.015 -0.027 
 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.018) (0.023) 
Mother works 31-40h -0.004 -0.024 0.041* 0.021 
  (0.020) (0.027) (0.022) (0.023) 
Mother works >40h 0.032 0.078 0.029 -0.060 
  (0.045) (0.070) (0.042) (0.037) 
     
n 7,774 4,745 8,323 6,968 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All results include 
the full set of control variables, except family characteristics. 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Figure 4-1: Percent overweight children by birth order 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Percent overweight children by age difference between siblings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix 4-1: OLS vs. probit results 
  
OLS Probit 
Mother works full-time  0.032*** 0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Mother works part-time  0.012 0.014 
 
(0.008) (0.009) 
Characteristics of the child   
Female -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Age (squared) -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Full-day schools (in state) -0.118* -0.120* 
 (0.066) (0.069) 
Nationality - German 0.001 0.005 
 (0.031) (0.024) 
Nationality - EU 0.025 0.022 
 (0.050) (0.045) 
Schleswig-Holstein 0.006 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Hamburg -0.055** -0.055*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) 
Lower Saxony 0.030** 0.030** 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Bremen -0.026 -0.024 
 (0.023) (0.022) 
Hesse -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Rhineland-Palatinate -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Baden-Wurttemberg -0.025** -0.026** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Bavaria -0.029** -0.029** 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Saarland 0.036 0.033 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Berlin -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Brandenburg 0.026 0.025 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 0.016 0.018 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Saxony 0.016 0.017 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Saxony-Anhalt 0.040*** 0.038** 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Thuringia -0.006 -0.006 
 
(0.018) (0.017) 
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Appendix 4-1: OLS vs. probit results (continued): 
  
OLS Probit 
Characteristics of the mother   
Mother is underweight -0.020* -0.022* 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Mother is overweight 0.065*** 0.067*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Mother is obese 0.109*** 0.114*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Nationality of mother - German -0.069*** -0.071*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Nationality of mother - EU -0.030 -0.021 
 (0.036) (0.028) 
Age of mother 0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Age of mother (squared) 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.001 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
Education of the mother   
Education - very low 0.053*** 0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Education -  low 0.011 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Education - below average -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
   
Job position of the mother   
Blue-collar worker -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.009) (0.008) 
Self-employed -0.017 -0.017 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
White-collar worker -0.015** -0.016** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Civil servant -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Household income (in EUR)   
less than 1300  0.024** 0.022** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
1301-1700 0.014 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
1701-2300 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
2901-4000 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
4001-5000 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
more than 5000 0.005 0.002 
 
(0.012) (0.013) 
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Appendix 4-1: OLS vs. probit results (continued): 
 
OLS Probit 
Family characteristics 
 
 
Number of siblings  0.022** 0.020* 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Number of siblings (squared) -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Age difference 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Age difference (squared) -(0.001)*** -(0.001)*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Only child 0.318** 0.429** 
 (0.146) (0.207) 
Middle-born children 0.014 0.016 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Last-born children 0.044*** 0.046*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
n 51,816 51,816 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Micro Census 1999, 2003 and 2005, own calculations. 
 
 
 
